Term paper

everything attached below 

[Disclaimer: This journal summation represents an example for the term paper. Students

may not use this particular journal article as their journal article.]

Dr. Millie D. Black

GOVT 2306.2W1

July 2, 2018

[Disclaimer: This journal summation represents an example for the term paper. Students

may not use this particular journal article as their journal article nor use any information

written by Dr. Black in this journal summation.]

Author: Julie Novkov

Title of article: Rethinking Race in American Politics; Political Research Quarterly

Journal citation in APA format:

Novkov, Julie. 2008. Rethinking Race in American Politics. Political Research Quarterly, 61

(44): 649-659.

Paper subject: To a large degree, this article surrounds the subject matter

of civil rights.

Specifically, Novkov (2008) is writing on the subject of political participation within the context

of civil rights.

Relating to the subject of American Government: This article makes direct connections with

American Government in several ways: (1) The journal article surrounds the subject matter of

political participation, which is an integral part of democracy and American Government, (2)

Novkov (2008) uses the 2008 presidential election as an exemplar in order to understand the

contemporary role of race and voting. Presidential elections, race, and voting are conventional

methods to participant in American Government. Additionally, in this course we examine issues

surrounding racial participation. Understanding participation through the racial lens is very

important given the long legacy of discrimination within the United States, (3) The author

considers the historical record (e.g. civil war, civil rights movement, Proposition 187, etc.) in

order to gain greater insights into some of the reasons Barack Obama secured the 2008

presidential election to become the 44th president of the United States. Within these subjects,

one can understand democracy in action. Democracy in action is an underlining principle within

American Government. Additionally, democracy in action is considered a basic right within

American Government.

Journal question: Novkov (2008) is asking whether America has truly moved beyond it legacy

of racialized discrimination with the election of its first African American president.

Journal’s thesis: Novkov (2008) states that throughout the most important historical moments in

America, one can find race playing a critical role. It is through these crucial racialized historical

times that Novkov (2008) believes (at least for now) race continues to play a significant role in

American politics in general and political participation (i.e. voting) in particular.

Why is the author writing the article? The author is at a symposium and recognized a common

theme among several papers. The common theme deals with the role of race in contemporary

American politics. Many individuals, commentators, and scholars continue to reject the thought

that race plays a salient/important role in determining vote behavior (outside the consensus that

most of the time African Americans vote for other African Americans). With that said, Novkov

(2008) wants to review the historical record through the lens of some popular theories in order to

help explain the role of race in voting. Most importantly, Novkov (2008) extends her study

beyond the usual black-white comparison to include Mexican Americans. Moreover, to answer

the “who cares” question, this article’s subject matter is important for “We the People’s”

thinking and understanding about whose goals will win out and how and at what cost will office-

seekers try to gain as many votes possible.

Scholarly debate: The scholarly debates throughout the article surround various thoughts about

leading theories explaining the contemporary role of race in political participation. The scholarly

debates are encompassed within two broad approaches: (1) cultural racial approach and (2)

structural racial approach. The cultural approach to understanding the role of race and political

participation underscores the current effects caused by the institution of slavery. Researchers

believe that the institution of slavery and the effects thereafter (once slavery was abolished)

continue to influence how some individuals participate in politics today (see King and Smith

(2005) and Omi and Winant (1994). King and Smith (2005) believe that race is not overtly, but

covertly influencing political participation. This nation has moved away from more blatant acts

of discrimination. Consequently, race is revealed in less obvious, indirect ways. Omi and

Winant (1994) influenced King and Smith’s (2005) theory denoting the cultural race approach.

Omi and Winant (1994) argue that race continues to play a major role because whites want to

maintain political supremacy. Others such as Fong illustrate how at particular historical times

race has been absent or has played a secondary role to other political components such as

ideology. Moreover, the cultural theory highlights the presence of race (and its importance)

because of the historical legacy of racial discrimination.

The structural approach denotes that individuals of particular races are skeptical of political

institutions. The historical record shows how Congress, Presidents, political parties, and various

Supreme Courts’ have interpreted constitutional rights along racial lines with minorities being

denied genuine access to political equality. Thus, keeping certain groups subjugated based on

social, economic, and political stereotypes. For example, such lawful, subjugated tactics were

Jim Crow laws and Proposition 187, which were applied to Blacks and Latinos, respectively.

Therefore, according to several scholars, race will continue to influence politics due to the

discriminatory practices at the institutional-level that prompts members of particular racial

groups to vote along safe lines (see Siegal 2004 and Jacobson 2008). It is these safe zones that

help explain some of the reasons why African Americans and other minority groups voted for

Barack Obama in the presidential election of 2008.

In addition, it would be inaccurate to portray race as the only salient component influencing

political participation. Novkov (2008) further examines the debates surrounding the impact of

ideology, class, and gender on vote behavior. Novkov (2008) recognizes the importance of these

additional components, but state these are subordinate in its influence to the salience of race. The

United States continues to be a raced-conscious country. Therefore, denying the importance of

race by proclaiming American is colorblind does nothing to further one’s understanding of the

importance of race and politics today.

Article findings: In stating the article’s findings, it is important to restate the question being

examined within the article. The question Novkov (2008) setouts to examine is the role of race

on political participation (i.e. voting). With the recent election of the first African American

president, race has been placed up close and personal. Overall, race continues to play a very

salient role for how members of particular races vote. The United States has come a long way in

terms of breaking down the race-based barriers that hinder members of raced-minority groups,

but racialized issues remain. However, despite contemporary racialized issues, there is

significant hope for the future in terms of a race-neutral society. Novkov (2008) suggests that

more research is needed within the areas of political participation as it relates to race and

ethnicity. Scholars need to continue to disentangle the salient role of race with the subordinate

roles of socioeconomic status, ideology, and gender if the hope of a race-neutral society is to

ever be fulfilled.

TERM

PAPER ASSIGNMENT FOR TEXAS GOVERNMENT – SUMMER 2018

The term paper assignment requires each student to select one (1) peer-reviewed journal article from the list below. Students can find digital copies of each journal article in Canvas under the “Writing Assignment” tab. Each student must follow the established guidelines described below (as well as the example posted to Canvas) in order to do well on the term paper assignment. Failure to follow the established guidelines will result in point deductions and possibly a failing grade for the course term paper. No late papers will be accepted.

WRITING GUIDELINES & EXPECTATIONS:

• The completed journal summary must be at least two (2) FULL single-spaced pages and NO LONGER THAN three (3) single-spaced pages. The journal summary must be typed, using 12point, Times New Roman font (ONLY) and standard one-inch page margins. Do not include items such as graphics, charts, pictures, or other attachments within your article summary. Students MAY NOT use any quotes or direct material from the journal article in their journal summary (i.e. NO QUOTED MATERIAL). ALL MATERIAL MUST BE PROPERLY PARAPHRASED and students cannot use personal and/or opinionated material in their journal summations.

• Where necessary, students are to use in-text citations using APA or MLA citations. Your paper should have internal parenthetical citations (e.g. Smith, 2010) for all facts, ideas, or information that are not original to you (see journal summary example posted to Canvas). The “Library” tab in your cougarweb account can assist in the proper usage citation style. In addition, Collin College’s Writing Center is another helpful resource.

APPROVED JOURNALS (Students are required to select one journal article from the list below.):

o State Judicial Elections’ Impact on Participation in Direct Democracy by Shauna Reilly and Carol Walker (2010)

o Politics, Prisons, and Law Enforcement by Michael C. Campbell (2011)

o Extending Immigration and Crime Studies by Ramiro Martinez Jr and Jacob I. Stowell (2012)

o Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder authored by Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily (2008)

o African Americans and Land Loss in Texas: Government Duplicity and Discrimination Based on Race and Class authored by Debra A. Reid (2003)

o The Partisan Impact of Congressional Redistricting by Seth C. McKee, Jeremy M. Teigen, and Mathieu Turgeon (2006)

2 | Page

PAPER OUTLINE:

The journal summary MUST have the following paper sections and information included within each section. Section headings listed below must be used for the layout of your journal summary (do not include the numbers).

Students must clearly section off their papers and substantively respond to each question listed below. The term paper is worth a total 100-points (see point allocations below).

1. Author(s) – List the author(s) of the journal article (1-point)

2. Title of journal & Complete title of article – Include the journal name & journal article title (2-points)

3. Journal citation in APA or MLA format – Cite the journal article using APA or MLA format (5-points).

4. Paper subject – List the course subject area surrounding your journal article (2-points).

5. How does the journal article relate to the Texas Government course? – Explain how your selected article relates to this Texas government course. Feel free to utilize information discussed in class and in the textbook to respond to this question (remember to paraphrase all material). This response must include a minimum of 10 sentences (12-points).

6. Article’s question(s) – Discuss the question(s) the author(s) is seeking to answer in the journal article (12-points).

7. Article’s thesis – Explain what the author(s) believes to be the answer(s) to the question(s) he/she is studying (12-points).

8. Why is the author writing the article? – Explain what the author(s) intends to add to the larger body of work/literature as a result of writing the article (12-points).

9. Discuss the scholarly debate within your article – Discuss the various arguments, positions, proponent and opponent debates, etc. surrounding the subject matter of the journal article. Summarizing the article is not sufficient. Students must provide a clear and concise understanding of the scholarly discussions surrounding the issue. Make sure to list the author(s) who supports each argument (20-points).

10. What did the author find in the article? – Summarize the findings of the article. Make sure to refer back to the research question when summarizing the findings, then give a wrap up of the journal article itself (20-points)

** (Cover page is worth 2-points. The cover page must contain the following: name [first and last], course name, section number, and date.)**

3 | Page

Students must respond to all questions properly. Failure to do so will result in significant point deductions (note the point allocations above). If you select an article that you feel you cannot substantively answer each question, select another article from the approved list.

SUBMITTING THE WRITING ASSIGNMENT:

Each student must submit their journal summary (including a cover page) to the term paper link located in Canvas. Upload your term paper (including cover page) as one complete document. Do not cut and paste your paper. Failure to follow these guidelines could result in significant grade/point deductions. Verifying proper submission of the journal summary is the student’s responsibility.

WRITING ASSESSMENT:

In this class, you are expected to write at a college-level. Your paper will be evaluated in each of the following areas: substance/quality of analysis and argument, proper grammar and usage, following the established term paper guidelines, and proper usage of the APA and MLA citation format. A quality paper should have few spelling, grammar, punctuation, or typographical mistakes. While this is not a paper for English class, the quality of your writing affects the substance of your writing. Frequent spelling, grammar, punctuation, and other language-usage mistakes will negatively impact your grade.

(FYI – Do not wait until the last minute to upload your paper. Turnitin.com is a world-wide plagiarism prevention website. Keep this in mind if you decide to wait until the deadline to upload your paper. Failure to meet any of the deadlines will result in your paper not being accepted for a grade. Consider this your warning.)

FAILURE OF YOUR PAPER TO COMPLY WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS IN ANY MATERIAL WAY WILL LOWER THE GRADE ON YOUR PAPER BY UP TO A FULL LETTER GRADE (OR MORE) IN ADDITION TO ANY POINTS LOST BECAUSE OF SUBSTANTIVE DEFECTS

State Judicial Elections’ Impact on Participation in Direct Democracy
Author(s): Shauna Reilly and Carol Walker
Source: The Justice System Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2010), pp. 225-241
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27977493
Accessed: 25-06-2018 21:54 UTC

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The Justice System Journal

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact on Participation
in Direct Democracy*
ShAUNA REILLY AND CAROL WALKER

This article examines how the presence of judicial elections on the ballot impacts voter partic

ipation on direct democracy measures affecting justice. Ballot roll-off occurs on judicial elec

tions and direct democracy measures for similar reasons. We explore the linkage between judi

cial elections and direct democracy measures based on theory indicating that ballot measures

affect other races on the ballot, particularly when these measures involve specific issues, and

the impact of different selection methods on ballot roll-off. To explore this refotionship, we

analyze 1,259 different ballot propositions from 1998 to 2007 in forty-one different states,

with varying judicial selection methods. We find there is increased roll-off for direct democ

racy measures when there are judicial elections on the ballot, but less ballot roll-off for direct

democracy measures when these measures have connecting topics. Further, because of the

impact and electoral consequences of different judicial selection methods we expect differences

in roll-off for these different selection methods.

TJow does the presence of judicial elections impact participation in direct democ
JL JLracy measures? How is participation impacted when direct democracy measures
concerning the judiciary are on the same ballot as a judicial election? Previous
research explored citizen participation and levels of ballot roll-off for judicial elections

and direct democracy measures independent of one another (Dubois, 1979; Taebel,
1975; Darcy and Schneider, 1989; Bullock and Dunn, 1996; Hall, 1999). The same
factors contribute to ballot roll-off on judicial elections and direct democracy meas
ures; however, there have been no studies to determine if there exists an interconnect

ed relationship between these types of ballot measures to voters. Judicial elections and

direct democracy generally suffer from high occurrences of ballot roll-off, and the rea
sons voters fail to make a selection on these measures are similar. Both elections offer

few partisan cues and generally low-salience issues while receiving low placement on

Both judicial and direct democracy elections require more knowledge and engage
ment of the citizen for participation (Klein and Baum, 1988; Sheldon and Lovrich,
1999) than traditional representative elections. These additional requirements on the

voter place a burden that dissuades many from voting on these measures, resulting in
ballot roll-off. Ballot roll-off is the difference in the votes cast for major offices and for

those further down the ballot, in this case judicial elections and propositions. Ballot

propositions allow the public to participate directly in the lawmaking process.

* Shauna Reilly is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice of Northern
Kentucky University in Highland Heights (reillys3@nku.edu). Carol Walker is a Ph.D. candidate in the
Department of Political Science of Georgia State University in Atlanta (cwalker_ga@yahoo.com).

the ballot.

The Justice System Journal, vol. 31, number 2 (2010)

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226 The Justice System Journal

However, propositions generally suffer from high levels of ballot roll-off as there is a
significant decrease in votes cast as one moves down the ballot, and ballot propositions

are traditionally located at the bottom of electoral ballots.
Direct democracy elections are a subset of elections that are subject to the same

limitations as other elections (campaigns, financial components, sponsorship, etc.).
They also provide an additional dilemma to the electoral agenda as the repercussions
of these elections can be substantial but their salience low. Citizens must live with the

consequences, yet few are aware of the issue or the consequences of the matter at
hand. Direct democracy, in its ideal, provides the citizenry the opportunity to voice
their opinions and directly contribute to the operation of state government.

This study seeks to explore ballot roll-off from an institutional perspective.
Central to democratic theory is that voting increases government accountability to the

people. Judicial elections and direct democracy measures exist to enhance voter
engagement in these areas of government. However, even when voters head to the

polls, they often fail to cast a ballot on these measures, weakening their contribution
to democratic participation. To address ballot roll-off concerns, it may be necessary to

consider judicial elections and certain direct democracy measures in conjunction as
there may be overlap on the issues when they appear on the same ballot.

Ballot measures can be connected to judicial elections in more than just position
and voter engagement requirements; they can be connected by topic. The connection
of topic intrinsically places a relationship between these two elections. When the topic
of ballot measure involves the judiciary or crime, we are going to see an increase in par

ticipation when they are combined with judicial elections on the same ballot because
of the interconnectivity of these elections (Nicholson, 2005). We expect that the con
nection of these elections allows voters to create heuristics and fight through to com

plete the ballot.

Literature and Theory
There is a large body of literature on the topic of roll-off among democratic scholars;
many of these studies focus on the roll-off witnessed in judicial elections (Klein and
Baum, 2001; Hall, 1999; Sheldon and Lovrich, 1999; Darcy and Schneider, 1989;
Dubois, 1979). Explanations for the phenomenon have been suggested in areas such
as limited information, poor media coverage, racial composition of the state
(Vanderleeuw and Engstrom, 1987; Bullock and Dunn, 1996), length of ballot (Taebel,
1975; Walker, 1966), and characteristics of the election technology (Nichols, 1998;

Nichols and Strizek, 1995). Over half the states allow judicial elections as means of

selecting their judges. Presumably, use of this method aims to increase democratic rep
resentation within the state and the involvement of the citizenry with their govern

ment. This is something that direct democracy also seeks to develop, further demon
strating the similarities in these elections.

Different electoral situations result in different levels of participation across elec

tions. This is especially true for different times in the election cycle (primary, midterm,

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact 227

and general elections), as well as elections on the same ballot. There are differences
in national and state elections (Kelley, Ayres, and Bowen, 1967; Kim, Petrocik, and
Enokson, 1975; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Ranney, 1968, 1972; Salisbury and Black,
1963; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1978, 1980). National elec
tions have more salience resulting in higher turnout. On the contrary, state elections,

particularly statewide propositions, deal with lower-salience issues that have a lower
placement on the ballot. This is especially true of most statewide propositions because
of complex and technical issues of direct democracy that do not have the traditional
cues of regular elections (Magleby, 1984; Reilly, 2009). Important cues, such as
political party, are lacking from ballot proposition voting (Lee, 1960; Hawley, 1973).
Further, there is evidence that voters experience fatigue, even in the presence of
heuristics to cue the public about voting preferences, when long ballots are involved
(Kimball and Kropf, 2006; Brockington, 2003; Nichols and Strizek, 1995; Darcy and
Schneider, 1989; Magleby, 1984; Taebel, 1975; Walker, 1966). This is particularly a
concern when dealing with voter awareness, because a more crowded ballot means
that voters are going to be less aware of individual races, which will likely lead to less

participation (Nicholson, 2005).
Ballot fatigue from a lengthy ballot (Kimball and Kropf, 2006; Brockington, 2003;

Nichols and Strizek, 1995; Bowler, Donovan and Happ, 1992; Darcy and Schneider,
1989; Magleby, 1984; Taebel, 1975; Walker, 1966) and difficult questions (Magleby,
1984; Reilly and Richey, 2008) have resulted in decreased turnout. In fact, Magleby’s
research goes beyond that previously discussed to focus on voter fatigue, demonstrat

ing that lengthy ballots are a plausible explanation for decreased participation and roll

off from the top of the ballot to lower races on the ballot in California (Magleby, 1984).

Direct democracy has been accused of complicating the ballot, further supporting

the idea that citizens are not knowledgeable about direct democracy proposals
(Schmidt, 1989; Magleby, 1984; Lipow, 1973; Pillsbury, 1931). Previous studies have
attempted to connect a citizen’s lack of education with participation on complex and
technical issues (Magleby, 1984) demonstrating that only some opinions are represent
ed through direct democracy. This complex readability has also been demonstrated to
increase roll-off (Reilly and Richey, 2008), demonstrating the importance not only of

accessible ballot language but also of the topics of these ballot propositions to voter
participation.

Ballot propositions have some of the lowest participation rates in the United
States and are managed on a state level in the same way as judicial elections. The low

rate of voter participation in such elections is a substantial concern if we are looking
to increase civic engagement through voter participation. Some scholars may argue

that there are benefits for limited participation on races down ballot, namely, that only

those that are educated about the issue participate. Are votes on these propositions
reflective of the public’s political wishes, or are these only the demonstration of elite

preferences, who for some reason or another are able to participate down ballot (more

knowledge or perhaps disproportionate influence in getting those initiatives on the

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228 The Justice System Journal

ballot)? If there are factors (Nicholson, 2005) that stimulate greater participation
down ballot or factors such as additional elections that can lead to higher participation
rates, then we as a democratic society need to identify those factors. It would seem
that these elections, which are supposed to be more democratic, in reality decrease
democratic participation by increasing roll-off.

We further develop Nicholson’s (2005) theory that the topic of the ballot meas
ure affects other races on the ballot. While Nicholson does not specifically address
judicial elections or criminal justice ballot measures, we can expand his theory to this
area of research. We suggest that the inclusion of ballot measures on the ballot changes

how voters evaluate judicial candidates; ballot measures can affect information and
engagement with these judicial elections when the topic connects these two races.
This interconnectivity between judicial and crime ballot measures and judicial elec
tions substantiates arguments that ballot measures affect up-ticket races. Thus, the
topic of the ballot measure is paramount when investigating the relationship between
ballot measures and judicial elections. We demonstrate that there may, in fact, be an
opposing effect when moving down the ballot as voters are motivated and more knowl

edgeable about these issues because of the connection to one or more elections. One
could suggest that justices running for election or reelection are likely campaigning on

issues of law and order, which necessarily connects ballot measures on these issues to

judicial elections. Failing to connect these races means that the ballot measures of dif
ferent topics when combined with judicial elections will face further roll-off.

Aside from topic, we can expect larger roll-off for ballot measures in general when

there is a judicial election for two separate reasons. First, the addition of judicial elec
tions increases the length of the ballot and, according to the literature, a longer ballot

leads to higher levels of roll-off (Kimball and Kropf, 2006; Brockington, 2003; Nichols
and Strizek, 1995; Darcy and Schneider, 1989; Magleby, 1984; Taebel, 1975; Walker,
1966). The length of the ballot or position has an impact on voter roll-off.

Judicial

elections, like ballot propositions, are typically at the end of the ballot and feature
complex information. Participation is traditionally low for judicial elections, at least
in some measures because of their location on the ballot (Dubois, 1979; Taebel, 1975).

Additionally, there are aspects of the ballot that contribute to low participation?the
longer the ballot, the higher the roll-off (Walker, 1966). Therefore, the further down
the ballot a proposition is the more likely it is to suffer from roll-off due to voter

fatigue. The connection of judicial elections and ballot measures contributes to longer
ballots. Both are also complex matters, which ultimately results in higher levels of bal
lot roll-off.

Second, we expect more roll-off for judicial elections and everything below
because of the intricacies of judicial elections. Judicial elections are often complex,
some selection methods lack cues, and are low salience?all factors that do not serve

to encourage voter participation. Judicial elections rarely have the heated campaigns
to draw voter attention as those elections higher on the ballot, such as gubernatorial,

congressional, or presidential races (Dubois, 1979). Candidates generally focus on

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact 229

their legal r?sum?s and discuss court administration or certain matters of judicial
reform (Dubois, 1980; Baum, 1994). This can be important if the issues they are cam
paigning on relate to the direct democracy issues on the ballot. Since there are not
often heated campaigns to provide voters with information, voters must rely on other

cues. Voters can rely on partisan cues in states with partisan judicial elections (Dubois,

1979; Champagne, 1986). However, some states select justices through nonpartisan
elections. In this case, voters can rely on incumbency, name recognition (Dubois,
1979, 1980), or gender, race, or any other individual traits if they can identify them
from the candidates’ names on the ballot (Bain and Hecock, 1957; Nagel, 1973; Byrne
and Pueschel, 1974; Dubois, 1980). Studies of judicial elections in certain states find
voters make a random selection based on no information or find the absence of nega

tive information about a candidate a good reason for reelection (Griffin and Horan,
1983; Champagne and Thielemann, 1991).

The second component of this analysis deals with the intricacies of judicial elec
tions. These elections have many similar characteristics to ballot proposition elec
tions. They are typically located at the bottom of the ballot and they are less salient
than other elections. Studying these two elections in conjunction provides evidence
about the impact less salient elections have on one another and the nature of any
interdependent relationship. As we will demonstrate, judicial elections increase roll
off for ballot propositions; therefore, it is vital to understand what contributes to this

roll-off and what we can do to facilitate higher participation in both these elections
and limit the impact on ballot propositions.

Methods of state judicial recruitment are of interest to scholars because of the
variation of selection methods employed. Though less explored, this variation in
methods can influence voters. A total of nine states use partisan elections, twenty
three states use a merit commission, twelve states rely on nonpartisan elections, four

states rely on governor appointment, and two states rely on legislative appointments.

Once selected, many justices must face retention elections. Overall, thirty-eight states
select their supreme court justices through some form of an election (Hall, 1992,
2001). Thus, the impact of different selection methods on judicial behavior often
comes into play in the literature on judicial politics in the state. However, the impact
of the selection method on the voting citizenry receives much less attention in com

parison despite the fact so many states choose to employ election as a means of judi
cial selection.

Different types of elections require different actions and levels of information on

behalf of the voters. States that hold partisan elections provide voters with partisan
cues to use when deciding whom to vote for in judicial races. Nonpartisan elections
do not provide voters with the same level of information; consequently, voters need to

acquire more information to make an informed choice. Many states also hold reten

tion elections, in which voters must vote yes or no as to whether justices already in
office should retain their position. To vote for or against retention, a voter would need

to form an opinion on the job performance of the sitting justice. In most cases, state

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230 The Justice System Journal

judges garner very little name recognition from voters. Information is clearly needed
in judicial elections, as it is clear that many voters abstain from voting because such
information is not readily available to them.

Considerable scholarly debate exists regarding the influence of judicial elections
on the quality of the judiciary, which can influence a voter’s decision. Partisan elec
tions, and to some extent nonpartisan elections, are seen as an ineffective means of
selecting justices by advocates of judicial reform. Their principal concern lies in the
fact that the vast majority of voters are uninformed about candidates and the issues at

play in judicial races. On the aggregate, judicial elections are almost always low-infor
mation elections for the voters (Sheldon and Lovrich, 1983; Dubois, 1980; Mathias,
1990; Hall, 1999). Some voters are not even aware that they will be voting for judges

until they reach the ballot on Election Day. Once judges are in office, the voting pub
lic rarely tracks the justices’ behavior and actions, hence allowing many incumbent
justices to retain their positions.

While the typical judicial race may entail low-salience electoral contests, some
studies of individual elections show that voters actually can become quite involved
(Baum, 1997; Hojnacki and Baum, 1992; Lovrich and Sheldon, 1984, 1985). How
ever, this is not the norm in these situations though it is a trend shown to be increas

ing in recent years. Certain judicial elections can spike the interest of the public (Hall,

2007). Nonetheless, studies have shown that electoral considerations are still of con
cern to justices who must face an election during their careers. Research suggests
reaching a balance between their policy goals against policy preference and career
needs, such as reelection, are extremely important concerns for a justice retained by
electoral vote, for both nonpartisan and partisan elections (Hall, 1987, 1992, 1995,
2001).

Enticing voters to cast votes in judicial elections is generally a problem. Voters’
face many disincentives since judicial elections are generally low-information races
and low on the ballot (Walker, 1966; Wattenberg, 2000). Due to low information and
disadvantageous ballot position, voter roll-off is extremely common in judicial elec
tions. Approximately 25 percent of voters fail to vote for any judicial seat, including
state supreme court seats for the period from 1980 through 1995 (Hall, 1999). This
contributes to the roll-off for ballot measures and elections lower on the ballot.

According to ballot information, ballot measures are typically lower on the ballot than

judicial elections. However, those that do vote may not be making the most informed
choice. Many voters are inclined to cast ballots in judicial elections, even if their infor

mation levels are low (Baum, 1989; Champagne and Thielemann, 1991). These can
be just as concerning to proponents of democracy as a lack of participation.

Judicial selection methods make a difference when it comes to ballot roll-off.
Providing low-information voters with cues (such as partisan cues) are a means of
enticing participation. Partisan elections are more likely to encourage participation,
with a roll-off rate of about 22 percent compared to 29 percent for nonpartisan elec
tions and 28 percent for retention elections during the same period (Dubois, 1979;

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact

Hall 1999, 2007).1 Partisan elections serve to facilitate voting since voters receive an
additional piece of knowledge on the ballot. Seemingly, decision making in retention
elections is simplified by having the choice of only yes or no and a voter simply voting
yes in a retention election if he or she is unaware of any negative information about a

judge. Thus, it would seem retention elections also require lower levels of knowledge
than nonpartisan elections, though this surprisingly has little impact on ballot roll-off.

Hypotheses
Our focus is on American states, using an expansive data set including ten years of bal

lot measures and judicial elections. First, we examine the differences in roll-off in
states that have judicial elections and those that do not to assess the impact of judicial

selection processes on direct democracy roll-off. Second, this data set looks at states

that have ballot measures concerning the judiciary during this time period to include

1,259 propositions. This provides many opportunities to explore our three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1?There will be increased roll-off for measures of direct democracy
when there are judicial elections on the ballot.

We expect to find that there has been an increase in ballot roll-off because of
longer ballots (Walker, 1966) with the addition of judicial elections, lack of cues (for
example, partisanship), and complex judicial elections. The addition of other less
salient elections and lengthening of the ballot increases roll-off on individual ballot
questions; because of this additional complexity voters will decrease their participation

in propositions. Therefore, when confronted with these multiple complex and less
salient elections, voters will simply choose to skip some voting questions or stop vot
ing altogether.

Hypothesis 2?There is less ballot roll-off for direct democracy measures concern
ing the judiciary when there are judicial elections on the ballot.

We expect to find this inverse relationship because of the connection between
direct democracy and judicial elections when the direct democracy measure deals
directly with the judiciary as citizens. This interconnection of elections and topics will

allow voters to overcome ballot complexities by creating a connection between two or
more elections on the same ballot. This will lead to higher relevance of these ballot
propositions and judicial elections at the ballot box. We anticipate this finding because

of the familiarity and attention brought to judicial elections when there is a connect

ing topic in ballot measures. Criminal justice issues on the ballot emphasize many of
the same issues that are incorporated into a judicial campaign; thus, there is an expect

ed relationship between these races that will lead to less roll-off for ballot measures.

Hypothesis 3?Judicial selection methods will impact ballot roll-off.
Given the differences in judicial selection methods and the different requirements

on voters, we expect to find differences dependent upon the election type. Retention
elections require the lowest levels of voter engagement, so we expect to find lower lev

*For the fifteen-year period from 1980 to 1995.

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232 The Justice System Journal

els of roll-off. Since partisan elections provide voters with an additional cue not pro
vided in nonpartisan elections, we also expect to find less roll-off for partisan elections

in comparison to nonpartisan elections. We expect to find less ballot roll-off for judi
cial and crime-related ballot measures when there are partisan elections since those
election campaigns can help provide an issue linkage for voters.

Methods and Data
The data set for this analysis is complex, drawing in information from a variety of
sources, namely, individual secretaries of state, Census information and the National
Council of State Legislatures. Our dependent variable roll is derived from the differ
ence of the total vote for the highest race on the ballot from the individual ballot
proposition, presented in the form of percent to standardize the variable. This is cal
culated for each ballot proposition in the data set. This variable is derived from infor
mation available on the individual Web sites of secretaries of state or election boards.

The majority of the highest races are for these offices: president, U.S. senator, or gov

ernor. However, in special elections the highest ballot is often more difficult to gener

alize. House elections, judicial elections, and even the first ballot measure can often
be the highest race on the ballot. For non-statewide races, the collective votes across
districts/counties for individual races are used as the highest race. This has resulted in
sixty-eight ballot measures having slightly higher vote totals than the highest races
(see Table 1).

To determine judicial races and what kind appears on each ballot, first we deter
mined what type of races each state had and whether those were partisan, nonpartisan
or merit from the American Judicature Society Web site. Then to properly code each
of these elections we examined which elections occurred on each ballot, using infor

mation available from the Web sites of the secretaries of state. A variable judicial is
created to indicate that there is a judicial election on the same ballot as the proposi
tion. These are judicial elections that occur in every district statewide on the same
ballot (this includes supreme, appellate, circuit, and county as long as they are on the
ballots consistently across the state). These were then broken into partisan, nonparti

san, and ment categories for a more detailed analysis.

Characteristics of the population are an excellent explanation for turnout and
vote choice and can even influence ballot roll-off. Several of these are used as control

variables for this analysis. Racial composition of the population can influence the
amount of roll-off during an election. There are differences in turnout and electoral

preferences among racial groups. This is most pronounced in the differences between
minorities (namely, blacks) and the white majority. Minority populations vote less
than the white population does on ballot propositions (Verba and Nie, 1972; Bullock
and Dunn, 1996; Darcy and Schneider, 1989; Vanderleeuw and Engstrom, 1987;

Magleby, 1985). There is a greater tendency for minorities to “roll-off rather than vote

for candidates for lesser offices or on referendum questions” (Vanderleeuw and
Engstrom, 1987:1091). This racial difference is evident even when controlling for

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact 233

factors such as education (Bullock and Dunn, 1996; Darcy and Schneider, 1989;
Vanderleeuw and Engstrom, 1987). Thus, the difference in voting is not just a socio
economic factor as there is strong evidence that the race of the voter can lead to roll

off on the ballot. We have included black and Hispanic percents of the population,
according to the Census Bureau, as a proxy for this racial composition of the public.

Education is noted as an important contributing factor to ballot roll-off and is
therefore included as a control in this analysis, measured by looking at the percent of

high school graduates. Citizens with lower levels of formal education are less likely to

cast a vote in low-salience races or issues, possibly because their education level indi
cates they are less informed about politics (Walker, 1966). Furthermore, highly edu
cated people are more likely to use ballot pamphlets and newspaper editorials than
lower educated people are (Bowler and Donovan, 1994). Therefore, there is a link
between education and ballot roll-off.

The position on the ballot variable is the number of races on the ballot before the

propositions on each state ballot. This information was gathered from the individual
secretaries of state and state board of elections Web sites. Races included in this count

were statewide elections. Local elections, while important, vary across counties and
districts and, thus, are not included when looking at ballot roll-off because these can
not be standardized across districts. When the ballot is not accessible, the position on

the ballot is estimated by counting the number of election results reported before the

question.
Economic issues can also contribute to political engagement. Individuals with

higher income levels are generally more engaged in politics (Verba and Nie, 1972).
This higher engagement can contribute to lower levels of ballot roll-off. Hence, other
control variables include standard socioeconomic variables (Rosenstone and Hansen,

2003) collected from the census, including income (annual household income inflated
to 2006 dollars) and unemployment rates. Further, we included a variable of density (the

number of people per square mile).
Voters who are “issue voters” are attracted to the polls not only because of parti

san loyalties but also because of issues that are important to them. Further, issues that

are controversial can also lead to an increase in participation for ballot propositions
(Magleby, 1984). There is evidence of controversial issues driving participation in the
2004 election where the religious right turned out in droves to ban gay marriage and

support George W. Bush (Jackman, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Donovan, Smith, and Tolbert,

2005). Thus, certain issues can lead to increased or decreased ballot roll-off depend
ing on their controversy or ease of comprehension. We have included a dummy vari
able for issues, particularly for gay marriage because of its impact on election turnout in

elections (Jackman, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Donovan, Smith, and Tolbert, 2005). Further,
we have included two different issue variables, crime and justice, for ballot measures to

determine if the inclusion of a judicial election impacts roll-off on ballot measures that

involve criminal justice or any judiciary components (e.g., salaries, term limits).

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234 The Justice System Journal

Roll-Off

General

Judicial

Persons per sq mile

High school
Age
Income

Unemployment

Hispanic

Black

Position

Gay marriage

Justice

Crime

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Mean Standard Deviation Min
.117
.85
.608
141
.813

36.3
46,886
34.76
14.08
9.44

13
.020
.033
.038

.146
.357
.488
222
.044

2.19
7,921
3.15
12.92
9.65
7
.142
.179
.192

-.093
0
0
1
.729

28.4
26,919
28.2

.8
.5
1

0
0
0

Max
.961

1
1

1,134
.883

41
65,144
44.3
44
37.4
36

1
1
1

Results and Analysis
Table 1 sets forth a descriptive look at each of the important variables in the data set.
In this data set there are 1,259 different ballot propositions from 41 different states
(including those that have judicial elections and those that do not). These ballot

propositions come from primary, general, and special elections conducted between
1998 and 2007. Table 2 provides a breakdown of what states are included in each cate
gory of this analysis.

Table 3 reports the results of a full model regression, including all ballot proposi
tions. The judicial variable is positive and significant, indicating judicial elections on
the ballot increase ballot roll-off for ballot propositions appearing on the same ballot.

In addition, the data analysis shows that general elections experience higher ballot
roll-off, while primary elections experience even greater levels of roll-off.

As expected states with a larger black population are more likely to experience
higher ballot roll-off. Likewise, when there is a higher number of high-school gradu
ates ballot measures are less likely to experience lower ballot roll-off. Position also has

a significant impact on roll-off, the further down the ballot a proposition is the more

likely that voters are to roll-off on that measure (although this is a minimal effect).

When there is a judicial election and a ballot measure on a judicial topic, our find
ings show there is higher roll-off, but when there is a judicial election and a ballot

measure on a criminal justice topic, there is lower roll-off. This result is somewhat
confusing, but does provide insight that particular issues may prevent roll-off when
they are connected to judicial elections. One possible explanation for the result is that

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact 235

Table 2
State Elections and Ballot States

Ballot Only
Colorado
Hawaii
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia

Partisan
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Missouri
New Mexico
New York
Pennsylvania
Texas
West Virginia

Merit
Alaska
Arizona
California
Florida
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maryland
Missouri
Nebraska
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Utah
Wyoming

Nonpartisan
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Kentucky
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nevada
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Dakota
Washington
Wisconsin

voters feel more connected to matters of the criminal justice system than to matters of

the intricate state court system, which many voters are often ill-informed about.

However, only the presence of a ballot proposition concerning a judicial system topic
reaches the level of statistical significance, as criminal justice ballot propositions failed

to reach statistical significance. It also seems that criminal justice ballot measures are
more highly correlated with other factors that influence roll-off. Less ballot roll-off
occurred when the gay-marriage issue appeared on the ballot, as that was an issue that
seemed to attract voters’ attention to the ballot.

The findings reported in Table 3 also indicate that the presence of judicial elec
tions on the ballot affect roll-off. It seems judicial elections increase ballot roll-off,
which is consistent with our expectations. Judicial elections are low information and
lengthen the ballot. Still, this finding requires further investigation?namely, looking
at different types of judicial elections with respect to roll-off phenomena.

Table 4 sets forth a breakdown of the results in Table 3 by different types of judi

cial election. Of particular interest is the relationship between ballot topic and judi
cial elections. For retention elections there is less roll-off in general elections; howev
er, roll-off increases for both partisan and nonpartisan elections in general elections.
On the other hand, in partisan elections, when there are cues in the judicial elections,
there is a decrease in roll-off on both criminal justice and judicial ballot issues.
Further, the presence of a gay-marriage measure decreases roll-off in all three types of

elections, consistent with previous findings. When looking specifically at the topic of

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236 The Justice System Journal

Table 3
Full Regression Model of Ballot Roll-off

Model 1 Model 2
General .033* .033*

(.014) (.016)
Primary .113** .113**

(.024) (.020)
Judicial .049** .047**

(.014) (.014)
Presidential .006 .005

(.008) (.008)
Persons per sq mile .000** .000**

(.000) (.000)
High-school grads -.466** -.454**

(.171) (.209)
Age .007** .006**

(.002) (.002)
Household income -.000 .000

(.000) (.000)
Unemployment .002 .002

(.002) (.001)
Hispanic -.001 -.001

(.001) (.001)
Black .002** .002**

(.001) (.001)
Position -.002** -.002**

(.001) (.001)
Gay marriage -.068* -.068*

(.033) (.033)
Justice .020

(.027)
Crime -.016

(.262)
.075 .069
(.186) (.211)
= 1,259 N=1,259

R2= 16.3** R2=16.0**

*p< .05 ** p< .01 Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

the ballot measure, when combining a retention or nonpartisan election with a ballot
measure on the topic of criminal justice, it is more likely that roll-off will decrease.
While not statistically significant, this is also true for partisan elections. This relation
ship across election types demonstrates the power of connecting judicial elections with

relevant topical ballot measures.

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact 237

Table 4
Ballot Roll-Off in Different Types of Judicial Elections

General

Primary

President

Persons per sq mile

High-school grads

Age
Household income

Unemployment
Hispanic
Black
Position
Gay marriage
Judicial
Crime

Retention
-.099
(.092)

.025*
(.010)
.000

(.000)
-.342
(.522)
-.001
(.002)
-.000**
(.000)
-.003
(.005)
.000

(.001)
.003

(.002)
-.002**
(.001)
-.074**
(.022)
.036

(.049)
-.018*
(.011)
.502

(.621)
= 324

R2= 20.4**

Nonpartiean
.048*

(.020)
.229**
(.048)
.022

(.012)
.000**

(.000)
-1.12**
(.309)
-.010
(.007)
.000

(.000)
-.000
(.004)
-.003*
(.001)
-.003*
(.002)
-.000
(.001)
-.077**
(.017)
.030

(.036)
-.019*
(.008)
1.34**
(.234)

N=391
R2= 31.8

Partisan
.163**

(.042)
.160**

(.035)
-.021
(.020)
-.000
(.001)

-1.58
(1.55)

.050
(.036)
.000

(.000)
.036

(.049)
.005

(.004)
.014**

(.003)
.005
(.003)
-.136
(.075)
-.025
(.033)
-.041
(.046)

-4.81
(3.88)

N=171
R2= 64.9

*p< .05 ** p< .01 Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

Conclusion
These findings support both of the hypotheses postulated at the onset. First, ballot
roll-off is higher when there is the presence of a judicial election. Second, the inter
action terms of judicial election and criminal justice ballot issues decreases ballot roll
off?yet, ballots with judicial elections and measures dealing with judicial topics lessen
roll-off in certain circumstances (namely, partisan elections). This confirms our first

hypothesis and supports the conceptual basis of our second hypothesis?that certain

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238 The Justice System Journal

ballot issues (when combined with judicial elections) result in less roll-off. This
research sheds light on the interaction of direct democracy elections and judicial elec
tions and contributes to research on participation in both judicial and direct democra
cy elections.

Any democracy requires the active participation of its citizens. States have the
power to take actions to ensure citizens are more actively engaged in their govern
ment. Taking measures to ease ballot roll-off in these types of direct democracy elec
tions will increase citizen involvement. The information regarding the selection

method of justices and ballot roll-off adds an interesting angle to the debate of selec
tion type. Considerations regarding democratic participation are related to how a state

chooses judges for the bench.

The American public when discussing American politics rarely considers judicial
politics. Many consider the judiciary to be controlled by law and not politics. Recent
scholarship has shown otherwise. Although Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist
Papers saw the judicial branch as being the “least dangerous branch,” today we have
seen the long-lasting impact and the important role the judicial branch can play in pol

icymaking. Thus, when citizens have the opportunity to become more involved in the

judiciary at the state level, it is important for democratic principles for them to take an
active, informed role.

At the federal level, there is not much experimenting with how judges get their
jobs, and there are no options for the federal voting public to amend operating aspects

of the judiciary directly. Justices who serve in the judicial branch at the federal level

are nominated for appointments and then confirmed by the Senate. Once they com
plete the confirmation process, they will have their jobs for life, given they continue to

participate in good behavior. However, when one looks at the variety of ways justices
reach their positions at the state level, they will find few similarities.

Democratic participation is an important element of state court composition and
the nature of state government. This study examined the important link between
direct democracy and judicial elections. When states make decisions to create or
change their judicial system, they can consider the impact this will have on direct
democracy participation. There are important implications for judicial ballot proposi
tions as well, which states could consider when creating ballots and determining when

measures will reach the ballot. This study provided the basis for more studies on the
relationship of the state judiciary, as well as other state elections, and measures of
direct democracy, jsj

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State Judicial Elections’ Impact 239

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• Contents

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• Issue Table of Contents

The Justice System Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2010) pp. i-iv, 125-248
Front Matter
Letter from the Editor-in-Chief [pp. iii-iv]
“Get a Life!”: On Interviewing Law Clerks [pp. 125-143]
The Application of Network Analysis to the Study of Trial Courts [pp. 144-163]
Strategic Passing and Opinion Assignment on the Burger Court [pp. 164-179]
Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme Court [pp. 180-200]
Threshold Rules as Tools of Deference?: Circuit Judge Gatekeeping in Administrative Agency Cases [pp. 201-224]
State Judicial Elections’ Impact on Participation in Direct Democracy [pp. 225-241]
Review Section
Review: untitled [pp. 242-246]
Of Note [pp. 247-248]
Back Matter