HLSS498: Intelligence Issues.

Discussion Questions: During our studies of Intelligence Issues, we became aware of several topics that surfaced repeatedly in our course readings and studies. Consider which ones were the most prevalent and focus on three and share your thoughts. For each, at a minimum, individually discuss What is it? Why is it a recurring issue? How does it affect the security of our nation? How could we solve it?

https://axeligence.com/humint-understanding-human-…

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20…

Intelligence and National Security
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fint20
The FBI and foreign intelligence in the domestic
setting
Darren E. Tromblay
To cite this article: Darren E. Tromblay (2023) The FBI and foreign intelligence
in the domestic setting, Intelligence and National Security, 38:7, 1055-1074, DOI:
10.1080/02684527.2023.2202074
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2202074
Published online: 19 Apr 2023.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 621
View related articles
View Crossmark data
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fint20
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
2023, VOL. 38, NO. 7, 1055–1074
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2202074
The FBI and foreign intelligence in the domestic setting
Darren E. Tromblay
ABSTRACT
ARTICLE HISTORY
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the United States’ primary
domestically-oriented intelligence service. Opportunities for the collec­
tion of foreign intelligence exist within the United States. Two narratives
regarding foreign intelligence collection run through the primary source
record of Bureau history. The first narrative is that foreign intelligence
information is a byproduct of the Bureau’s reactive investigations of
threats to national security and the second is that the Bureau has
exploited opportunities to develop foreign intelligence as a distinct objec­
tive. This latter narrative is supported by a lengthy legacy of activities
directed at gathering foreign intelligence and at facilitating the collection
of foreign intelligence by other agencies. Identifying and selecting
a narrative of foreign intelligence collection will help the Bureau to
incorporate this consideration into its future evolution.
Received 18 December 2022
Accepted 2 April 2023
Introduction
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been an integral participant in the United States’
evolving approach to intelligence. Until the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (he immediate
predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)) following the end of World War II, the FBI was
the United States’ sole civilian intelligence service responsible for the collection of foreign intelli­
gence. When the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA the legislation demarcated areas of
functional responsibility – walling off police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security
functions from the CIA – but left the concept of foreign intelligence largely undefined (and clear
assignment of responsibilities for its collection incomplete).
Foreign intelligence is not limited to information located abroad where it is usually the domain of
the CIA. It is also often present within the domestic setting due to multiple factors. Foreign
government officials, located in the United States at diplomatic establishments in Washington,
New York, and elsewhere have access to valuable intelligence about their governments’ plans and
objectives. Furthermore, US residents who travel abroad are sometimes positioned to obtain
information of significance. By virtue of their geographic reality, these sources of information are
within the bailiwick of the FBI.
Two narratives regarding foreign intelligence collection run through the primary source record of
Bureau history, which this article interrogates. These narratives, which seem to compete within the
FBI’s internal documents across multiple decades, are that the Bureau collects foreign intelligence
information as a byproduct of its reactive investigations and alternately that the FBI specifically
exploits opportunities to develop foreign intelligence as a dedicated objective. The FBI’s relationship
with the mission of collecting foreign intelligence remains unclear, which allows competing narra­
tives to maintain their own momentum. Clarification and ratification of this relationship would help
the Bureau to decisively determine how it should evolve. Clarification and subsequent evolution
CONTACT Darren E. Tromblay
tromblay@gwu.ed
© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
1056
D. E. TROMBLAY
would contribute to the broader U.S. intelligence enterprise and ultimately the policymaking
apparatus.
The Bureau’s historical record demonstrates a willingness and capability, at times, to accept the
mission of collecting foreign intelligence present in the domestic setting. The declassified record
illustrates efforts to provide US decisionmakers with an informational advantage against targets
including the Soviet Union and China. Its history vis-à-vis the CIA demonstrates that it considered
itself to function as a coordinator of foreign intelligence collection domestically.
However, the FBI has not always been ideally structured to fully exploit opportunities within its
area of responsibility. The Bureau’s reactive missions, especially counterintelligence/counterespio­
nage have at times narrowed the lens through which the FBI assesses the intelligence present in the
domestic setting. A recurring theme is that foreign intelligence is a byproduct, rather than an
objective, of the Bureau’s work. This is problematic when viewed against the status of the FBI, as
the United States’ primary domestic intelligence service. The Bureau should be fully cognizant of and
systematically exploiting domestically available foreign intelligence information beyond what it
happens to unearth in the course of specific investigations.
The post-9/11 FBI has taken steps to fulfill its role as a collector of domestically-available foreign
intelligence. Specifically, under then-Director Robert Mueller III, it established the Foreign
Intelligence Collection Program. It can take measures to further build the foreign intelligence mission
into is operations. The Threat Review and Prioritization process, which guides how the Bureau
allocates resources, should incorporate foreign intelligence requirements into its considerations.
Additionally, the FBI, as the agency responsible for the Director of National Intelligence’s domestic
representative program, should ensure that it is using this position to coordinate interagency
exploitation of opportunities to derive foreign intelligence domestically.
What this article is not is an evaluation, within the interagency context, of how effective the FBI
has been in the field of collecting foreign intelligence domestically. The existing, declassified
historical record is thin in this respect. Certainly, FBI involvement with the development of intelli­
gence estimates during the Cold War as well as correspondence between the FBI and CIA regarding
the SOLO operation suggest that it was adding value. However, determining effectiveness is largely
beyond the scope of this article, which seeks to establish the existence of a throughline regarding
foreign intelligence collection in the Bureau’s history, a necessary precursor to any assessment of the
collection’s value.
Literature on the FBI’s contribution to U.S. collection of foreign intelligence is limited. Much of the
existing work focuses on the collection of information meant to disrupt specific national securityrelated threats (e.g., terrorism, foreign intelligence services). Foreign intelligence serves different
customers – other U.S. government intelligence services and U.S. policymakers – rather than the
Bureau’s immediate mission sets.
A few authors have written about specific operations and programs that produced foreign
intelligence information. John Barron’s Operation SOLO, for instance, acknowledges the strategic
significance of a counterintelligence operation.1 Raymond Batvinis addressed the FBI’s Special
Intelligence Service (SIS) which operated through Latin America from 1940 until 1947 and, which,
among other functions, serviced other U.S. government agencies’ intelligence requirements.2
However, as Tromblay highlights, the SIS was dismantled ultimately absorbed into the CIA.3
Furthermore, Batvinis’ scholarship focuses on what the FBI could accomplish abroad, while this
article addresses the FBI’s ability to develop information of foreign intelligence value domestically.
The literature on the FBI’s domestic activities fall into two broad categories – neither of which
gives attention to foreign intelligence information. Accounts of intelligence operations – such as
those excellently written by David Wise – focus on the dynamics of spy-versus-spy rather than
examining the intelligence take.4 The other category of literature is the critical vein, such as the work
of Athan Theoharis, who are critics of the tradeoffs between the Bureau’s work in the field of national
security and American democracy.5 More recently, Beverly Gage, in her biography of J. Edgar Hoover,
made a similar argument, insisting that the FBI used its national security mission to impose norms on
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1057
American society.6 While these arguments are valuable discourse, they focus on the impact, rather
than the intelligence outcome, of the FBI’s actions.
Origins of the FBI’s role as a collector of domestically available foreign intelligence
The FBI was present at the creation of the United States intelligence community (IC). On
26 June 1939, then-US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) indicated that investigations of all
espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters should be handled through a coordinated
effort of the FBI, the Military Intelligence Division, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.7 This group
could be viewed as an IC predecessor. FDR further strengthened the FBI’s role as an intelligence
service on 6 September 1939 when he designated the Department of Justice and the Bureau as
responsible for all investigative work relating to espionage, sabotage, and the neutrality violations.8
While these functions were reactive in nature, they represented the extent to which the United
States was willing to go in establishing an intelligence enterprise. Therefore, FDR’s instructions were
empowering rather than limiting, as they put the FBI at the forefront of the United States’ approach
to intelligence.
How the United States conceptualized intelligence evolved with its experience of World War II.
During the war, the Bureau – specifically its Special Intelligence Service (SIS) – functioned as the
United States’ sole civilian intelligence service abroad.9 This progression again put the FBI in a role of
leading the United States’ formulation of its approach to intelligence. The SIS serviced intelligence
requirements from other US government agencies.10 By doing this, the Bureau, by providing foreign
intelligence, contributed to the United States’ development of an informational advantage. Not
unrealistically, Hoover, in 1946, was displeased by indicators that the United States would establish
a service that would supplant the FBI abroad. In September he wrote, regarding the impending
relinquishment of the SIS to the Central Intelligence Group (the immediate predecessor to the CIA)
‘the powers that be think it practical to divide domestic & foreign intelligence. Such a move will
create a “Pearl Harbor”’.11 The FBI’s role as the primary driver of US civilian intelligence development
was coming to an end.
During the war, the Bureau, within the United States, had explored avenues for providing US
decision-makers with an informational advantage, going beyond the investigative function of
counterintelligence, counterespionage, and counterterrorism (as sabotage would be characterized
today). In 1942, an FBI communication directed to Hoover indicated that the Bureau had received
a request to develop confidential informants from among the foreign sales representatives, of the
American industries in enemy, occupied, and neutral countries, who had been recalled to the United
States,12 The information which these sales representatives had acquired in their travels was of
potential value to the US national defense program.13 According to the communication, the FBI
would be in a position to ‘continue to keep the United States informed of the war preparation
activities of foreign powers after [World War II had] ended’.14 The Bureau also indicated that it
intended to protect its intelligence role from competing US agencies. After learning that the Office of
Strategic Services was attempting to burgle the Spanish embassy in Washington, DC, to obtain
codes, the FBI disrupted this operation and warned the OSS that the latter agency had no authority
to engage in such activities.15 This contretemps further strengthened the FBI’s role as the primary
collector of foreign intelligence domestically when FDR intervened and affirmed that the Bureau
would have sole responsibility for embassy break-ins (but would have to share the take with the
OSS).16 These collection activities of foreign intelligence information were a domestic corollary to the
Bureau’s efforts abroad.
The reorganization of US intelligence in 1947 did not remove the function of domestically
collecting foreign intelligence from the FBI. Rather than giving the CIA sole responsibility for the
collection of foreign intelligence, the National Security Act invested the Agency with responsibility
for ‘coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies’.
The Act also protected a role for the FBI in several ways. According to the Act the CIA was denied
1058
D. E. TROMBLAY
‘police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions’. Additionally, the Act
incorporated the FBI into the US intelligence architecture by noting that ‘upon the written request
of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make
available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination as may be essential to the national security’. These measures placed limits on the
Bureau but did not challenge the FBI’s role as a collector of foreign intelligence present domestically.
Defining foreign intelligence
The National Security Act of 1947 focused on jurisdictions but afforded almost no space to defining
foreign intelligence. When surveying the potential for developing an informational advantage from
developments in the domestic landscape, the FBI used the term ‘positive intelligence’ to describe
what would later be defined by the US government as foreign intelligence. According to a 1966,
Bureau-prepared outline of FBI – CIA relations, the FBI noted that ‘positive intelligence’ is ‘informa­
tion relating to national security and concerning other countries where such information is signifi­
cant to our Government development and execution of plans, policies, and courses of action. Such
intelligence can be divided into various strategies, such as economic, military, scientific, political
geographic et cetera’.17 The Bureau differentiated positive intelligence from counterintelligence,
which it described as ‘primarily designed to penetrate, monitor, neutralize and/or disrupt the foreign
intelligence security services’.18
Approximately a decade after the FBI had articulated these definitions, the White House estab­
lished similar concepts in Executive Order 11,905, which defined ‘foreign intelligence’ as ‘informa­
tion, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign
powers, organizations or their agents’.19 Executive Order 12,333, which remains in effect, defines
foreign intelligence similarly as ‘information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of
foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for the
information on international terrorist activities’.20 This process of definition has shaped the FBI’s
approach to foreign intelligence, most notably by informing the succession of Attorney General
guidelines for the Bureau, including the 2008 Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations which defines
foreign intelligence as ‘[i]nformation relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations and foreign persons, or international
terrorists’21
Evolution of the FBI’s post-1947 domestically-oriented collection of foreign
intelligence
Operations of the FBI after 1947 indicate that the Bureau did not relinquish its role as a collector of
foreign intelligence present domestically. The intelligence cycle – specifically the requirements,
collection, and dissemination phases – is a useful lens through which to understand the FBI’s foreign
intelligence collection activities. In its setting of requirements, the Bureau demonstrated that it
intentionally assumed the role of foreign intelligence collector on behalf of decisionmakers beyond
the Bureau. Intelligence collection included targets of interest due to the possibility that they would
enhance the United States’ informational advantage. Finally, dissemination to policymakers and
other elements of the intelligence community elicited responses which confirmed the value of the
FBI as a collector of foreign intelligence and called on the Bureau to continue pursuing this
collection.
Answering requirements
The long-running SOLO operation provides multiple insights into the FBI’s formulation of intelli­
gence requirements directed at obtaining foreign intelligence information. SOLO was the code-
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1059
name for the FBI’s effort to control the official liaison representation between the Communist Party,
USA (CPUSA) and the Soviet Union.22 By 1963, the FBI had expanded the scope of SOLO to include
the covert liaison activities of the operation’s informants and communist parties around the world.23
Although SOLO was international in scope it utilized informants who were based in the United States
and thus fell solidly in the FBI’s area of responsibility. However, the Bureau was cognizant that SOLO
could produce information of use to customers beyond the FBI. The FBI did not directly approach
other agencies to solicit requirements which their SOLO source could address since there was ‘a
strong possibility that any discussion’ could jeopardize the source’s security.24 Instead, it relied on its
representation on high-level intelligence committees as well as its expertise developed through
Soviet and Chinese matters to ‘ascertain the specific targets which are of foremost interest to the
United States Government’.25
Coordination was imperfect. For instance, the FBI, although it took other agencies’ interests into
consideration, opted not to advise either the CIA or the State Department about one SOLO
informant’s plans for travel to the Soviet Union in early 1959.26 This would later cause some
consternation within the Bureau. In a 1971 memo, an FBI official expressed concern that if the CIA
became cognizant of the SOLO operation, it could accuse the Bureau of ‘failure to coordinate’.27 The
FBI official noted that the CIA could place ‘special emphasis’ on SOLO because it had ‘many highlevel foreign ramifications’.28
Requirements for the informants became increasingly detailed with successive missions. In 1958,
anticipating the travel of one SOLO informant to the Soviet Union, the Bureau assessed that the
informant should be briefed regarding topics of interest to the Bureau including the manner in
which Soviet Union directs and controls other communist parties throughout world and any
indication regarding Soviet plans for future aggression either against United States or in other
parts of world.29 By the time the third SOLO mission was in the planning stage, the Bureau assessed
that there were ‘certain general objectives or targets which [could] be given to the informant
involving matters of interest to the Bureau and the U.S. Government’ which were distributed across
two categories: matters relating to the CPUSA and matters relating to international affairs.30
This second category is significant from a foreign intelligence perspective. It appears to be the
finalization of an earlier proposal for the SOLO operation to obtain ‘national intelligence’ which was
information relevant to ‘formulating national security policy of the U.S’.31
FBI requirements directly addressed foreign powers’ perceptions of US activities and sought to
elicit information of value to policymakers interacting with those foreign powers. One area of
interest, which the FBI articulated in a mid-1959 communication, was the USSR’s positions on
Berlin and Germany, specifically possible concessions that the Soviets would be willing to make
for a summit meeting.32 A December Bureau communication elaborated on the interest in the
Soviets’ ‘current stand on the Berlin situation’ and what the USSR hoped to gain – and what it
would be willing to concede – during the forthcoming series of summit conferences.33 In late 1960,
FBI requirements included the question of whether, if a summit conference did not materialize as
a result of Khrushchev’s presence at the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviets would
nevertheless advocate for a summit meeting.34 Would the Soviets, the FBI wondered, push for
a summit before or after the 1960 US presidential election?35 Following the inauguration of thenPresident John F. Kennedy, the FBI continued to pursue intelligence on Soviet summitry intentions.
A mid-1961 Bureau communication sought reactions and evaluation of recent conferences between
Kennedy and Khrushchev as well as information on Khrushchev’s plans to meet with Kennedy in the
future or to invite the President to Russia.36
Relatedly, Bureau taskings sought to help policymakers better understand how foreign powers
would react to US actions. A late 1959 Bureau communication indicated interest in the reaction of
the Soviets, Czechoslovakia, and the PRC to then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s trip to Asia and
Europe.37 Then, in mid-1960, the FBI sought information about the Cuban reaction to Eisenhower’s
visit to certain Latin American countries.38 In addition to visits by officials, the Bureau sought to take
the temperature of the Soviets regarding the Peace Corps. In mid-1961, the FBI formulated
1060
D. E. TROMBLAY
requirements which focused on reactions to the Peace Corps, specifically whether the Soviet Union
perceived it as a serious threat to the spread of communism and, if so, what Moscow intended to do
to counter it.39
Finally, a review of the requirements that the FBI levied on the SOLO informant indicate that the
FBI viewed the operation as benefitting US decision-makers’ informational advantage vis a vis
geopolitical developments which were of interest to the United States. Consistent with the desire
to prevent another Pearl Harbor, a driving motivator for the creation of the IC, the Bureau used the
SOLO operation imminent Soviet or Chinese aggression.40 Sino – Soviet tensions were also a topic
toward which the FBI guided its SOLO informants.41 Additionally, the FBI indicated a desire for the
SOLO informants to develop information regarding Soviet and Chinese activities in the Western
Hemisphere.42 Finally, the FBI directed its SOLO operation toward developing information about the
internal political dynamics of both the Soviet Union and China.43
The FBI perceived value in its use of intelligence requirements to orient its informants toward
information of value to US decision-makers. A Bureau communication, remarking on the success of
the third SOLO mission, the first one that the FBI had preceded by developing a detailed set of
requirements, noted that the ‘tremendous success’ was ‘due to a large measure to the Bureau’s
decision to prepare specific targets or missions for their informant to accomplish during this trip to
the Soviet Union and Red China’.44 A late 1960 Bureau communication made a similar observation,
noting that ‘[p]rior to the informant’s departure on each mission, the Seat of Government prepared
specific targets for the informant which were in a large measure responsible for the outstanding
success achieved’.45
The Bureau viewed itself as responsive to collection requirements originating from elsewhere
within the US government. In a 1966 communication to its field offices, the FBI acknowledged that ‘[i]
n actual practice, the Bureau is required by the President and other agencies to develop information
of a positive intelligence nature’.46According to a 1970 FBI communication, the Bureau regularly
received copies of the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) from the CIA.47 These lists set forth
the positive intelligence priorities and requirements of IC members.48 (For context, according to the
CIA, the CIRL was provided to its stations only for reference and that its contents did not constitute
collection requirements for CIA operations.49) Supervisors at FBI headquarters reviewed the lists and
furnished them to interested field offices.50
The FBI, more than four decades later, continued to look at policymakers’ needs to develop
collection requirements. In 2004, the Bureau advised Congress that the National Intelligence
Priorities Framework (NIPF) was the foundation for the FBI’s development of intelligence require­
ments process.51 According to Intelligence Community Directive 204, the NIPF is ‘the [Director of
National Intelligence’s] sole mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities and reflects
intelligence topics, pertaining to countries and non-state actors, approved by the President.52 As of
FY 2009, the FBI was the primary or supporting collector on 98 of the topics associated with the
NIPF.53 The FBI stated that it
overlays on the NIPF the investigative priorities assigned to [the Bureau] in order to ensure that intelligence
requirements for which the FBI is both the primary intelligence agency and the lead operational entity are
adequately reflected in [the Bureau’s] collection taskings.54
In the decade following 9/11 the FBI sought ways to integrate itself with the broader intelligence
community to ensure that the Bureau could exploit its unique area of responsibility to address
collection requirements. The FBI’s Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Unit was
the single point of entry for all information requests and represented the FBI on the Director of
Central Intelligence National Intelligence Collection Board and ensures that IC taskings were passed
to FBI field offices.55 Subsequently, in 2007, the FBI advised Congress that it was participating in the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Integrated Collection and Analysis Requirements
System, a project in development that would link information requirements to collection and tasking
and intelligence production.56
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1061
Collection
FBI operations, as it took on intelligence responsibilities during World War II, presaged the variety of
vectors through which it would pursue foreign intelligence on domestic soil. Foreign presences – in
the form of diplomatic establishments – on US soil provided the most obvious targets for exploita­
tion. Coverage of these establishments could provide advance notice of foreign governments’
intentions vis-à-vis the United States. If acquired in a timely manner, this information could afford
an informational advantage to policymakers engaging these governments. Additionally, nondiplomatic foreign nationals who traveled to the United States – and Americans traveling abroad –
also presented opportunities to gather information on foreign countries. This was particularly
valuable when a country – such as China – did not have a diplomatic presence in the United States.
The presence of foreign diplomatic establishments within the United States gave the Bureau
unique opportunities to glean insights about foreign governments’ activities. According to a 1966
FBI communication, the Bureau, for many years ‘has had a continuing program of developing sources
in diplomatic installations’ which, in addition to furthering Bureau counterintelligence activities, also
worked toward ‘developing positive intelligence information which might assist the Government in
formulating policy’.57 Specifically, the Bureau acknowledged that it gained access to the official
establishments of the Soviet Union in order to develop ‘positive intelligence regarding their
intentions’.58 Additionally, according to a 1966 FBI communication, the Bureau obtained ‘valuable
intelligence’, which it distributed to other elements of the US government, including the White
House, through the use of live informants as well as technical surveillances on non-Soviet bloc
countries’ diplomatic establishments.59
The FBI was also interested in the information which US-based individuals, beyond diplomatic
establishments, could provide. In 1965, for instance, a Bureau official suggested the need to broaden
its definition informant to include individuals in the field of foreign intelligence, due to the FBI’s
increased responsibilities in the field.60 Of particular concern to the official was ‘[t]he current political
and social turmoil in Central and South America and the efforts of Communist China and the Soviet
Union to destroy the influence of the United States and enhance their own standing’ which
prompted the fear of a communist takeover in Latin American countries similar to what had occurred
in Cuba.61 The FBI official believed that the ‘White House and other Government agencies are looking
to the Bureau more now than ever before to develop . . . . positive, high quality intelligence
information . . . This new responsibility requires [the Bureau] to take a fresh look at the types of
sources [it is] to develop’.62 Especially interesting were individuals participating in the activities of
exile groups, persons engaged in export-import businesses, and those engaged in gathering news
for foreign language media.63 In late 1965, it was recommended and approved that the concept of
an informant be broadened to include ‘a class of individuals in the foreign intelligence field which
[the FBI was] developing as sources in connection with [the FBI’s] increased responsibilities in this
field’.64
A focus on non-diplomatic sources was apparent in the Bureau’s collection against China prior to
1979. By the late 1960s, the FBI had acknowledged a need to develop ‘positive intelligence’ relating
to Chinese matters.65 Due to a lack of diplomatic relations with Beijing, China did not have an
embassy in the United States. Therefore, it made sense that the FBI would have to resort to other
measures. The FBI initiated two programs – Chinese Aliens Entering the U.S. and Chinese Entering
the U.S. Claiming U.S. Citizenship – in 1965, which, in addition to serving a counterintelligence
purpose, also furnished ‘positive intelligence of interest to other U.S. agencies’.66 Additionally,
according to a 1971 inspection report, the FBI viewed the increased travel by U.S. citizens to the
PRC as an opportunity to gather positive intelligence.67
Under Director William Webster, the FBI continued to perceive itself as a collector of foreign
intelligence information. In 1978, Webster made clear that ‘the FBI [was] designated the agency to
collect [foreign intelligence] information from U.S. persons within the United States’.68 In 1980,
Webster noted that the Bureau had upgraded its analytical capability in part to improve the
1062
D. E. TROMBLAY
production and dissemination of foreign intelligence.69 Webster was also cognizant of how the
Bureau’s other work could yield foreign intelligence insights. In 1980 he advised Congress that
identifying a foreign intelligence service’s targeting of an individual ‘tells us something about the
interest of the foreign service particularly in technology. And may give us some very strong
indications of weaknesses of the foreign power that has tasked this effort’.70
Foreign intelligence collection became a formal aspect of the FBI’s post 9/11 collection activities.
In May 2006, the Director of National Intelligence instructed the Bureau to collect foreign intelligence
against the NIPF and pursuant to the National HUMINT Collection Directives.71 The FBI responded to
this by establishing a dedicated Foreign Intelligence Collection Program.72 Prior to the creation of
the FICP, the Bureau, according to its 2009 budget request, did not have any concerted efforts to
collect FI exclusively.73 As the FBI advised Congress in 2009, the Bureau ‘must acquire the capacity to
establish and carry out a positive foreign intelligence collection and reporting effort that allows the
FBI to be responsive to taskings received by the [DNI]’.74While the FBI had collected foreign
intelligence for decades, this was the first time that it would have a component focused solely on
foreign intelligence.75
Dissemination
The process of dissemination affirms the FBI’s role as a collector of foreign intelligence in two ways.
First, the feedback from policymakers serves as an endorsement of Bureau efforts. The feedback
leads to the second affirmation of Bureau activities: the development of requirements that drive
further collection.
Policymakers navigating long-term Cold War conundrums benefitted from the FBI’s foreign
intelligence collection. For instance, an informant participating in the SOLO operation persuaded
the Soviets to allow the informant to review an 84-page secret Soviet document dealing with the
ideological dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist
Party of China.76 The informant was able to make a 34-page summary of the document, which the US
Department of State officials assessed to be ‘the most important single item the FBI had ever
disseminated to the Department of State’.77 Additionally, the Bureau disseminated SOLO informa­
tion, of ‘extreme value’, to the White House on relations between the USSR and the PRC.78
Additionally, the Bureau was positioned to furnish information which could help policymakers to
deal with rapidly evolving crises. An FBI communication noted that the Middle East crisis, precipi­
tated by Israel’s invasion of Egypt and the English and French occupation of Suez ‘created definite
challenges for [Bureau] supervisors handling the work’.79 An agent, who was ‘thoroughly conversant
with Israeli matters’ in a supervisory role at FBI headquarters facilitated the ‘immediate dissemination
of intelligence data collected through Bureau sources and informants’.80 In recognition, the US
Department of State commented in writing, on multiple occasions, regarding the effectiveness of the
FBI’s intelligence coverage.81
The Middle East was not unknown territory to the FBI. Since the late 1940s, the Bureau had been
interested in Israel since the late 1940s. According to a 1949 FBI communication ‘[t]he seeking of
world power recognition by the Israeli government has . . . invaded the Bureau’s investigative field
due to the behind the scenes manipulations of the Zionist movement’.82 The Bureau assessed ‘some
of these moves have been closely akin to internal security problems faced by the Bureau and have
involved highly placed U.S. Government personnel’.83 Furthermore, the FBI was interested in the
support that the Israeli government was receiving from the Soviet Union and satellite nations.84
Several years later, an FBI communication indicated that investigations with a nexus to Israel
involved the leakage of classified information to the Israeli government.85 Additionally, at least
one FBI agent at headquarters was handling Israeli-related matters also worked on espionage cases
of an Egyptian origin.86 This familiarity, albeit largely from a counterintelligence perspective, was
almost certainly of value when the FBI had to exploit its coverage for data of foreign intelligence
significance.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1063
Formulation of requirements
Policymakers did not simply accept FBI collection of foreign intelligence as a byproduct of opera­
tions. Rather, there are multiple indicators, that they expected to Bureau to actively produce such
information. In 1966, the Bureau advised its field offices that it was ‘required by the President and
other agencies to develop information of a positive intelligence nature’.87
A 1971 inspection of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence Division noted,
[t]he President has noted the paucity of positive intelligence information available to him for high-level policy
decisions. We have recognized our responsibilities in this area through intensified coverage . . . as illustrated in
the increase of establishments being afforded sensitive coverage and through the increase of our live informant
coverage targeted against the nations involved.88
Furthermore, according to a 1974 inspection of the FBI Intelligence Division (the successor to the
DID), the ‘[President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board] has recently advised that the Board feels
the FBI should be placing more emphasis on positive intelligence collection in the United States’.89
Executive Order 11,905 on United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, issued in February 1976,
further confirmed the role of the FBI in the field of foreign intelligence. Specifically, the Bureau would
conduct within the United States and its territories, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community
designated by the President, those lawful activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized by the
President and specifically approved by the Attorney General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelligence
collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.90
EO 11,905 further authorized the FBI to ‘[c]ollect foreign intelligence by lawful means within the
United States and its territories when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community desig­
nated by the President to make such requests’.91 Finally, EO 11,905 authorized the FBI to disseminate
foreign intelligence information to appropriate federal agencies, state and local law enforcement
agencies, and cooperating foreign governments.92
The next step toward formalizing the Bureau’s role as a collector of foreign intelligence was the
establishment of the first Attorney General (AG) guidelines for foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence. Issued in May 1976, in the context of EO 11,905 which preceded them by
a matter of months, these guidelines defined foreign intelligence as information concerning the
capabilities, intentions, and activities of any foreign power relevant to the national security or to the
conduct of foreign affairs of the United States.93
Executive Order 12,333, issued in December 1981, became a cornerstone document for the
U.S. intelligence community and further reinforces the themes articulated in EO 11,905 and the AG
guidelines. Specifically, EO 12,333 authorizes the Bureau to ‘[c]onduct within the United States, when
requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities under­
taken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other
agencies within the Intelligence Community’ and to produce and disseminate foreign intelligence.94
Subsequent iterations of AG guidelines further confirmed the FBI’s foreign intelligence role.
The 1995 Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations authorized the FBI to collect foreign intelligence in response
to requirements of topic interest published by the National Foreign Intelligence Board or its
successor; upon a request by an official of the Intelligence Community designated by the
President; to clarify or complete foreign intelligence previously disseminated by the FBI; and,
when approved by the Attorney General; and in response to tasking specifically levied on the FBI
by an official of the Intelligence Community designated by the President.95 In 2003, the Attorney
General issued Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
Collection. These guidelines explicitly justified the Bureau’s foreign intelligence activities, stating
that ‘[t]his role is frequently critical in collecting foreign intelligence within the United States
because the authorized domestic activities of other intelligence agencies are more constrained
than those of the FBI’.96 The guidelines go on to authorize the FBI’s collection of foreign
1064
D. E. TROMBLAY
intelligence ‘in response to requirements of topic interest published by an entity authorized by
the Director of Central Intelligence to establish such requirements, including but not limited to,
the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center’.97 Furthermore, when approved by the AG,
the FBI may provide ‘operational support’ to authorized intelligence activities of other entities of
the IC upon a request made or confirmed in writing by an official of the IC designated by the
President.98 The request shall describe the type and duration of support required, the reason why
the FBI is being requested to furnish the assistance, and the techniques that are expected to be
utilized, and shall certify that such assistance is necessary to an authorized activity of the
requesting entity’.99 Then, in late 2006, the Attorney General issued Supplemental Guidelines
for Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence which facilitated the FBI’s
response to the DNI’s tasking of the FBI to develop foreign intelligence.100
In 2008, the AG issued Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, which took a new approach than
previous iterations. These were consistent with the updated version of EO12333 which explicitly
invested the Bureau with the responsibility to ‘coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign
intelligence collected through human sources, or through human-enabled means and counter­
intelligence activities inside the United States’.101 As the new guidelines noted, ‘the principal
directives of the Attorney General governing the FBI’s conduct of criminal investigations, national
security investigations, and foreign intelligence collection have persisted as separate documents
involving different standards and procedures for comparable activities. These Guidelines effect
a more complete integration and harmonization of standards’.102 The new guidelines articulated
the FBI’s foreign intelligence role in no uncertain terms, defining the FBI’s role as ‘the primary
collector of foreign intelligence within the United States’ and extended the sphere of the FBI’s
information gathering activities beyond federal crimes and threats to the national security to ‘seek
information regarding a broader range of matters relating to foreign powers, organizations, or
persons that may be of interest to the conduct of the United States’ foreign affairs’.103 According
to the guidelines the FBI would be guided by nationally-determined intelligence requirements,
including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the National HUMINT Collection
Directives.104
The FBI, in its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), explained how it would
interpret and implement the AG’s guidance. The DIOG defines a Foreign Intelligence Requirement as
a collection requirement issued under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence and
accepted by the FBI Directorate of Intelligence.105 Additionally, the President, an IC office designated
by the President, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or other designated Department of
Justice official may levy a Foreign Intelligence Requirement on the FBI.106 Foreign Intelligence
Requirements, according to the FBI fall into one of two categories: the first is those that address
national security issues within the FBI’s core national security; the second is information relating to
the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign orga­
nizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists which are not within the FBI’s core national
security mission.107 The FBI refers to requirements derived from the second category as Positive
Foreign Intelligence Requirements.108 A full investigation to collect positive foreign intelligence is
appropriate when a DNI-authorized requirement exists for a particular issue and that requirement
has been accepted by the DI at FBI headquarters.109
Assistance to the intelligence community
Since it is positioned to collect information at the behest of other US intelligence community
members, the FBI’s foreign intelligence customers are not limited to policymakers but, rather, also
include other IC members endeavoring to serve policymakers. This dates at least to the National
Security Act of 1947, which put the Bureau at the disposal of the DCI. In furtherance of assisting other
elements of the IC, the Bureau has provided foreign intelligence derived through HUMINT collection
and also apparently facilitated signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. The reactions of the agencies
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1065
served by the Bureau’s activities attest to the value that FBI foreign intelligence collection has
contributed.
IC members’ endorsement of collection
IC agencies responsible for developing assessments, approving commented on FBI-collected intelli­
gence.The SOLO operation elicited a succession of positive responses from the IC. In late 1959, thenDCI Allen Dulles referred to the SOLO information as ‘terrific’ and found remarks by PRC officials
reported by one of the SOLO informants to be especially helpful in helping to understand the Soviet
Union’s line of peaceful coexistence (a position which hastened the break between the PRC and the
USSR).110 A decade later, the SOLO operation continued to contribute to the IC’s understanding of
the Sino – Soviet split. According to a 1969 FBI communication, one of the SOLO informants had
developed information regarding the dispute which the IC considered to be ‘extremely important’
since it substantiated information, regarding Soviet intentions, which had come from other
sources.111
There are also indicators that the FBI contributed intelligence to IC components gained from
collection against foreign establishments located in the United States to IC counterparts. A 1966
inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division noted that ‘valuable intelligence regarding various
non-Soviet bloc countries’ was obtained through live informants and 27 technical surveillances on
diplomatic establishments.112 The FBI disseminated this information ‘widely’ to the intelligence
community.113
It is worth noting that interagency rivalry – playing out in the FBI being the to one-up the CIA –
may have provided additional impetus to the Bureau’s collection of foreign intelligence information.
In 1959, the FBI noted that it had obtained information, through the SOLO operation, regarding
international communism that was not available from other US government entities ‘a fact admitted
by CIA’.114 Then, in early 1961, the Bureau assessed that the ability to expeditiously disseminate
information obtained through the SOLO operation kept the Bureau ‘in the forefront as the out­
standing intelligence agency in the world’.115 During the next year, the FBI characterized the SOLO
operation missions as keeping the Bureau ‘at the pinnacle in the intelligence field in the eyes of the
President, top-level Government officials, and intelligence agencies’.116
Assistance to collection by other agencies’ collection
The FBI did not only collect substantive information on behalf of its IC partners – it also gathered
technical data that would facilitate other agencies’ work. Its work on the ANAGRAM program, to
assist the National Security Agency (NSA) was an example of such activity. ANAGRAM, which the FBI
initiated in 1954, was an effort to penetrate foreign diplomatic establishments in the United States to
obtain cryptographic material.117 (This was not a new function, as the Bureau had assumed a similar
responsibility – to the chagrin of the OSS – during World War II.) The FBI regularly recorded the value
of the take. According to an inspection report from 1960, the DID had provided cryptographic
material which had originated with eight countries and saved the NSA $960,000 in time and labor.118
A 1961 report noted that the cryptographic material obtained by the Bureau was valued at
$408,500.119 In 1962, the FBI noted that the ANAGRAM Program had produced a savings of
$673,321.41 since the previous inspection.120 Then, in 1964, the Bureau reported that the
ANAGRAM, since the last DID inspection, program had produced data valued at $3,340,000.121
Additionally, the FBI and NSA embarked on efforts, apparently distinct from ANAGRM, in the late
1960s. According to an inspection of the DID this consisted of ‘extremely sensitive operations’
undertaken in cooperation with the NSA to enhance the capability for infiltrating the diplomatic
communications of foreign governments.122 The first breakthrough occurred in 1968.123 In late 1970,
the then-acting NSA Director advised the Bureau that this coverage provided information of priority
concern to the NSA which would otherwise be unobtainable by the US government.124 By 1971, the
1066
D. E. TROMBLAY
FBI was conducting six of these operations which were ‘responsive to high national priority require­
ments in the production of cryptanalytic and intelligence data’.125
The FBI, in addition to procuring cryptanalytic material for the NSA also operated technical
collection against foreign government establishments on NSA’s behalf. In 1962, a Bureau commu­
nication noted that, at NSA’s request, the FBI was maintaining coverage of teletype facilities at 17
diplomatic establishments.126 A 1971 Domestic Intelligence Division inspection identified that the
FBI had increased the number of teletype facilities it was covering at NSA’s request to 64 and was
also operating four microphone surveillances on behalf of that agency.127
Role in coordinating collection
Responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence from sources in the domestic setting was
largely undefined by the National Security Act of 1947. The Act not only failed to define foreign
intelligence, it also failed to do more than give the vaguest sense of how the FBI and CIA would
interact when it came to domestic collection. This was a recipe for conflict between the two agencies
which eyed each other distrustfully for almost two decades after the signing of the Act.128 As the FBI
noted, in a 1966 communication to its field offices ‘there is no law, directive, or charter which
authorizes CIA to engage in the clandestine development of positive intelligence sources in the
United States’.129 This created ‘gray areas’ of interest between the two agencies.130
In 1966, the FBI and CIA developed a set of guidelines meant to resolve the simmering issue of
responsibility for collecting foreign intelligence within the domestic setting. These were a refinement
of ‘ground rules’ that the two agencies reached in January 1964.131 As the FBI noted in 1966, both
agencies had an interest in the clandestine development of positive intelligence and there was
a necessity for a ‘clear cut understanding’ of jurisdiction and coordination.132 The guidelines gave the
FBI a function of coordinating domestically-oriented operations. Foremost among these rules was
a provision which made the FBI a gatekeeper for the collection of foreign intelligence, stipulating
that ‘CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the
concurrence and coordination of the FBI’.133 Furthermore, the CIA was to confer with the FBI before
approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor to the United States.134 In
addition, the CIA was supposed to advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset
and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI.135 When
the CIA did handle agents in the United States it was supposed to ‘service FBI security or counter­
intelligence requirements’.136
The arrangement did not allay the FBI’s suspicions about CIA operations domestically.
Commenting on the conference at which the guidelines were developed, Hoover noted ‘I hope
we still don’t let our guard down as CIA has always outsmarted us because of our gullibility’.137
Hoover remarking on the communication to the FBI’s field offices which described the guidelines
observed ‘I hope there is no “sneaker” in this. Time will tell’.138 This skepticism spilled over into how
the FBI communicated the issuance of ground rules to its field offices. In the communication laying
out these rules the Bureau warned offices that ‘[a]lthough we have been informed by CIA that the
Bureau’s jurisdiction and operational interests will not be interfered with, we cannot discount the
results of past experiences stemming from CIA’s operational and organizational deficiencies. We
have no reason to believe there will be a revolutionary change of these conditions’.139
FBI – CIA coordination on foreign intelligence collection continued to evolve after the
development of the 1966 guidelines. According to a 1982 CIA document titled ‘Guidance for
CIA Activities within the United States’, Executive Order 12,333 requires that CIA foreign
intelligence collection activities conducted within the United States be coordinated with the
FBI.140 As of 2004, there was at least some sense in the Bureau that the FBI – CIA relationship
was working well. A Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s New York field office indicated that he
believed the Agency would share information about a source traveling to the United States
but, according to the interviewer, caveated this with ‘you don’t know what you don’t know’.141
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1067
A 2005 CIA – FBI Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) provided updated guidance.142 One
objective was to ensure that the two agencies were not working at cross purposes and had
knowledge of whether their counterpart had already debriefed or recruited a source.143 In
developing the MOU, the FBI initially insisted on controlling all of the CIA’s domestic activities,
including the Agency’s U.S.-based assets.144 Ultimately, the MOU reaffirmed the need for the
CIA to coordinate its operations with the FBI and ensured that the CIA’s domestic component,
known as the National Resources Division, provided the FBI with more information about
operations and debriefings.145 None of this diverged very far from the 1966 agreement (the
need for successive understandings leaves the observer to wonder how well any of these
arrangements were honored).
Challenges and opportunities
Although the FBI has repeatedly demonstrated a unique capacity for collecting foreign intelligence
information domestically, it has, at times, acted diffidently toward this function. Hoover, speaking to
Congress in 1965, provided some insight into the FBI’s thinking, saying ‘our primary responsibility . . .
is a counterintelligence nature. At the same time, however, a great deal of positive intelligence
information is produced from our investigations and sources’.146 A communication to the field, the
following year, similarly characterized foreign intelligence as a byproduct of other work, stating ‘[f]or
many years, the Bureau has had a continuing program of developing sources in diplomatic installa­
tions for the purpose of discharging our counterintelligence responsibilities and incidentally for
developing positive intelligence information which might assist the Government in formulating
policy’.147 Nearly a decade later, a Bureau official noted that one value of counterintelligence was
‘the large amount of straight intelligence obtained as a byproduct by counterintelligence agents in
the normal course of their business’.148 In 1984, then-Director William Webster continued this theme,
telling Congress, ‘in the course of our sensitive investigative techniques in place to develop counter­
intelligence we pick up positive intelligence and that in turn is referred to CIA’.149 By the late 1990s,
even the ability to effectively sift the byproduct of counterintelligence investigations in order to
provide external decisionmakers with an informational advantage was in doubt. As of 1999, there
was no mechanism to ‘systematically mine information collected by FBI programs to determine if any
of it is of national intelligence or foreign policy interest’.150
Even if the FBI had consistently pursued foreign intelligence as an objective, in its own right, it did
not have a collection management apparatus. This meant that, by the late 1990s, FBI programs
currently did not have systematic collection requirements and sources were not routinely debriefed
for information beyond the scope of an immediate investigation.151 In 2000, the FBI attempted to
remedy this deficiency by requesting an analytic enhancement that would allow it to transition from
a system in which collection requirements are derived to fill the needs of individual investigations to
one that facilitated the monitoring and evaluating of collection requirements on a programmatic
and national level.152 However, the introduction of analysts would not necessarily ensure that
foreign intelligence became more than a byproduct. In 1999, Congressional testimony noted that
rather than orienting sources toward foreign intelligence, the analysts would ‘extract the national
foreign intelligence information collected as a byproduct of FBI investigations and process it for
dissemination to policy makers’.153 This perpetuated the approach that treated foreign intelligence
as a byproduct rather than an objective.
The creation of the FBI’s Foreign Intelligence Collection Program (FICP) was an attempt to remedy
these deficiencies. As the Bureau’s 2009 budget justification acknowledged
[p]rior to the establishment of the FICP, the FBI collected FI tangential to its existing cases. There were no
concerted efforts to collect FI exclusively, nor did the FBI have an investigative program that solely focused
intelligence collection activities on FI .154 The FICP existed specifically to remedy this issue. It explicitly treated FI
as an objective, rather than as a byproduct, avoiding duplication with the FBI’s existing counterintelligence and
counterterrorism programs.155
1068
D. E. TROMBLAY
Following the introduction of the FICP, the FBI re-organized how it allocated resources. The Threat
Review and Prioritization Process (TRP), which was the result of the re-organization, had the potential
to enshrine foreign intelligence collection or to cement the treatment of FI as a mere byproduct of
reactive functions such as counterintelligence. In 2010, the Bureau began developing TRP and
introduced it two years later.156 The FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) manages TRP.157 At HQ,
the TRP is used to determine the Bureau’s National Threat Priorities (NTPs).158 Field offices use the
outcomes of the HQ prioritization process to conduct their own iteration of the TRP process to
allocate resources toward NTPs as well as other threat issues.159 As described by the FBI, TRP ‘allows
FBI headquarters to gain an understanding of threats within each field office’s area of responsibility
and the distribution of threats across the domestic landscape’.160 The process is directed at devel­
oping mitigation strategies to counter the identified threats.161
TRP offers both potential and peril, for the FBI’s role in the collection of FI, depending on how the
process is implemented. The DI is positioned to ensure that FI is incorporated into TRP. It is through
the DI that the FBI accepts intelligence requirements authorized by the Director of National
Intelligence.162 Within the DI, the Collection Management Section (CMS) is responsible for FICP
policy and oversight.163 However, TRP is vulnerable to the entrenched view of foreign intelligence as
something that is ancillary to a reactive mission such as counterterrorism or counterintelligence. TRP
has been criticized for not helping the FBI to look over the horizon and to instead emphasize
responses to immediate threat actors and activities. According to the 9/11 Review Commission, TRP
gave ‘little emphasis’ to emerging threats.164 Foreign intelligence provides context for understand­
ing the emergence of new threats, which do not simply appear sui generis. Additionally, furnishing
US policymakers with appropriate foreign intelligence insights can advance the TRP process’s over­
arching objective of threat mitigation, since well-crafted policy can curb existing or emergent threats
at the strategic level.
One of the areas where the Bureau has an opportunity to lead an interagency effort in developing
foreign intelligence is the Domestic Director of National Intelligence Representative (DDNIR) pro­
gram. In 2009, the DNI issued Intelligence Community Directive 402 ‘Director of National Intelligence
Representatives’.165 These Representatives serve as the ‘principal advisors’ to their assigned organi­
zations for Intelligence Community matters; as conduits between the DNI and their assigned
organizations, and as the DNI’s personal representatives to a variety of U.S. and foreign
partners.166 DNI representatives play a significant role in integrating the IC components within
their respective areas of responsibility. Specifically, they are tasked with leading the IC effort to
integrate intelligence support by ‘[a]cquiring, maintaining, and appropriately sharing knowledge of
relevant IC activities, including intelligence or intelligence-related agreements, arrangements or
exchanges’; ‘[e]nsuring active collaboration among IC elements’; ‘[a]assiting IC elements’ represen­
tatives in implementing their responsibilities’; and ‘[e]valuating the quality of IC support, including
recommending to the DNI or his designee modifications to IC mission posture including resources,
priorities, or allocation of IC personnel as appropriate’.167
The FBI furnishes the DDINRs. Circa 2009, the DNI launched a pilot program which would appoint
the heads of four FBI field offices as DNI representatives.168 This coordination function is consistent
with the role outlined for the Bureau in the 1966 agreement with the CIA. In its initial iteration, the
program was scheduled to operate for 18 months.169 The DNI and Director of the FBI (D/FBI) signed
a Memorandum of Agreement, Domestic Director of National Intelligence Representative Program,
in late 2011.170 In February 2012, the DNI officially designated 12 FBI executives – the heads of FBI
offices in Atlanta; Boston; Chicago; Denver; Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New York; Pittsburgh; San
Francisco; Seattle; and Washington, DC – as DDNIRs responsible for 12 geographic regions.171 In late
2012, the DNI amended ICD 402, with the revisions rescinding the 18-month pilot program and
placing the selection of DDNIRs within the formal DNI Representatives framework.172 As described by
the update to ICD 402 ‘[t]he DNI’s representatives for locations inside the U.S. are accountable to the
DNI and D/FBI, or their respective designees’.173 The DDNIRs foster collaboration with the IC
representatives in the DDNIRs’ respective regions of responsibility.174 In 2015, then-Director James
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1069
Comey advised Congress that DDNIRs were ‘working with Intelligence Community partners within
their region to understand the threat picture and develop a more coordinated and integrated
Intelligence Community enterprise’.175 In addition to its bilateral agreements with the CIA, the
DDNIR program positions the Bureau to take responsibility for coordinating activities directed at
exploiting foreign intelligence in the domestic setting. The challenge, as with TRP, is ensuring that
the process does not only focus on threats but also incorporates opportunities to provide decisionmakers with an informational advantage derived from unique opportunities on U.S. soil.
Conclusion
Exploitation of opportunities within the domestic setting can yield foreign intelligence which
provides U.S. decision-makers – both at the policymaking and IC levels – with an informational
advantage. However, the organization of the IC, from its founding onward has created murkiness
about agencies responsibilities. This haziness leads to both the potential for agencies – such as the
CIA – to overstep their mandates, as well as for agencies – such as the FBI at times – from thorough
collection of available intelligence.
As the primary US domestic intelligence service, the FBI is the logical agency to lead collection of
foreign intelligence within the homeland. To accomplish this it should ensure that TRP, or any
successive process of resource allocation, incorporate collection of FI as an objective – rather than
treat it as a byproduct. Additionally, through the DDNIR, the Bureau should lead a coordinated
interagency approach to developing foreign intelligence present in the domestic setting. The ease
with which information crosses borders – both physical and virtual – into the United States creates
an increasing likelihood that data of value will be present domestically and Washington should
ensure that it has the implements in place to identify and obtain it.
Notes
1. Barron. Operation SOLO: The FBI’s Man in the Kremlin.
2. Batvinis. The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence; Batvinis. Hoover’s Secret War against Axis Spies.
3. Tromblay. ‘Inside Out: Domestic Origins of U.S. Foreign Intelligence’.
4. Wise. Cassidy’s Run: The Secret Spy War Over Nerve Gas.
5. Theoharis. The FBI & American Democracy. A Brief Critical History.
6. Gage. G-Man: J. Edgar Hoover and the Making of the American Century.
7. US House of Representatives. Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. Part 1., before the
Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives.
8. Ibid.
9. Tromblay. The FBI Abroad.
10. Federal Bureau of Investigation. History of the SIS Division. Volume 1.
11. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–80750. September 26, 1946.
12. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 66–2542. SA J. M. McGrath to JEH. March 7, 1942.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Waller. Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage.126–127.
16. Ibid. 127.
17. Federal Bureau of Investigation. SAC Letter 66–10. 2-15-66.
18. Ibid.
19. Executive Order 11,905 – United States Foreign Intelligence Activities.
20. Executive Order 12,333 – United States Intelligence Activities.
21. The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations.
22. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–268746. F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont. SOLO; Internal Security;
August 28, 1958.
23. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. SAC Chicago to Director, FBI. Solo; IS-C. 4/17/64.
24. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont. Solo; Internal Security –
C. June 1, 1959.
25. Ibid.
1070
D. E. TROMBLAY
26. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmontl SOLO; CG-5824-S. January 5,
1959.
27. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. Sam J. Papich to The Director. Relations with CIA. March 5, 1970.
28. Ibid.
29. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director FBI to SAC Chicago. SOLO, IS-C. 3/12/58.
30. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director to SAC Chicago. SOLO; Internal Security – C. July 29, 1959.
31. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. S. B. Donahoe to A. H. Belmont. SOLO; Internal Security – C. June 5,
1959.
32. See note above 30.
33. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director to SAC New York. Solo; Internal Security – C. December 23,
1959.
34. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director FBI to SAC Chicago. Solo: Internal Security. September 16,
1960.
35. Ibid.
36. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director, FBI to SAC New York. Solo; Internal Security – C. June 9,
1961.
37. See note above 33.
38. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director to SAC Chicago. Solo; Internal Security – C. April 6, 1960.
39. See note above 36.
40. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director to SAC Chicago. SOLO; Internal Security – C. July 29, 1959;
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. S. B. Donahoe to A. H. Belmont. SOLO; Internal Security – C. June 5,
1959.
41. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. S. B. Donahoe to A. H. Belmont. SOLO; Internal Security – C. June 5,
1959; Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director FBI to SAC Chicago. Solo: Internal Security.
September 16, 1960; Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director, FBI to SAC New York. Solo;
Internal Security – C. June 9, 1961.
42. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director to SAC New York. Solo; Internal Security – C. December 23,
1959; Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director FBI to SAC Chicago. Solo; Internal Security –
C. 7-2-60.
43. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. Director to SAC Chicago. SOLO; Internal Security – C. July 29, 1959;
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. S. B. Donahoe to A. H. Belmont. SOLO; Internal Security – C. June 5,
1959.
44. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–57045. Baumgardner to Belmont. SOLO. December 9, 1959.
45. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–268746. F. J. Baumgardner to A.H. Belmont. Solo. Internal Security.
September 13, 1960.
46. Federal Bureau of Investigation. SAC Letter. 66–10. 2-15-66.
47. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. W. C. Sullivan to C.D. Delaoch. Relations with Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). March 30, 1970.
48. Ibid.
49. US Senate. Foreign and Military Intelligence. Book I. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. United States Senate.
50. See note above 47.
51. US House of Representatives. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 2005. Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives.
52. Intelligence Community Directive Number 204. Roles and Responsibilities for the National Intelligence Priorities
Framework.
53. Federal Bureau of Investigation. FY 2009 Budget Request.
54. See note above 51.
55. Ibid.
56. ‘John S. Pistole, Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. January 25, 2007’, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/imple
menting-the-intelligence-reform-and-terrorism-prevention-act (accessed July 3, 2022).
57. Federal Bureau of Investigation. SAC Letter. 66–10. 2-15-66.
58. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 66–17404. W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont. Confidential Files Maintained in
Room 6527.
59. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–191804. W. M. Felt to Tolson. Inspection – Domestic Intelligence Division.
June 1, 1966.
60. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 66–2542. W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan. Security Informants and Confidential
Sources Proposed Change in Manual of Instructions Volume IV. Latin American Section. December 7, 1965.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1071
63. Ibid.
64. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 66–2542. W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan. Security Informants and Confidential
Sources; Proposed Change in Handbook for Special Agents, Part I, Latin-American Section. 12-20-65.
65. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–149000. W. M. Felt to Tolson. Inspection -Domestic Intelligence Division;
Inspector Donald W. Morley; 2/12/68–2/28/68. March 6, 1968.
66. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection. 8/19/71.
67. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection 8/23/71.
68. US Senate. National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978. Before the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the United States Senate.
69. ‘From William H Webster to DCI, December 1, 1980. Report for the Administration’, Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780002-1.pdf (accessed July 3, 2022).
70. US House of Representatives. H.R. 6588, the National Intelligence Act of 1980. Before the Subcommittee on
Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. House of Representatives.
71. US House of Representatives. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
72. Ibid.
73. Federal Bureau of Investigation. FY 2009 Budget Request Summary.
74. See note above 71.
75. Ibid.
76. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–268746. F. J. Baumgardner to A.H. Belmont. Solo. Internal Security.
September 13, 1960.
77. Ibid.
78. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–191804. J. F. Malone to Mohr. Inspection. Domestic Intelligence Division.
December 4–18, 1961. 12/29/61.
79. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–95998. W. A., Branigan to Mr. Belmont. December 27, 1956.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–95998 Inspection Report, Security Division, April 8, 1949.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–95998. R. Raymond Wannall, Special Agent, GS-14, 1954.
86. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–95998. 1950.
87. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (B) Central Intelligence Agency – operations in the United States. SAC Letter 66–
10. 2-15-66.
88. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–149000. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection. 1971.
89. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–95998. O. T. Jacobson to Mr. Callahan. Inspection – Intelligence Division.
January 11, 1974.
90. Executive Order 11,905: United States Foreign Intelligence Activities. February 18, 1976.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. US Senate. National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978. Before the Select Committee on
Intelligence, United States Senate. 95th Cong. (1978).
94. Executive Order 12,333 United States Intelligence Activities. December 4, 1981.
95. Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations. 1995.
96. Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection. 2003.
97. Ibid.
98. Federal Bureau of Investigation. FY 2009 Budget Request Summary.
99. Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection. 2003.
100. See note above 98.
101. Executive Order 12,333 United States Intelligence Activities (As amended by Executive Orders 13,284 (2003),
13555 (2004) and 13,470 (2008).
102. Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. ‘Federal Bureau of Investigation. Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 9 (U) Foreign Intelligence’,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, https://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations
%20Guide%20percent28DIOG%29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2008-version/FBI%
20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20percent28DIOG%29percent20Part%201per
cent20of%205 (accessed July 3, 2022).
106. Ibid.
1072
D. E. TROMBLAY
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091. F. A. Frohbose to A. H. Belmont. Solo. 12-10-59.
111. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 66–2542. W.C. Sullivan to C.D. DeLoach. Racial and Security Informant Coverage.
9-10-69.
112. Federal Bureau of Investigation.67–191804. W. M. Felt to Tolson. Inspection – Domestic Intelligence Division.
June 1, 1966.
113. Ibid.
114. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091 A. H. Belmont to the Director. SOLO. 12/11/59.
115. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100–428091 F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont. Solo; Internal Security.
February 17, 1961.
116. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67—268746. F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan. SOLO. Internal Security –
Communist. February 8, 1962.
117. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach. Black Bag Jobs. July 19, 1966.
118. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–191804. J. F. Malone to Mohr. Inspection – Domestic Intelligence Division.
October 26 – November 18, 1960. November 30, 1960.
119. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–191804. J. F. Malone to Mohr. Inspection. Domestic Intelligence Division.
December 4–18, 1961. 12/29/61.
120. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–191804 J. H. Gale to Tolson. Inspection – Domestic Intelligence Division.
November 15 – December 3, 1962. December 11, 1962.
121. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67–57045. J. H. Gale to Tolson. Inspection – Domestic Intelligence Division.
July 1–21, 1964. July 31, 1964.
122. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. Domestic Intelligence Division. 1-12-71.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection. 8/19/71.
126. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 66–2542. Sullivan to Belmont. Confidential Informant and Similar Types of
Coverage. August 24, 1962.
127. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection 1/12/71.
128. Tromblay. The FBI Abroad.
129. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (B) Central Intelligence Agency – operations in the United States. SAC Letter 66–
10. 2-15-66.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. Central Intelligence Agency Operations in the United States.
February 7, 1966.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach. Relationships with Central
Intelligence Agency (Positive Intelligence). 3/6/70.
138. Ibid.
139. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. (B) Central Intelligence Agency – operations in the United States.
SAC Letter 66–10. 2-15-66.
140. ‘Central Intelligence Agency. Guidance for CIA Activities within the United States. 1982’, Central Intelligence
Agency https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85B00552R001000070007-8.pdf (accessed July 3,
2022); https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85b00552r001000070007–8; ‘Appendices to
Guidance for CIA Activities within the United States and Outside the United States’, Central Intelligence
Agency, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85B00552R001000070008-7.pdf (accessed July 3,
2022).
141. ‘Memorandum for the Record. Joe Billy, Special Agent in Charge for Counterterrorism, New York Field Office.
January 10, 2004’, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, https://www.archives.gov/files/declassifi
cation/iscap/pdf/2012–048-doc21.pdf (accessed July 3, 2022).
142. ‘AR 2-2B (U//AIUO) Annex B – Guidance for CIA Activities within the United States’, Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006235715.pdf (accessed July 3, 2022).
143. Dana Priest. ‘CIA Plans to Shift Work to Denver’ Washington Post. May 6, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/05/AR2005050501860.html.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1073
146. US House of Representatives. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1966, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
147. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62–116395. (B) Central Intelligence Agency – operations in the United States.
SAC Letter 66–10. 2-15-66.
148. Federal Bureau of Investigation.62–116395. W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall. SENSTUDY 75. 2/11/75.
149. US House of Representatives. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1985, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
150. US House of Representatives. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and States, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 2000, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. See note above 71.
155. FY 2009 FBI Congressional Budget Justification.
156. US Department of Justice. Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Threat Prioritization (Washington,
DC (US Department of Justice 2016)).
157. Ibid.
158. US House of Representatives. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2017, Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 2B.
159. Ibid.
160. US Department of Justice. Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Threat Prioritization.
161. 9/11 Review Commission. The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century: Report of the Congressionallydirected 9/11 Review Commission.
162. ‘Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 9 (U) Foreign Intelligence’, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
https://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20percent28DIOG%
29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2008-version/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%
20and%20Operations%20Guide%20percent28DIOG%29percent20Part%201percent20of%205 (accessed July 3,
2022).
163. Ibid.
164. See note above 161.
165. ‘Intelligence Community Directive 402, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/ICD/ICD402.pdf (accessed July 3, 2022).
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. US Senate. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate.
169. ‘Intelligence Community Directive 402’, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/ICD/ICD402.pdf (July 3, 2022).
170. Ibid.
171. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Justice. Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information.
172. See note above 169.
173. Ibid.
174. See note above 171.
175. US Senate. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015. Before the
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate. 13th Cong. (2015).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Darren E. Tromblay has served as an analyst with the US intelligence community for more than 15 years. He is the
author of The FBI Abroad; Spying: Assessing US Domestic Intelligence Since 9/11; and Securing the Private Sector. He has
been published in a variety of venues including the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
Intelligence and National Security, Lawfare, and Just Security. Mr. Tromblay holds an MA from the Elliott School of
International Affairs at George Washington University, an MS from the National Intelligence University, and a BA from
the University of California, Riverside. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.
1074
D. E. TROMBLAY
Bibliography
9/11 Review Commission. The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century: Report of the Congressionally-directed 9/11
Review Commission. 2015.
Barron, J. Operation SOLO: The Fbi’s Man in the Kremlin. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1996.
Batvinis, R. The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007.
Batvinis, R. Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. History of the SIS DivisionVol. 1 Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
undated
Gage, B. G-Man: J. Edgar Hoover and the Making of the American Century. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Inspector Generals of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Justice. Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information. Washington, DC: Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, 2017.
Priest, D. “CIA Plans to Shift Work to Denver.” Washington Post. May 6, 2005 https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/content/article/2005/05/05/AR2005050501860.html.
Theoharis, A. The FBI & American Democracy. A Brief Critical History. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Tromblay, D. E. The FBI Abroad. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2020.
Tromblay, D. E. “Inside Out: Domestic Origins of U.S. Foreign Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 34, no. 3 (2021): 525–557. doi:10.1080/08850607.2020.1798329.
US Department of Justice. Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Threat Prioritization. Washington, DC: US
Department of Justice, 2016.
US House of Representatives. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1966, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965.
US House of Representatives. Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part 1, Before the Committee
on Internal Security, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974.
US House of Representatives. H.R. 6588, the National Intelligence Act Of 1980. Before the Subcommittee on Legislation
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1980.
US House of Representatives. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1985, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. Pt.
8. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984.
US House of Representatives. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and States, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 2000, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Pt 2. Washington, DC: House of
RepresentativesGovernment Printing Office, 1999.
US House of Representatives. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 2005. Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004.
US House of Representatives. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives Pt. 1. Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 2009.
US House of Representatives. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2017, Before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. Pt. 2B. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2016.
US Senate. Foreign and Military Intelligence. Book I. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. United States Senate. Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1976.
US Senate. National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act Of 1978. Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the United States Senate. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978.
US Senate. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009.
US Senate. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015. Before the Committee
on Appropriations, United States Senate. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015.
Waller, D. Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage. New York: Free Press,
2011.
Wise, D. Cassidy’s Run: The Secret Spy War Over Nerve Gas. New York: Random House, 2000.