Communications Question

Select one philosopher or school of philosophy from

Column A

and one philosopher or school of philosophy from

Column B

, and respond to the following questions:

In our first class session we examined the concept of political legitimacy as an issue that is addressed implicity or exexplicity in the thought of every political philosopher, as Socrates illustrated through his notion of the “noble lie.” We have observed that a philosopher’s estimation of the nature of “men” (human nature) plays an important role in the noble myth he offers to legitimate the body politic. Describe, compare, and contrast the views of human nature proffered by one theorist or philosophical school in Column A and another theorist or school of thought in Column B. What are the consequences of each thinker/school’s assessment of human nature for the ideal polity each thinker prescribed? Conclude your essay by describing briefly the consequences of this assessment for each school’s/thinker’s view of the legitimacy of revolutionary political change.

Column A

1. Confurius(Kongzi) 2. Mencius(Mengzi)

3. Mozi

Column B

1. Xunzi. 2. Han Feizi.

3.The Daoists(Laozi & Zhuangzi)

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POLI 113BR Week 3 – Confucianism and its Contenders: The Problem of
Human Nature (I)
Video Part 1
Background image: White Deer Grotto Academy (白鹿洞書院) in Jiangxi
Province, 1 of the 4 Great Academies of China, with a statue of Zhu Xi, who
compiled the Four Books.
A. Human Nature in Western Political Philosophy
Before we delve into Mencius’s thought, I would like to review for
you the importance of the notion of human nature in Western
political thought. I have already discussed it to some extent in
previous lectures, but what I want to do today is review the
significance of the view of human nature held by different thinkers
for their ideal polity and the legitimating myths that they offer. As
you will see, we are not just going to consider human nature in
Confucius and Mencius—rather we will see that this issue formed the
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foundation of each thinker’s ideas on politics and the basis for their
points of agreement and disagreement among them.
1. Socrates and Plato
What can we say was the perspective on human nature in the
imaginary Socratic lie, as recorded by Plato in the Republic?
– According to that noble lie, men were fundamentally, by nature,
unequal. Remember that I explained that ancient thinkers believe that
what is natural is good. In Socrates’s noble lie, this inequality among
men is dictated by the divine (“the gods”), by mixing gold, silver, or
bronze into their souls (this is called “the race of the metals”). That
inequality determined the different roles that men would play in life,
from the philosopher-king at the pinnacle of the social and political
order, to the guardians who assisted the philosopher-king in guiding
and defending the city-state, to farmers and other manual laborers.
Socrates and Plato do not explain whether human nature on the whole
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is naturally good or evil, but they clearly believed that living a good life
was the objective of all men. However, in their view, one must live in a
good political system in order to achieve that objective. This is because
is very difficult to live a good life in a bad polity. If you have a corrupt
leader who is capricious and doles out punishment for various kinds of
deeds and misdeeds in a very inconsistent manner, men and women
who live in the polity will be preoccupied with their own individual
survival, which will take precedence over doing what is in the interests
of the city-state. Conversely, the implication of this view is that if the
people in the polity are acting badly, it is, in part, the fault of their
leaders.
Another implication of Socrates’s and Plato’s noble lie is that there is
no right to rebellion. Why is that? It is because their polity is an organic
polity. People do not elect to create the polity as in social contract theory.
Rather, they are simply born into it. The polity exists prior to the people
who are its members. Therefore, there is no mechanism for opting out.
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As in the analogy I drew to the Japanese Meiji kokutai family theory of
the state, it is virtually impossible to opt out of that organic state either.
What are you going to do – stop being Japanese? This myth was so
powerful in Japan that it broke down all resistance to the emperor
system on the part of Japanese Communist Party members who were
imprisoned for their views before and during World War II. They
tenkōed – recanted Marxism and decided to support the emperor system,
with some even advocating a sort of state socialism under the rule of the
emperor!
Most notably, they tended to do so en masse – that is, collectively.
That is because Japan is a very group-oriented society – one’s identity is
based on belonging to a group – but also because nationalism expressed
in the kokutai myth made them all members of a single Japanese
extended family with the Imperial Household as the head family and
the Emperor himself as the father of the entire family. These individuals
had gone astray together, as members of a political organization that
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advocated the overthrow of the emperor system; therefore, it would
make sense that they would make their way back into the fold of that
family together. If you would like to read more about this, you might
want to read my article regarding it,1 or a variation on that article in my
book The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan
(which we read in POLI 113C, since that course covers the period ending
in the 20th century).
2. Western Social Contract Theory
As we moved to a discussion of social contract theory in Western
political philosophy, we found that different conceptions of human
nature also undergirded differences conceptions of artificial, man-made
polities of modern Western political thinkers.
a. For Thomas Hobbes, men were basically equal to one another, and
by nature man was fundamentally evil. Remember that Hobbes
1 Germaine A. Hoston, “Tenkō: Marxism and the National Question in Prewar Japan,”
Polity 16.1 (Fall 1983): 96-118.
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argued that men’s desire to compete with other to gain more for
themselves, their desire to seek safety from others, and their yearning
for others to think as highly of them as they think of themselves
cause them to use violence to “make themselves masters of other men’s
persons, wives, children, and cattle” and to defend their reputations and
those of their families.
As a result, the state of nature – prior to the creation of the
absolute monarchy – is a state of war, with every man at war with
every man. No rational human being could possibly wish to remain
in such a condition, and thus men concluded a social contract with
everyone else in the polity to give up the right to use their own
physical force against others in order to be able to live in safety with
the protection of the absolute monarchy. It is Hobbes’s view of
human nature as evil that causes men to bind themselves out of fear
of each other; that evil nature also helps to explain why there can be
no right of revolution. Men with such an evil nature could not be
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trusted to make correct and fair judgments about political matters
especially with respect to something so vital as the continued
existence of the monarchy. For, in Hobbes’s version of social contract
theory, which did not involve two stages, but a single one, as soon as
the body politic was dissolved, men and women would once again be
plunged into a state of war. That would be nonsensical.
b. By contrast, John Locke had a much more sanguine (optimistic) view
of human nature. Locke believed that human beings were
fundamentally good but that socio-economic circumstances led them
astray. Indeed, Locke articulates even more explicitly than Hobbes
the relationship between our assumptions about human nature and
our views about the best polity:
To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original,
we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is a
state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their
possessions and persons as they think fit; within the bounds of the law
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of nature, without asking leave (permission), or depending upon the
will of any other man. [It is] . . . a state also of equality, wherein all
the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more {power -GAH} than another.”2
Locke goes on to describe how, through divine influence,
human beings recognize that “it is no less their duty to love” others
at least as much as themselves. This is obviously based on the 2nd
of the 2 great commandments in Christian teaching: Love your
neighbor as yourself. Thus, although Locke agrees with Hobbes
that humans are basically equal, he believes that they are
fundamentally good. Thus, for Locke, the state of nature is not
inevitably a state of war, but it only has that potential.
Recognizing that potential, reasonable men conclude a social
contract to live in peace in civil society to ensure that “ill-nature,
2 John Locke, “An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil
Government,” in Social and Political Philosophy, eds. John Somerville and Ronald E.
Santoni (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973), p. 169.
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passion, and revenge” not “carry them too far in punishing others”,
with the “confusion and disorder” that necessarily “will follow” from
this situation: “God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men.” 3 Locke’s optimism about human
nature, as compared to Hobbes’s view, allows him to can advocate
revolutionary if the government violates the right of all men to life,
liberty, and property that it was created to protect. Remember,
Locke had a two-stage social contract theory: first there was the
agreement to live in peace together, then the agreement to
establish a particular political leader or leaders. Thus, even if there
were a political revolution, civil society would remain in tact.
4. Conclusions: What we have seen from this brief review of Plato and
Socrates and Hobbes and Locke is that different theories of politics are
founded on differing ideas about the nature of human beings. The same
is the case among the ancient Chinese thinkers that we have before us.
3 Ibid., p. 174.
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Once we have fleshed this out a bit with respect to Confucius and
Mencius (in Confucianism), we can better appreciate the manner in
which Xunzi, who was also a Confucian philosopher, nevertheless
marked the beginning of a transition from Confucianism to Legalism.
These views about the nature of man also led to very different political
prescriptions of the Legalists and the Daoists.
Video Part 2
Pearl of Wisdom regarding the top 5 shared characteristics of successful
men as described in Napoleon Hill, Think and Grow Rich.
As long as we are talking about the nature and characteristics of
human nature in political philosophy, this is an excellent opportunity to
introduce you to some interesting findings made by Napoleon Hill about
the 5 most common characteristics of successful individuals.
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Video Part 3
II. Detailed Discussion of Mencius in terms of the problem of Human
Nature
A. Human nature in Confucianism
Just to review, what was the keynote of Confucius’ thought? (The
notion of ren 仁, translated as humanity, benevolence, or humaneness).
Now, here I would like for us to follow our text very closely—that is, I
expect for you to participate actively beginning now. Please have your
Chan book (A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy) available to you so that
you can follow along and make annotations. For the convenience of
those who do not have their own copies of the book, I have included
the passages I am reading.
Let us start with p. 51 of Chan, Bk VI, Part I of the Mencius:
6A:1.Kao Tzu said, “Human nature is like the willow tree, and
righteousness is like a cup or a bowl. . . . Turn{ing} human nature into
humanity and righteousness is like turning the willow into cups and bowls.”
Mencius said, “Sir, can you follow the nature of the willow tree and make
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the cups and bowls, or must you violate the nature of the willow tree before
you can make the cups and bowls? If you are going to violate the nature of
the willow tree in order to make cups and bowls, then must you also violate
human nature in order to make it into humanity and righteousness? Your
words, alas! Would lead all people in the world to consider humanity and
righteousness as calamity [because they required the violation of human
nature]!”
Now, I would like to emphasize something very important here. Pay
careful attention to who is saying what in these passages. The first
statement by Kao Tzu is a statement by Mencius’s students. This means
that what is said there is most likely incorrect. His statement is corrected
by Mencius immediately. Therefore, when you are looking for
quotations when you get ready to write your paper, make sure that you
are quoting Mencius – and not one of his students — when you are
explaining Mencius’s ideas.
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Secondly, what is the point here? Kao Tzu suggests it is unreasonable
to expect human beings to cultivate humanity and righteousness, but
they are not in accordance with the nature of human beings. In other
words, the implication of Kao Tzu’s comment is that human nature is
not good. Now, let us see how this discussion continues:
6A:2 Kao Tzu said, “Man’s nature is like whirling water. If a breach in
the pool is made to the east it will flow to the east. If a breach is made to
the west it will flow to the west. Man’s nature is indifferent to good and
evil, just as water is indifferent to east and west”.
Once again, the student, Gaozi {Kao Tzu}, has made an erroneous
observation. Human nature, he suggests, is like water that moves in
accordance with what happens to its environment. Mencius promptly
corrects his student again：
6A:2（continued, on page 52):
Mencius said, “Water, indeed, is indifferent to the east and west, but is it
indifferent to high and low? Man’s nature is naturally good just as
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water naturally flows downward. There is no man without this good
nature, neither is there water that does not flow downward. Now you can
strike water and cause it to splash upward over your forehead, and by
damming and leading it, you can force it uphill. Is this the nature of
water? It is the forced circumstance that makes it do so. Man can be
made to do evil, for his nature can be treated in the same way.”
Here we see that Mencius is embarking on distinguishing himself as
the Confucian theorist of human nature. Confucius had talked about the
notion of ren, or humanity, but Mencius develops this into a full-fledged
theory of human nature. For example, Mencius then addresses the
question of whence evil behavior comes: If human beings are
fundamentally good, why we do see so many people doing wrong?
B. The Four Beginnings
His answer is that the virtues are to be found internally, that is, that
men are naturally endowed with these virtues; all men are morally
equal. Moreover, Mencius elaborates upon these virtues, distinguishing
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more precisely than Confucius had ren 仁 from yi 义 (righteousness), li
礼 (propriety), and zhi 智 (wisdom). Let us read the second paragraph
of Book 6A Chapter 6, which is the first full paragraph on p. 54:
6A:6. Mencius said, “If you let people follow their feelings [original
nature], they will be able to do good. If man does evil, it is not the fault of
his natural endowment. The feeling of commiseration is found in all men;
the feeling of shame and dislike {of wrongdoing – GAH} is found in all
men; the feeling of respect and reverence is found in all men; and the
feeling of right and wrong is found in all men. The feeling of
commiseration is what we call humanity; the feeling of shame and dislike
is what we call righteousness; the feeling of respect and reverence is what
we call propriety (li); and the feeling of right and wrong is what we call
wisdom. Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not drilled
into us from outside. We originally have them with us. Only we do not
think [to find them]. Therefore it is said, ”Seek and you will find it,
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neglect and you will lose it.” [Men differ in the development of their
endowments], some twice as much as others, some five times, and some to
an incalculable degree, because no one can develop his original
endowment to the fullest extent. The Book of Odes says, ‘Heaven
produces the teeming multitude. As there are things there are their
specific principles. When the people keep their normal nature they will
love excellent virtue.’ Confucius said, “The writer of this poem indeed
knew the Way (Tao). Therefore as there are things, there must be their
specific principles, and since people keep to their normal nature, therefore
they love excellent virtue.’”
I cannot overemphasize the significance of this passage. It alone
could well be the foundation for the widespread acceptance of the claim
made by the founder of the Rationalist School of Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi
that Mencius was Confucius’s greatest disciple. It raises issues that
became the most widely debated matters in Confucianism and NeoConfucianism. We have:
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 The all-important notion of human nature, which is our focus
today. Mencius clearly states that human nature is good, “just
as water naturally flows downward.”
 The question of the origin of evil. If human beings are good,
why do we see wrongdoing?
 The question of how difficult it is to cultivate the Confucian
virtues.
 The question of why some people are more successful than
others in cultivating them.
 The notion, from the Book of Odes, that human beings, like all
the myriad things in the universe, have their own “specific
principles (li 理).”
I urge you to highlight this part of today’s lecture and refer back to it
whenever we discuss Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism.
Let us discuss it by beginning with Mencius’s contribution to
Confucius’s discussion of humanity (ren) and the other virtues that
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characterize it. How did Mencius depart from or develop this key
notion of ren – humanity – as discussed by Confucius? First, he
coined the notions of the benevolent mind-and-heart (renxin 仁心)
and benevolent government (renzheng 仁政). The origin of renxin,
the benevolent heart, he traced back to the fundamental goodness of
human nature. He did the same with regard to the Four Virtues
emphasized by Confucius. This is evident in this passage in his
discussion of the Four Beginnings (si4duan1 四端, which all men
possess) (on p. 65).
a. Ren 仁 arose out of man’s innate sense of compassion buren zhi
xin (不忍之心), the fact that men and women are unable to bear
another’s suffering. As he writes in 2A:6 (“’All men have the mind{and-heart – GAH} which cannot bear [to see the suffering of]
others.’” He goes on to elaborate on this point. Indeed, it is on the
basis of this observation that Mencius develops the idea of the four
beginnings of the four virtues. Let us read this entire passage:
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2A:6. Mencius said, “All men have the mind which cannot bear [to
see the suffering of] others. The ancient kings had this mind and
therefore they had a government that could not bear to see the
suffering of the people. When a government that cannot bear to see the
suffering of the people is conducted from a mind that cannot bear to
see the suffering of others, the government of the empire will be as
easy as making something go round in the palm {of your hand –
GAH}.
“When I say that all men have the mind{-and-heart} which
cannot bear to see the suffering of others, my meaning may be
illustrated thus: Now, when men suddenly see a child about to fall
into a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and distress, not to gain
friendship with the child’s parents, nor to seek the praise of their
neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation [of lack
of humanity if they did not rescue the child]. From such a case, we see
that a man without the feeling of commiseration is not a man; a man
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without the feeling of shame and dislike {of wrongdoing –GAH} is
not a man; a man without the feeling of deference and compliance is
not a man; and a man without the feeling of right and wrong is not a
man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the
feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the
feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and
the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Men have
these Four Beginnings just as they have their limbs.”
You cannot possibly discuss Mencius without discussing this
notion of the Four Beginnings. Why is this important? Because it
explains why the cultivation of virtue is indeed possible, contrary to
what Mencius’s student Gaozi implied in the first quote we read.
Remember that Gaozi suggested that somehow it was unnatural for
men to act in accordance with the virtues of humanity and
righteousness. Here we see that buren zhi xin or ceyin zhi xin 恻隐之心
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(a compassionate heart) is the beginning of humanity. The same
applies with regard to the other 3 virtues.
Let us continue with the rest of this chapter, beginning at the
bottom of page 65:
Having these Four Beginnings, but saying that {men} cannot
develop them is to destroy themselves.{In other words, if we
have these Four Beginning, but we claim that we cannot
develop them into the full-fledged virtues, we are basically
destroying ourselves. –GAH.} When they say that their ruler
cannot develop them, they are destroying their ruler. If anyone
with these Four Beginnings in him knows how to give them the
fullest extension and development, the result will be like fire
beginning to burn or a spring beginning to shoot. When they are
fully developed, they will be sufficient to protect all people within
the four seas (the world). If they are not developed, they will not be
sufficient even to serve one’s parents.”
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Here we see Mencius echoing Confucius’s vision of eventual world
peace. The practice of self-cultivation of these four beginnings is the
key to achieving that. Moreover, as we see later in the text (7B:16, on p.
81 of Chan), “Humanity is [the distinguishing characteristic of] man.
When embodied in man’s conduct, it is the Way.”
b. yi 义, righteousness, Mencius said, arose out of man’s innate sense
of shame (chi 耻) .
c. propriety (li 礼) arose out of deference/modesty with respect to
one’s older siblings and compliance with the desires of one’s parents
(xiao 孝). Propriety could be extended from xiao towards one’s own
elders, as we see in Book 1A, chapter 7 on p. 61: “Mencius said, “Treat
with respect the elders in my family and then extend that respect to include
the elders in other families.” The rest of that paragraph explains how
the other virtues could be extended to other families as well.
d. Wisdom (zhi 智) arose from the sense of right and wrong (shifei 是
非), which all men have, in Mencius’s view.
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C. The Five Bonds
Yet ren remains the paramount virtue, and it is a universal one. Men
are morally equal, and in society men are continually in interaction
with one another. It is in the Mencius that we find the Confucian idea of
the 5 bonds that tie human beings together expressed. Men and women
are bound to one another in these relationships by certain moral
principles, and through learning (meaning the self-cultivation of these
virtues), they come to have a good life. See Mencius 3A:4, at the bottom
of p. 69:
According to the way of man, if they are well fed, warmly clothed,
and comfortably lodged but without education they will become almost
like animals. The Sage (emperor Shun) worried about it and he appointed
Hsieh to be minister of education and teach people human relations, that
between father and son, there should be affection; between ruler and
minister, there should be righteousness; between husband and wife, there
should be attention to their separate functions {This refers to the
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division of labor between husband and wife, to use more
contemporary language.}; between old and young, there should be a
proper order; and between friends, there should be faithfulness.”
The five bonds, or “Five Relations”, as Chan translates the term, are the
following:
1. Between father and son: affection (qin 亲)
2. Between ruler and minister: righteousness (yi 义)
3. Between husband and wife: attention to separate functions (bie 别).
In French we would refer to this as “Vive la difference!”
4. Between young and old: proper order (xu 序)
5. Between friends: faithfulness / trust (xin 信)
I like Chan’s commentary here. His point is that all men and women
are related to one another, and all should be friends (therefore, there
is no room in this schema for the “enemy”). Indeed, even friends are
like brothers and sisters to each other.
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D. The role of government
We can also see in this passage that a function of government-Mencius cites this example of the sage-king Yao — is to instruct the
people in these proper relationships. Let us continue reading the rest of
the passage:
Emperor Yao said, ‘Encourage them {these relationships –GAH}, lead
them on, rectify them, straighten them, help them, aid them, so they
discover for themselves [their moral nature], and in addition, stimulate
them and confer kindness upon them.’”
Now this point raises the question of why men need government in
the first place? If men are inherently good, why do we see men behaving
badly, creating luan 乱/亂? Mencius’s answer is very much like that
offered by John Locke, who similarly believed that men are
fundamentally good. You will recall that Locke argued that what made
the state of nature a state of war was the appearance of adverse
circumstances – specifically scarcity and spoilage (there was no
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refrigeration in his time). For Mencius there was a similar link between
the fundamental goodness of men and the need for government. He too
argued that men behave badly under bad circumstances. In 6A:7, we
read the following (p. 55):
6A:7. Mencius said, “In good years most of the young people behave well.
In bad years most of them abandon themselves to evil. This is not due to
any difference in the natural capacity endowed by Heaven. The
abandonment is due to the fact that the mind is allowed to fall into evil.
This is a very important point, which leads to the discussion of the need
for self-cultivation. Let us continue with the same passage on p. 55:
Take for instance the growing of wheat. You sow the seeds and cover
them with soil. The land is the same and the time of sowing is also the
same. In time they all grow up luxuriantly. When the time of harvest
comes, they are all ripe. Although there may be a difference between the
different stalks of wheat, it is due to differences in the soil, as rich or poor,
to the unequal nourishment obtained from the rain and the dew, and to
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differences in human effort. Therefore all things of the same kind are
similar to one another. Why should there be any doubt about men? The
sage and I are the same in kind. . . . I say there is a common taste for
flavor in our mouths, a common sense for sound in our ears, and a
common sense for beauty in our eyes. Can it be that in our minds{-andhearts} alone we are not alike. What is it that we have in common in our
minds{-and-hearts}? It is the sense of principle and righteousness (i-li
{义理 or 義理}, moral principles ). {Interestingly, in contemporary
Japanese, this character combination means a “sense of duty” or
“honor”. –GAH} The sage is the first to possess what is common in our
minds. Therefore moral principles please our minds as beef and mutton
and pork please our mouths.” {I am a bit different here – I prefer
broccoli and rice because I am a vegetarian! — GAH}
Again, this is another allusion to the notion of the Four Beginnings, is
it not? There really is no excuse for our not being moral, because all of
us have this sense of principle and righteousness, or morality inherent in
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us from our birth. Yet only the few – “the worthies” are able to preserve
it. Listen to the following passage in 6A:9 (on p. 57):
6A:9. Mencius said, “I like fish and I also like bear’s paw. If I cannot
have both of them, I shall give up the fish and choose the bear’s paw. I like
life and I also like righteousness. If I cannot have both of them I shall give
up life and choose righteousness. I love life, but there is something I love
more than life, and therefore I will not do anything improper to have it. I
also hate death, but there is something I hate more than death, and
therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger. If there is
nothing that man loves more than life, then why should he not employ
every means to preserve it? And if there is nothing that man hates more
than death, then why does he not do anything to avoid danger. There are
cases when a man does not take the course even if by taking it he can
preserve his life, and he does not do anything even if by doing it he can
avoid danger. Therefore there is something men love more than life and
there is something men hate more than death. It is not only the worthies
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alone who have this moral sense. All men have it, but only the worthies
have been able to preserve it.
In short, as Mencius also said, “Everyone can be a Yao or a Shun”.
However, in order to do that, one must practice self-cultivation. In 6A:11,
we read (on p. 58):
6A:11. Mencius said, ”Humanity is man’s mind{-and-heart} and
righteousness is man’s path. Pity the man who abandons the path and
does not follow it, and who has lost his mind{-and-heart} and does not
know how to recover it. When people’s dogs and fowls are lost, they go
to look for them, and yet, when they have lost their {minds-and}hearts, they do not go to look for them. The way of learning is none
other than finding the lost mind{and-heart}.”
Video Part 4
These observations are also suggestive of the point that I made earlier
regarding Socrates and Plato – how they believed that living a good life
requires living in a good polity.
There is a direct link between
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Mencius’s
observations
about
adverse
circumstances
and
the
importance of government, but only limited government is good
government.
In the Mencius 3A:3, Mencius makes this connection explicitly:
3A:3. Duke Wen of T’eng asked about the proper way of government.
Mencius said, “The business of the people should not be delayed. The
Book of Odes says:
In the morning go and gather the grass.
In the evening twist your ropes.
Then get up soon on the roof [to do the repairs],
For before long the grains have to be sowed.
The way according to which the people conduct their lives is this: If they
have a secure livelihood, they will have a secure mind{-and-heart}. And
if they have on secure livelihood, they will not have a secure mind{-andheart}. And if they have no secure mind{-and-heart}, there is nothing
they will not do in the way of self-abandonment, moral deflection,
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depravity, and wild license. When they fall into crime, to pursue and
punish them is to entrap them. How can such a thing as entrapping the
people be allowed under the rule of a man of humanity? Therefore a
worthy ruler will be gravely complaisant and thrifty, showing a
respectful politeness to his subordinates, and taking from the people
according to regulations. Yang Hu said, ‘He who seeks to be rich will not
be humane. He who seeks to be humane will not be rich.’”
Mencius does not make an argument in terms of rights here. His
argument appears to be a practical one. It is clear that for Mencius, it is
unreasonable to expect men to live good lives when they are suffering
under the burden of a government that collects too much in taxes and
otherwise interferes with their ability to earn a livelihood. Indeed, the
blame for that rightly lies with the government itself. At the same time it is
clear that Mencius’s argument for limited government is based on the
assertion of the primacy of the people in the polity. Human beings are the
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essence, the most important part, of the polity. Let us examine this in
greater detail.
a. First of all, note that Mencius, like Locke, believes, that all men are
morally equal. Everyone can cultivate the virtues), as we saw above
in 6A:7.
b. Secondly, Mencius argues that the people ( 人 ) are the primary
consideration in the state. We read the following in 1B:7 (on pp. 6162):
1B:7. Mencius said [to King Hsüan], “ . . . When all your immediate
ministers say that a man is worthy, it is not sufficient. When all your
great officers say so, it is not sufficient. When all your people say so, look
into the case, and if you find him to be worthy, then employ him. When
all your immediate ministers say that a man is no good, do not listen to
them. When all your great officers say so, do not listen to them. When all
your people say so, look into the case, and if you find him to be no good,
then dismiss him. When all your immediate ministers say that a man
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should be executed, to not listen to them. When all your great officers say
so, do not listen to them. When all your people say so, look into the case,
and if you find that the person should be executed, then execute him. It is
therefore said that the people execute him. Only in this way can a ruler
become parent of the people.” Chan adds, “No one in the history of
Chinese thought has stressed more vigorously the primary importance of
the people for the state. Mencius considers the people even more
important than the ruler or territory….”
c. In the same vein, Mencius also draws a distinction between humane
government and despotism in 2A:3 (p. 64):
2A:3 Mencius said, “A ruler who uses force to make a pretense of
humanity is a despot. Such a despot requires a large kingdom. A ruler
who practices humanity with virtue is a true king. To become a true king
does not depend on a large kingdom. T’ang became so with only seventy li,
and King Wen with only a hundred. When force is used to overcome
people, they do not submit willingly but only because they have not
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sufficient strength to resist. But when virtue is used to overcome people,
they are pleased in their hearts and sincerely submit, as the seventy
disciples submitted to Confucius. The Book of Odes says：
From the west, from the east,
From the south, from the north,
None wanted to resist.
This is what is meant.”
The most important tool of good government is moral example,
provided by the king and his ministers.
d. Regarding the need for good government, as I suggested earlier, like
Plato and Socrates, Mencius believes that men and women need a
good polity to be truly virtuous. As Mencius wrote in 4A:20 (on p.
75):
4A:20. Mencius said, “It is not enough to remonstrate {with} the
government officials, nor is it enough to criticize the governmental
measures. It is only the great man who can rectify what is wrong in the
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ruler’s mind{-and-heart}. Let the ruler be humane, and all his people
will be humane. Let the ruler be righteous, and all his people will be
righteous. Let the ruler be correct, and all his people will be correct. Once
the ruler is rectified, the whole kingdom will be at peace.”
e. Finally, in the case of bad government, leading to poor productivity
among people, as we have seen in 3A:3 on pp. 66-67, it is wrong for
government to punish people for their depravity. That would be
entrapment.
f. Hence we have here in the thought of Mencius effectively a
justification for revolution. Furthermore, in 4A:2, quoting Confucius,
4A:2. Mencius said, “The compass and square are the ultimate standards
of the circle and the square. The sage is the ultimate standard of human
relations. To be a ruler, one should carry out to the limit the way of the
ruler. To be a minister, one should carry out to the limit the way of the
minister. They only have to follow the example of Yao and Shun. He who
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does not serve his ruler as Shun served Yao does not respect his ruler,
and he who does not rule his people as Yao ruled his, injures his people.
Confucius said, ‘There are but two ways to follow, that of
humanity and that of inhumanity.’ A ruler who oppresses his people to
the extreme will himself be slain and his kingdom will perish. If he
oppresses not to the extreme, even then his life will be in danger and his
kingdom will be weakened. They will be called by the names ‘King Yü
(meaning an unenlightened king) and ‘King Li’ (meaning a cruel king)
and thought they may have filial sons and affectionate grandsons, they
will not be able in a hundred generations to change these names. The
Book of Odes says:
The mirror of the Shang dynasty is not far back,
It was in the time of the Hsia dynasty [whose last, wicked
king was removed by the founder of Shang].
This is what is meant.”
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4A:9. Mencius said, “Chieh and Chou lost their empires because they lost
the people and they lost the people because they lost the hearts of the
people. There is a way to win the empire. Win the people and you win the
empire. There is a way to win the people. Win their hearts and you will
win the people. And there is a way to win their {minds-and-}hearts. It is
to collect for them what they like and do not do to them what they do not
like, that is all. The people turn to the humanity [of the rule] as water
flows downward and as beasts run to the wilderness.”
g. This justification for revolution is mediated by the doctrine of the
Mandate of Heaven (tianming 天命). This is discussed in the Mencius
5A:5 on pp. 77-78.
5A:5. Wan Chang asked, “Is it true that Yao gave the empire to Shun?
Mencius replied, “No. The emperor cannot give the empire to another
person.” “Yes, but Shun had the empire. Who gave it to him?” Mencius
said, “Heaven gave it to him.” “By Heaven’s giving it to him, do you
mean that Heaven gave it to him in so many words?” “No. Heaven does
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not speak. It simply shows its will by [Shun’s] personal character and his
conduct of affairs.”
“May I ask how Heaven showed its will by [Shun’s] character and his
conduct of affairs?” Mencius said, “The emperor can recommend a
person to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the
empire.” . . .
“May I ask how it was that Yao recommended him to Heaven and
Heaven accepted, and that he showed him to the people and the people
accepted him?” Mencius said, “He had him preside over the sacrifices,
and all the spiritual beings enjoyed them. This means that Heaven
accepted him. He had him preside over the conduct of affairs, and the
affairs were well managed, and the people felt satisfied. This means that
the people accepted him. It was Heaven that gave the empire to him. It
was he people that gave the empire to him. Therefore I said, ‘The emperor
cannot give the empire to another person.’ Shun assisted Yao for twentyeight years. This was more than a man could do; it was Heaven that did
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it. After the death of Yao, when the three-year mourning was completed,
Shun withdrew from the son of Yao to the south of the South River.”
h. Heaven, as Mencius wrote, “sees as my people see.” Let us read the
rest of this passage (on p. 78).
“Therefore I said, ‘Heaven gave the empire to him].’ Only then did he
go to the Middle Kingdom (China) and take the emperor’s seat. If e
had occupied the place of Yao and applied pressure to his son, it would
have been an act of usurpation, and not a gift of Heaven. The ‘Great
Declaration’ said, ‘Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my
people hear.’ This is the meaning.”
Ordinarily, in a hereditary monarchy, Yao would have been
succeeded by his son. However, because the will of the people –
exhibiting the Will of Heaven – was with Shun, Shun succeeded
Yao, even though he was not Yao’s son. This represents a change
in the Mandate of Heaven – a geming 革 命
– which in
contemporary Chinese means revolution. Heaven removed the
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Mandate from the House of Yao (which would have made the son
of Yao the new ruler) and gave it to Shun instead, because Heaven
“sees as the people see”. This was not a violent uprising, but it was a
change in the Mandate of Heaven motivated by the support of the
people for Sun, Mencius argues. Thus, Mencius provides for a
right to revolution, which is based on the obligation of the king to
allow the people to provide for their own livelihood (minsheng 民
生 – For those of you who are familiar with modern Chinese
history, yes, this is the phrase that is the basis of the Father of the
Chinese Sun Yat-sen’s Third People’s Principle – 民 生 主 義 –
People’s Livelihood. This was interpreted by some who belonged
to Sun’s Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (Zhongguo Tongmenghui
中國同盟會) to mean some sort of state socialism that would
ensure that people could support their families.
i. However, as in the thought of John Locke, the legitimacy of rebellion
against the rule is conditional. According to Mencius’s theory, if the
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rebellion is not sufficient to unseat the ruler, then it is not Heaven
that has withdrawn the Mandate from the ruler and conferred it
upon another. Moreover, if the new leader has used inhumane and
illegitimate methods to unseat the ruler and assert his own power, he
is merely a usurper, as we have just seen on p. 78.
Thus, Mencius makes a significant contribution to Confucian political
thought. It is important to note that it is precisely because he takes the time
to articulate a clear argument about the innate nature of men and women
that he is able to articulate a clear and cogent noble lie to legitimate the
Confucian polity, the Mandate of Heaven (Tianming 天 命 ). Note the
similarities and differences with ancient Greek thinkers. Mencius believes
that the ideal leader must be a junzi, a superior man, just as Socrates and
Plato argued for the philosopher-king. However, Mencius’s argument is
somewhat different from that made by Socrates and Plato. Mencius’s
argument is not based on the premise of a natural inequality among men.
On the contrary, he argues that all men are morally equal. The difference
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between the man who has earned from Heaven the right to rule and the
one who has not lies in their actual behavior, their practice of virtuous
behavior. This is ultimately dependent on the sincerity of individual person
and his will (zhi 志), his intent, his desire – indeed his burning desire, to
cultivate the Four Beginnings of virtue with which he has been endowed
by Heaven.
This raises the question of whether some people naturally have
greater ability to form and implement such a will. This would become the
point of departure for many vigorous debates among those who would
seek to enhance Confucianism in subsequent centuries. They would
support their arguments with passages from the other two of the Four
Books: The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean.
Video Part 5
III. The Great Learning (Daxue 大学 or 大學 in traditional Chinese)
We have now completed our examination of the first two of The Four
Books, the Analects, and the Mencius. The other selections from The Four
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Books that we are discussing this week are The Great Learning, the characters
for which, by the way, means “university” in contemporary Chinese; and
the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸). They offer us further reflections
with respect to what we have observed in Confucius and Mencius
regarding human nature, and especially with respect to the theme of selfcultivation. Extracted from the Liji, they most likely did not come from
Confucius, as some claim. But what is important—just as in the case of
Socrates’s noble lie — is that those who follow Confucianism believe that
they represent authentic parts of the Confucian tradition. This is because
we find numerous passages in the Analects and in the Mencius that come
directly from these two books.
Clearly the purpose of The Great Learning is to educate people in
cultivating virtue. Here too we see the notion of the “rule of virtue” in
government and the intimate link between the cultivation of virtue and the
good polity. Let us begin by reading on p. 86-87:
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The Way of learning to be great (or adult education) consists in
manifesting the clear character, loving the people, and abiding (chih) in the
highest good.
…
The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world
would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to
their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate
their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to
cultivate their persona lies would first rectify their minds. Those who wished
to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished
to make their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. The
extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. When
things are investigated knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended,
the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind{-and-heart} is
rectified; when the mind{-and-heart} is rectified, the personal life is
cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated;
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when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is
in order, there will be peace throughout the world. From the Son of Heaven
down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life
as the root or foundation. There is never a case when the root is in disorder
and yet the branches are in order. There has never been a case when what is
treated with great importance becomes a matter of slight importance or what
is treated with slight importance becomes a matter of great importance.
I cannot overstate the significance of this passage. It became the basis for
countless commentaries that dominated Confucian and Neo-Confucian
discourse for millennia. This text is so significant because it contains in a
nutshell the Confucian vision of the ideal world order and – even more
significantly – how that is order is to be achieved. For those of us studying
Confucianism as a political philosophy, it directly connects the moral status
and endeavors of the individuals who comprise the polity to the fate of the
polity and to that of the entire world (Tianxia 天下, “All under Heaven”).
Thus, it also links the comportment of kings, ministers, and others who
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would be junzi, superior men directly to the fate of the universe. Finally,
this text contains the famous passage that became the foundation for the
Neo-Confucianism, which in turn the Socratic lie for imperial China for
another millennium after the 1,500 years that Confucianism became the
basis for the world’s first civil service examination system in China. That is
the sentence that I have put in bold: “The extension of knowledge consists
in the investigation of things.” In other words, we expand our knowledge
– our knowledge of the most important thing in the world – the Will of
Heaven — by investigating, by studying things. Which things must you
study? Ah, that became a matter of contention between Zhu Xi and Wang
Yangming, as you will see later this quarter. In the meantime, you should
meditate on this passage, which is about how to go about the process of
self-cultivation, and why it became so influential in China.
1. For all the importance of the investigation of things for “the
perfecting of knowledge” as the text states at the top of page 89, even
more critical to achieving one’s purpose is the will, the “état d’esprit”
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as the French put it. Therefore, it is imperative that he who would be
a junzi, including the ruler, “make the will sincere”. What does this
mean? This means that you must engage in self-cultivation with a
sincere intention to learn the Will of Heaven. If you are investigating
things, perhaps by meditating on them, that will do you no good
unless you do so with the sincere desire to learn the Will of Heaven.
We have already seen in The Mencius that the ruler must not deceive
the people. Yet even more importantly, The Great Learning reminds us,
he must not deceive himself. Let us read on p. 89-90:
6. What is meant by “making the will sincere” is allowing no selfdeception, as when we hate a bad smell or love a beautiful color.
This is called satisfying oneself. Therefore the superior man will
always be watchful over himself when alone. When the
inferior man is alone and leisurely, there is no limit to which he
does not go in his evil deeds. Only when he sees a superior man
does he then try to disguise himself, concealing the evil and
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showing off the good in him. But what is the use? For other people
see him as if they see his very {}mind-and-}heart. This is what is
meant by saying that what is true in a man’s heart will be shown
in his outward appearance. Therefore, the superior man will
always be watchful over himself when alone….” {Emphasis
added — GAH}
Let us try to restate these ideas in ordinary English. One must
“rectify his or her mind” to make sure that it is correct. One must
overcome one’s tendencies to egoism. This is a theme that we will
encounter once again when we study Buddhism.
Moreover, the affairs of state are intimately intertwined with
the state of virtue of its people: On p. 94 in Chan, we read:
There has never been a case of a ruler who loved humanity and
whose people did not love righteousness. There has never been a case
where the people loved righteousness and yet the affairs of the state
have not been carried to completion. And there has never been a case
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where in such a state the wealth collected in the national treasury does
not continue in the possession of the ruler.”
The last two sentences are a bit confusing because of the multiple
negatives. To clarify, the case described is one in which the ruler has
remained in office and retained the Mandate of Heaven because the
“people loved righteousness.”
Here, once again, then, we see the notion of the Mandate of Heaven:
quoting the Shijing [The Book of Odes], on p. 92 (I), The Great Learning says:
The Book of Odes says, “How much the people rejoice in their prince, a
parent of the people!.” He likes what the people like and dislikes what the
people dislike. This is what is meant by being a parent of the people. The
Book of Odes says, “Lofty is the Southern Mountain! How massive are
the rocks! How majestic is the Grand Tutor Yin (of Chou)! The people all
look up to you!” Thus rulers of sates should never be careless. If they
deviate from the correct path they will be cast away by the world. The
Book of Odes says, “Before the rulers of the Yin (Shang) dynasty lost
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the support of the people, they could have been counterparts of Heaven.
Take warning from the Yin dynasty. It is not easy to keep the Mandate of
Heaven.” This shows that by having the support of the people, they have
their countries, and by losing the support of the people, they lose their
countries. Therefore the ruler will first be watchful over his own
virtue. If he has virtue, he will have the people with him. If he has
virtue, he will have the people with him. If he has the people with
him, he will have the territory. If he has the territory, he will have
wealth. And if he has wealth, he will have its use. Virtue is the
root, while wealth is the branch. If he regards the root as external
(or secondary) and the branch as internal (or essential), he will
compete with the people with the people in robbing each other.
Therefore when wealth is gathered in the ruler’s hand, the people will
scatter away from him; and when wealth is scattered [among the people],
they will gather round him. Therefore if the ruler’s words are uttered in
an evil way, the same words will be uttered back to him in an evil way;
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and if he acquires wealth in an evil way, it will be taken away from him
in an evil way. In the “Announcement of K’ang” it is said, “The
Mandate of Heaven is not fixed or unchangeable.” The good ruler
gets it and the bad ruler loses it. {Emphasis added — GAH}
Here we see that Mencius’s emphasis on the centrality of the people
and their views and commitment to righteousness echoes this theme in
The Great Learning. Note also that this classic also emphasizes the
connection between the cultivation of virtue in oneself and in one’s
family, on the one hand, and the government of the state. Once again
government is by moral example. See Chapter 9 on the previous page (p.
91), where we read the following:
9. What is meant by saying that in order to govern the state it is
necessary first to regulate the family is this: There is no one who cannot
teach his own family and yet can teach others. Therefore the superior man
(rule) without going beyond his family, can bring education into
completion in the whole state. . . . When the individual families have
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become humane, then the whole country will be aroused toward
humanity. When the individual families have become compliant, then the
whole country will be aroused toward compliance. When one man is
greedy or avaricious, the whole country will be plunged into disorder.
Such is the subtle, incipient activating force of things.
Here again we have a summary of the Confucian vision of the ideal
order. It draws the connection among the three points mentioned by
Chan in his introduction to The Great Learning: “manifesting the clear
character of man, loving the people, and abiding in the highest good.”
(p. 84). This articulates clearly that the self-cultivation of virtue by each
individual in society is intimately related to the political sphere, in
which the most urgent imperative is “loving the people” and “abiding
in the highest good.”
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Video Part 6
IV. The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong)
Now we turn to the Fourth of the Four Books – The Doctrine of the Mean.
First, what is the Mean? No, this is not a book about the teachings of mean
people! Rather, it is, like The Great Learning, a section of the Liji (The Book
of Rites). However, it is “a discourse on psychology and metaphysics”, as
Chan puts it on p. 95. Thus, it is has a more mystical quality to it, which
made it very attractive to Daoists and Buddhists, as well as to Confucian
thinkers. Because one of the goals of the philosophers who came to craft
Neo-Confucianism was to make Confucianism sufficiently complete, with
its own mysticism and religious elements, this book came to become
emphasized heavily by the Neo-Confucians. The Doctrine of the Mean
emphasizes the connection between nature as a whole and man’s endeavor
to understand and to follow the Way of Heaven. The two realms are
emphatically one in this classic.
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So, what does the word “Mean” in the title of this classic mean (sorry
about that!)? Let us examine the text in Chapter 1 (p. 98). We shall begin
with the second paragraph and then return to the first paragraph:
Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is
called equilibrium (chung 中, centrality, mean). {Note that this is the
same character as the one used for “China”, meaning the “Middle
Kingdom” 中国.} When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain
due measure and degree, it is called harmony. Equilibrium is the great
foundation of the world, and harmony {is} its universal path. When
equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, heaven and
earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.
Thus, the “mean” refers to an equilibrium among men’s various
competing states of mind. The junzi (the superior man) is not dominated by
feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, but rather he (or she, but in the
time of the ancient philosophers, they saw this mostly as a male enterprise)
succeeds in maintaining a healthy equilibrium among these various
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feelings. To put this more simply, we must not allow ourselves to be
buffeted about by our temporary feelings of joy, sadness, anger, or pleasure,
because such feelings interfere with our ability to focus on our singular
mission of cultivating virtue within ourselves and our families.
Furthermore, there is an element of cosmology here that we will
encounter again when we study Zhuxi later in this course. The equilibrium
within the individual is correlated with equilibrium or harmony in the
universe as a whole. For those who have taken courses in Western political
philosophy, it might be helpful at draw a comparison with, for example,
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. When Hegel talks about Mind, he is at
once talking about the mind of God or Geist and the mind of the individual
man, who is a manifestation, an emanation, of God.) Since God, as the
creator, is the originator of the entire world, there is the mind of God
something called totality. In other words, the Divine Idea in the Mind of
God embraces the totality of the universe.
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The important point here is that the Doctrine of the Mean is a book that
focuses on the difficulty of achieving this mean, this equilibrium within
each one of us, and therefore it is an intensely spiritual text. What is
interesting for us is how Confucius especially applies this to any individual
who would claim the right to lead and rule others.
Every allegedly
superior man (junzi) is challenged to the fulfill the obligations that he
demands of others. Let us read from chapter 13 of The Doctrine of the Mean
on p. 101:
[Confucius said, . . . ] “There are four things in the Way of the superior man,
none of which I have been able to do. To serve my father as I would expect my
son to serve me: that I have not been able to do. To serve my ruler as I would
expect my ministers to serve me: that I have not been able to do. To serve my
elder brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to serve me: that I have
not been able to do. To be the first to treat friends as I would expect them to
treat me: that I have not been able to do. In practicing the ordinary virtues and
in the exercise of care in ordinary conversation, when there is deficiency, the
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superior man never fails to make further effort, and when there is excess, never
dares to go to the limit. His words correspond to his actions and his actions
correspond to his rods. Isn’t the superior man earnest and genuine?”
Wing-tsit Chan, the editor and translator of the Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy, points out that this is actually a “positive golden rule” in
Confucianism: Do unto others what you would want others to do unto you.
Chan wants to refute the claim that some have made that Confucius had
only a negative golden role to the effect that one must not treat others as
one would not wish to be treated oneself.
However, I believe that there are two other key points in this passage:
1) The first is about the meaning of sincerity, which the Doctrine of the
Mean associates directly with the notion of the Dao and the natural world. I
know, I have just talked about sincerity, but the next couple of passages lay
the groundwork for connecting Confucian self-cultivation to the
metaphysics of the natural world.
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Let us look first at the following passage from Chapter 25 on page 108.
Now this first passage, I would like to warn you, is rather spiritual:
25. Sincerity means the completion of the self, and the Way is self-directing.
Sincerity is the beginning and the end of things. Without sincerity there
would be nothing. Therefore the superior man values sincerity. Sincerity is
not only the completion of one’s own self, it is that by which all things are
completed. The completion of the self means humanity. The completion of all
things means wisdom. These are the character of the nature, and they are the
Way in which the internal {the essential} and the external {the secondary}
are united. Therefore wherever it is employed, everything done is right.
This is a very important passage because it would hold significant
implications for how one interprets the notion of the “things” we are urged
to investigate in The Great Learning. First, let me clarify that the notion of
“completion” means fulfillment of one’s potential as a human being or as
part of nature, but not in the narrow sense of the satisfaction of the senses.
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It means the fulfillment of the potential of each thing in nature, including
one’s self as a human being.
Now, what are the “internal” and the “external”? This would
subsequently become a matter of debate in Neo-Confucianism. But let us
not get ahead of ourselves. On p. 109. we read that sincerity 诚(cheng) is
connected with the eternal nature of the Dao, the Way of Heaven.
26. Therefore absolute sincerity is ceaseless. Being ceaseless, it is lasting.
Being lasing, it is evident. Being evident, it is infinite. Being infinite, it is
extensive and deep. Being extensive and deep {or profound — GAH}, it is
high and brilliant. It is because it is [so] extensive and deep that it contains
all things. It is because it is high and brilliant that it overshadows all things.
It is because it is infinite and lasting that it can complete all things. In being
extensive and deep, it is a counterpart of Earth. In being high and brilliant,
it is a counterpart of Heaven. In being infinite and lasting, it is unlimited.
Such being its nature, it becomes prominent without any display, produces
changes without motion, and accomplishes its ends without action.
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We will come back to the notion of “non-action” when we address
Daoism next week. For now, it suffices to note that this passage connects
man’s internal struggle to cultivate virtue to nature and the
complementary notions of movement and non-movement, Heaven and
Earth, that are themes in the Book of Change. The human quest for selfcultivation in the Way of Heaven is part of the natural workings of the
universe as a whole.
2) The second key point in this passage brings us right back to the notion of
the “rectification of names” zhengming. As it applies to a political leader, it
means that the ruler must be worthy of being called the ruler. We read in
Chapter 28, on p. 111 the following:
[Confucius said, . . . ], “Although a man occupies the throne, if he has not the
corresponding virtue, he may not dare to institute systems of music and
ceremony.”
Hence, it was not only necessary to have a virtuous man occupy the throne.
Such a man must continuously act in a manner that is consistent with his
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name as the emperor. Otherwise, either he must rectify his behavior or …
the implication is that he will risk the possibility that Heaven will
withdraw the Mandate of Heaven from him.
These themes in the Doctrine of the Mean would provide fertile grand
for future Confucian thinkers, especially those who became involved in the
endeavor to formulate Neo-Confucianism.
Video Part 7
V. Critiques of Confucianism: Xunzi and an introduction to Mozi
Now we examine some critics of some of the Confucian ideas that we
have addressed so far. In doing so, we will emphasize the theme of the
treatment of human nature and its implications for their views regarding
the ideal polity. The two thinkers that we will address today are Xunzi and
Mozi. To be clear, Xunzi is regarded – and certainly regarded himself — as a
Confucian, but his estimation of human nature differs dramatically from
the views of Confucius and Mencius (especially Mencius). While he
nevertheless upholds the notion of the Mandate of Heaven, his views about
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human nature thus laid the groundwork for formulation of Legalism and
for different implications for revolution change.
A. Xunzi
Usually, when we discuss each thinker, we begin with that thinker’s
view regarding human nature and then make our way to his diagnosis
of the human condition, and finally, to his articulation of his ideal polity
and the Socratic lie to support it. In the case of Xunzi, because his views
on human nature collide with those of Confucius and Mencius – who
became his rival for the title of Confucius’s best disciple – I think it is
important first that I underscore the fact that Xunzi clearly saw himself
as a Confucian thinker. He does not criticize Confucius, not directly at
least. Instead, he levels his criticisms against Mencius. Even in doing so,
however, on other matters, Xunzi is in complete agreement with
Confucius and Mencius. For example, Xunzi agrees on the preeminent
importance of certain virtues. He writes (on p.121):
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Of the things in heaven, none is brighter than the sun and moon. Of
the things on earth, none is brighter than water and fire. And among
men’s virtues, none is brighter than propriety and righteousness.
Xunzi also agrees on the importance of the rites, although, as we
shall see, his reasoning for why they must be performed is different
than that of Mencius. Finally, Xunzi agrees with Confucius and
Mencius regarding the “rectification of names”. He was distressed by
the departure of kings and ministers from the moral implications of
the titles they held. He writes the following, for example, in Chapter
22 “On the Rectification of Names” (Section 2 on p. 124):
. . . When sage-kings instituted names, the names were fixed and
actualities distinguished. The sage-kings’ principle were carried out
and their wills understood. Then the people were carefully led and
unified. Therefore, the practice of splitting terms and arbitrarily
creating names to confuse correct names, thus causing much doubt in
people’s minds and bringing about much litigation, was called great
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wickedness. It was a crime, like private manufacturing of credentials
and measurements, and therefore the people dared not rely on strange
terms created to confuse correct names. Hence the people were honest.
Being honest, they were easily employed. Being easily employed, they
achieved results. Since the people dared not rely on strange terms
created to confuse correct names, they single-mindedly followed the
law and carefully obeyed orders. In this way the traces of their
accomplishments spread. The spreading of traces and achievements of
results are the highest point of good government. This is the result of
careful abiding by the conventional meaning of names.
Now the sage-kings are dead and the guarding of names has
become lax, strange terms have arisen, and names and actualities have
been confused. As the standard of right and wrong is not clear, even
the guardians of law and the teachers of natural principles are in a
state of confusion.
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Here we have Xunzi’s diagnosis of the human condition. We have
government, but the government is not doing its job and is
allowing the proliferation of “strange” and misleading names to
confuse people. The various names that describe our roles in
society – as a mother, father, brother, sister, king, minister, or
friend – also prescribe the way in which we are to conduct our
affairs and maintain our relationships with others. Thus, when
people are confused about names, they are confused about ethics,
and the result is a sort of luan.
Now Xunzi obviously shared this belief with his teacher,
Confucius. He goes further than Confucius in the remainder of
this section, which also offers insights on ontology, that is, how
human beings come to know and understand their being and the
their experience of the world.
However, in the next section,
entitled “The Nature of Man is Evil” (Chapter 23, on p. 128), we
realize that while lax government and its failure to enforce correct
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names is a problem, the ultimate source of luan for Xunzi is human
nature. Indeed his discussion of this marks the beginning of his
articulation of his Socratic lie defending his ideal polity.
Let us examine this argument in greater detail. As Xunzi put it
very plainly, even harshly (on p. 128):
The nature of man is evil; his goodness is the result of his activity.
Let us pause for a minute and restate this more clearly. Man in his
nature is evil. Human nature is evil. It is only as a result of his effort
that he can be observed to be performing good actions. Let us
continue with description of human nature:
Now, man’s inborn nature is to seek for gain. If this tendency is followed,
strife and rapacity result and deference and compliance disappear. By
inborn nature one is envious and hates others. If these tendencies are
followed, injury and destruction result and loyalty and faithfulness
disappear. By inborn nature one possesses the desires of ear and eye and
likes sound and beauty. If these tendencies are followed, lewdness and
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licentiousness result, and the pattern and order of propriety and
righteousness disappear. Therefore to follow man’s nature and his
feelings will inevitably result in strife and rapacity, combine with
rebellion and disorder, and end in violence. Therefore there must be the
civilizing influence of teachers and laws and the guidance of
propriety and righteousness, and then it will result in deference
and compliance, combine with pattern and order, and end in
discipline. From this point of view, it is clear that the nature of
man is evil and that his goodness is the result of activity.
{Emphasis added – GAH}
Notice Xunzi’s emphasis on laws – the conduct of the rites alone is
not sufficient. He continues:
Crooked wood must be heated and bent before it becomes straight.
{Contrast this to Mencius’s discussion of willow tree and cups
and bowls with Gaozi. — GAH} Blunt metal must be ground and
whetted before it becomes sharp. Now the nature of man is evil. It
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must depend on teachers and laws to become correct and achieve
propriety and righteousness and then it becomes disciplined. Without
teachers and laws, man is unbalanced, off the track, and incorrect.
Without propriety and righteousness, there will be rebellion, disorder,
and chaos. The sage-kings of antiquity, knowing that the nature of
man is evil, and that it is unbalanced, off the track, incorrect,
rebellious, disorderly, and undisciplined, created the rules of propriety
and righteousness and instituted laws and systems in order to correct
man’s feelings, transform them, and direct them so that they all may
become disciplined and conform with the Way (Tao). Now people who
are influenced by teachers and laws, accumulate literature and
knowledge, and follow propriety and righteousness are superior men,
whereas those who give rein to their feelings enjoy indulgence, and
violate propriety and righteousness are inferior men. From this point
of view, it is clear that the nature of man is evil and that his goodness
is the result of his activity.
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Of course, Xunzi was not unaware that Mencius held a different
view. Let us see how he responds to Mencius, at the top of page 129:
Mencius said, “Man learns because his nature is good.” This is not
true. He did not know the nature of man and did not understand the
distinction between man’s nature and his effort. Man’s nature is the
product of Nature {Heaven would be a better translation here
because the character Tian 天 is the same character as that used
to refer to Heaven — GAH}; it cannot be learned and cannot be
worked for. Propriety and righteousness are produced by the sage.
They can be learned by men and can be accomplished through work. . . .
Mencius said, “The nature of man is good; it [becomes evil] because
man destroys his original nature.” This is a mistake. By nature man
departs from his primitive {meaning “original” –GAH} and capacity
as soon as he is born, and he is bound to destroy it. From this point of
view, it is clear that man’s nature is evil.
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The implication of this is very clear from the preceding passage. One
cannot expect the controls on men’s negative impulses to come from
within men themselves: They must come from without, from social
controls. Only through the laws and the rights (li), as imposed by
sages and sage-kings guided by teachers – like Xunzi — can virtue be
realized. Again, for Xunzi, however, the rites are not enough. Man’s
evil nature renders laws and punishments absolutely necessary. The
conclusions for human self-control are the same as those reached by
Confucius
and
Mencius
concerning
self-cultivation.
But
the
consequences for the political order are dramatically different. Men
cannot be trusted to cultivate the virtue necessary to maintain a
peaceful order.
Let us read a more succinct articulation of Xunzi’s prescription for
the political order (on p. 131):
. . . Man’s nature is evil. Therefore the sages of antiquity, knowing that
man’s nature is evil, that it is unbalanced and incorrect, and that it is
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violent, disorderly, and undisciplined, established the authority of rulers
to govern the people, set forth clearly propriety and righteousness to
transform them, instituted laws and governmental measures to rule them,
and made punishment severe to restrain them, so that all will result in
good order and be in accord with goodness. Such is the government of
sage-kings and the transforming influence of propriety and righteousness.
Now we are in a position to elaborate upon the differences between
Xunzi and Mencius. It should be obvious to you now why the two men
were rivals. If one was right, the other had to incorrect about something
as fundamental as the understanding of human nature. I would like to
note a few other significant differences between the two men’s views.
1. Xunzi sees hierarchy as a positive feature. Mencius does not go as
far as Xunzi does on this point. Indeed, Xunzi believes that
recognition of social distinctions and natural hierarchy is what sets
human beings apart from beasts.
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2. Xunzi agrees with Mencius that the right to exercise political rule
depends on the sagacity (sage-like qualities) or virtue of an
individual, even if that individual is not a member of the royal family.
Remember Mencius’s discussion of how Shun succeeded Yao.
However, Xunzi’s discussion of succession occurs in the context of a
scenario in which the emperor has died. Consider the following
quotation:
“If there is no Sage among [the emperor’s] descendants, but there is
one among the Three Chief Ministers, then it is best that the empire
should go to them; they will revive and restore it. Then the empire is
submissive; it turns to them without any difference. If a Yao succeeds
a Yao, what change is there? Only a change of dynasty, an alternation
in the government is difficult. Hence when the Emperor lives, that
whole country exults; it is most obedient and well-ordered; according
to people’s virtue is rank determined. When he dies, the person who is
able to carry the responsibility of the empire will naturally succeed
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him. In this, the distinctions of the rules of proper conduct (li) and of
standards of justice (i) are made complete, and what need is there of
abdication?”4
Here there is the possibility of succession on the basis of virtue,
whether or not the successor is a member of the royal family.
However, it is rationally based, rather than being articulated in the
context of a notion of a Heavenly Mandate. Nor is there any notion,
as in The Mencius, that Heaven “sees with the eyes of the people.” It
seems to me that a possibility of a judgment on the part of “the
people”/Heaven to remove a “mandate” to rule from the ruling
emperor is not in the cards for Xunzi. In other words, I do not see his
much more authoritarian philosophy allowing for the possibility of a
revolution from below.
4 Quoted in Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 302-303.
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Xunzi believes man is fundamentally evil — thus he is not an
advocate of human freedom, and he would distrust the “instincts” of
ordinary people. Here is another passage to underscore this point:
“The Emperor’s authority and position are most honorable and he has
no peer in the empire. . . . His virtue is pure and complete; his
wisdom and kindness are most illustrious. When he faces the south
(i.e., seated on his throne) and rules the empire, all living people are
moved and obey, and yield to his influence. The empire then has no
recluses nor any neglected good men. What is in accord with his acts
is right; what differs from them is wrong.”5
As you can see, Xunzi’s views are much more akin to those of
Hobbes, who defended monarchical absolutism–except that there is
no “social contract” of any kind in Xunzi.
5 Quoted in ibid., vol. 1, p. 302.
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Video Part 8
B. Mozi
1. Key tenets of Mozi’s philosophy
Now Xunzi’s would not be the only criticism that could be raised
against Confucian philosophers. Of course, as we have seen, although
Xunzi opposed Mencius regarding the view of human nature, he
considered himself to be a Confucian philosopher. If Xunzi believed
that li (propriety) and yi (righteousness) were imposed for the good of
human beings, Mozi would take this notion of imposition and use it to
make a trenchant critique of Confucianism on which Daoists could
build.
Mozi is believed to have lived between the time that Confucius lived
and Mencius’s lifetime, and came from the same northeastern area of
China where Mozi had lived. Thus, we find in some of Mencius’s
writings some very negative treatment of what Mencius considered to
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be an unfortunate preponderance of Mohist ideas. We will discuss this
in greater detail later.
Next week, you will have actually read some of Mozi’s writings. But
I would like to begin to discuss Mozi now, in order to give you an idea
of an alternative to Confucian thought that developed between the time
that Confucius lived and the time in which Mencius developed the
elaboration of Confucius’s ideas into the theory of human nature that
we have just examined. Mozi’s thought will also help us to understand
the other philosophical systems of Legalism and Daoism, which we will
examine next.
Observing the social and moral ills of his lifetime and the suffering
that they brought to the common people, Mozi felt compelled to try to
do something about it. Thus, his teachings express his compassion for
the common people and offer profound criticism of their rulers. Mozi
and his followers “condemned the music, dances, and luxurious living
of the literati, because he felt that such pastimes taxed the wealth and
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energy of the common people and added nothing to the material
welfare of the nation.”6 He developed these critical perspectives into a
systematic attack on Confucianism.
On one major point, Mozi was in agreement with Confucianists: the
ideal that rulers had the obligation of seeking out men of wisdom and
virtue and employing them in their governments to help society to
restore peace and order. Ideally, of course, Mozi would be one ideal
such wise advisor to the ruler.
2. Mozi’s critique of the Confucians
Mozi’s critique is a trenchant one:
a. First of all, in his view, the ideas of the Confucians were
hypocritical. Mozi taught (p. 213), “{That to which} the man of humanity
devotes himself . . . surely lies in the promotion of benefits for the world and the
6 “Introduction,” in Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, trans. Burton
Watson, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies, no. 74 (New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1967), p 6.
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removal of harm from the world.” However, in fact, they had brought much
harm in the name of humanism.
1. Similar criticisms attacked offensive warfare and elaborate funerals and
other spending on rites that Mozi considered to be extravagant and
wasteful of the resources of the people. Let us examine his words on p.
228-229 of the Chan book:
Now the gentlemen o[f] the world still doubt whether elaborate funerals
and extended mourning are right or wrong, beneficial or harmful.
Therefore Mo Tzu said: I have inquired into the matter. If the doctrines of
those who advocate elaborate funerals and extended mourning are
followed in the affairs of the country, it will mean that whenever a king,
duke, or great official dies, there would be layers of coffin, the burial
would be deep, the shrouding would be plenty, the embroidery covering
would be elaborate, and the grave mound would be massive. . . .
Mourners would weep in a confused manner to the point of choking,
wear sackcloth on the breast and flax on the head, keep the snivel
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dangling, live in a morning hut, sleep on straw, and rest their heads on a
lump of earth. . . . All this is to last for three years.
. . . So much wealth is buried in elaborate funerals and long periods of
work are suspended in extended mourning. Wealth that is already
produced is carried to be buried and wealth yet to be produced is long
delayed. To seek wealth in this way is like seeking a harvest by stopping
farming. . . .
b. Mozi also attacked what he felt were the fatalistic doctrines of
Confucianism, because he wanted men to believe that wealth and good
fortune came only in response to virtuous deeds. As he wrote (on p. 222),
“When fate decrees that one shall enjoy longevity, one will enjoy longevity. And
when the fate decrees that one will suffer brevity of life, he will suffer brevity of life.
What is the use of exerting strong [effort]?” Criticizing Confucianism as a
doctrine that benefitted a small minority, Mozi opposed the notion that the
favored position of the few might be legitimated by fatalistic view of the
favor of Heaven. As he wrote (on p. 225), people would just accept being
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poor and weak as their fate instead of taking responsibility for doing what
needs to be done for them to prosper.
c. Yet, Mozi’s most important attack on Confucianism was based on a
philosophical perspective that was radically universalistic. Thus in the
selection that you read from his chapter on “Universal Love” jian’ai 兼爱,
Mozi blamed the ills of his age on the lack of universalistic love. The
Confucianists had actually contributed to this problem by stressing what
Mozi considered the “partiality” — the “partial” love — of filial piety that
was so emphasized by Confucius. By contrast, Mozi argued that the key
was for men and women to love everyone as one loves one’s own family.
See the following passage from p. 214:
What is the way of universal love and mutual benefit?
Mo Tzu said: It is to regard other people’s countries as one’s own. Regard
other people’s families as one’s own. Regard other people’s persons as
one’s own. Consequently, when feudal lords love one another, they will
not fight in the fields. When heads of families love one another, they will
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not usurp one another. When individuals love one another, they will not
injure one another. When ruler and minister love each other, they will be
affectionate and filial. When brothers love each other, they will be
peaceful and harmonious. When all the people in the world love one
another, the strong will not overcome the weak, the many will not
oppress the few, the rich will not insult the poor, the honored will not
despise the humble, and the cunning will not deceive the ignorant.
Because of universal love, all the calamities, usurpations, hatred, and
animosity in the world may be prevented from arising. Therefore the man
of humanity praises it.
3. Mozi’s noble lie
Ironically, while Mozi seems to be idealistic in believing that
universal love is the solution to man’s problems in the political realm, he
quite frankly admitted that it is difficult to achieve, even within one’s own
family. It is not that surprising, then, that a much more pessimistic outlook
emerges when he examine his noble lie. Chan suggests, on p. 231, that
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Mozi is in harmony with Confucian thought in that he seems to accept the
notion of the Mandate of Heaven. Chan goes on to dismiss criticisms of
Mozi as “absolutist” (see p. 231). I believe that Chan discounts such
criticism too easily. This is a serious matter, one that — coupled with
Mozi’s view that universal love is indeed very difficult and his opposition
to warfare — can be viewed as making Mozi’s political philosophy very
authoritarian. It would, moreover, certainly negate any possibility of
legitimate revolutionary change.
One of the key differences between Mencius and Mozi lies in Mozi’s
doctrine of “Agreement with the Superior” (p. 230). In fact, this is where
Mozi articulates his noble lie. He writes:
“ . . . [W]hy not examine the theory of the origin of the government? In
the beginning when man was created, there was no ruler. People existed
as individuals. As they existed as individuals, there was one concept of
right for a hundred men, a thousand concepts of right for a thousand men,
and so on until there were a countless number of concepts of right for a
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countless number of men. All of them considered their own concepts of
right as correct and other people’s concepts as wrong. And there were
strife among the strong and quarrels among the weak. Thereupon Heaven
wished to unify all concepts of right in the world. The worthy was
therefore selected and made an emperor. The emperor, realizing his
inadequate wisdom and ability to govern alone, selected the next best in
virtue and appointed them as the three ministers. The three ministers,
realizing their inadequate wisdom and ability to assist the emperor alone,
divided the country into states and set up feudal lordships {feudal
domains — GAH}. The feudal lords, realizing their inadequate wisdom
and ability to govern the land within the four borders by themselves,
selected the next best in virtue. . . . Therefore, in appointing the three
ministers, the feudal lords, the great officers, the prime minister, the
village elders, and the heads of households, the emperor of old did not
select them because of their wealth, high position, or leisure, but
employed them to assist in bringing political order and administering the
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government. . . . When order prevails in the empire, the emperor further
unifies all concepts of right as one in the empire and makes it agree with
[the will of] Heaven. Therefore the principle of agreement wit the
superior can be applied by the emperor to govern the empire, by the
feudal lords to govern the state, and heads of households to govern the
family. . . .
You can see in this passage a sort of belief in the notion of the Mandate of
Heaven. However, Mozi clearly does not believe that human beings are
fundamentally good. Rather they are characterized by egotism and
arrogance, in that they insist on maintaining their own opinions against
those of others. Thus, Mozi’s account of life without a “superior”, that is,
without a supreme authority that has the mandate to rule, is like that of
Thomas Hobbes. Like Hobbes’s state of nature as a state of perpetual
potential war, it is characterized by “strife” and quarrels”.
The solution to this problem was contrived by Heaven. On page 219, we
read, “I . . . know that Heaven gives the standard to the emperor.” “Thus the
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emperor is the most honorable in the world and the richest in the world.” Order
comes about when subordinates accept and live in agreement with the
standards established by their superiors, from the emperor on down to the
common person, and these standards are ultimately laid down by Heaven.
As Fung Yu-lan argues, Mozi’s identification of the Emperor as the Son of
Heaven with Heaven itself and his insistence that the will of the emperor is
the will of Heaven, makes “his Emperor not … only a ruler, but . . . the final
arbiter of all teachings and ideas.” With Mozi’s insistence on the agreement
of all with the Superior, there is no basis for an individual who has his own
ideas and “standards” – or a group of such individuals — to oppose
imperial authority legitimately, which make his emperor an absolute
monarch. Interestingly, even Xunzi, who had a much more pessimistic
view of human nature than Mozi’s vision of universal love would seem to
suggest, “criticized this aspect of Mo Tzu’s philosophy, saying that “’Mo
Tzu
had
vision
regarding
uniformity,
but
no
vision
regarding
individuality’.”7
7
Hsün-tzu, pp. 184-185, cited in Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 102.
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4. The limits of the influence of Mohism
The vehemence with which Mencius criticized Mozi’s ideas would
suggest that Mohism was as influential as Confucianism. Yet we do not
hear much today about Mohism and its followers. This could be because of
a combination of profound changes in Chinese society and intellectual life
that rendered Mohism unappealing to members of the ruling class, the
audience to which Mozi’s teachings were directed. Some of these changes
were:
a. Technological change in agriculture that made the upper classes
more affluent than they had been in Mozi’s time. This would have
made Mohism’s emphasis on frugality and plain living less
attractive to them. (As one author of a late chapter in the Zhuangzi
put it, Mohism allowed for “’no singing in life, no mourning in
death’”: “’It causes the people to be anxious, to be sorrowful, and
its ways are hard to follow.’” (Zhuangzi, Chapter 10, “Tianxia”).
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When people have more leisure time, how do they like to spend it?
They prefer to engage in activities with friends and family that
bring them joy.
b. The growth of rationalism made Mozi’s emphasis on spirits and
ghosts less appealing and persuasive.
c. The utilitarianism that characterized many of Mozi’s arguments
was deemed to offer an inadequate basis for an entire moral
philosophy, especially in comparison with Confucian ethics and
Daoist metaphysics.
Nevertheless, Mozi’s philosophy is interesting because it has significant
connections with other philosophies that we are studying. We have seen
that this view of the “state of nature” makes his philosophy very much like
that of Xunzi with regard to the question of human nature. Since the
Legalists cited Xunzi and his followers to support their philosophy, as we
shall see, this makes Mozi a connection between Confucianism and
Legalism (on the political right). Mozi’s emphasis on practicality and the
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impossibility of ensuring agreement on a given set of ideas would support
the point of departure for Xunzi’s disciples, the most important of whom
would include the Legalist Han Feizi and the legalistic practitioner Li Si.
On the other hand, on the political left, Daoists also shared some points in
common with Mohism and Mozi’s critique of the hypocrisy of the
Confucianists.
However, despite their shared connection to Mozi, the Legalists and
the Daoists held very divergent views. We will continue with the
competing views of the Daoists and Legalists concerning human nature,
the human condition, and the ideal polity next week.
 
Week 4:
Confucianism and its Contenders: The Problem of Human
Nature (II) (Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism)
IV.1 of 72
Week 4:
Confucianism and its Contenders: The Problem of Human
Nature (II) (Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism)
Video Part 1
Background: Golden Lotus Daoist temple in Lucheng, Zhejiang Province,
China
 Review of the Short Midterm Paper Prompt
 Pearl of Wisdom regarding the Importance of Compliance with
Formal Requirements (Requirements with respect to Form)
I. Completion of the discussion of Mozi
As we move from the discussion of Mohism to the discussion of Legalism
and Daoism, it is helpful to note certain elements in Mohism that may have
contributed not only to Daoism but to Legalism as well. Here I am going to
clarify and elaborate upon a few points that I have mentioned briefly before
to help us to make the transition to a discussion of Legalism.
A. First, although Mozi was generally opposed to warfare, Mohism did
recognize a role for “legitimate” force—as for example, on the part of the
small state defending itself against the larger state. Warfare would come to
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Nature (II) (Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism)
IV.2 of 72
be the keynote of Legalist policies under Emperor Qin Shi Huang.
B. It is also important to keep in mind the fact that while Mozi’s advocacy
of universal love would seem to be based on a rather sanguine view of
human nature, Mozi’s …