Communications Question

https://mediaengagement.org/research/general-elect..

SPC 4930 Take Home Final Exam
ASSIGNED: 4/25/24
DUE: 5/2/24 by 11:59 PM EST
DIRECTIONS: Please answer completely all questions. Note that questions may contain multiple
parts and your answers should clearly indicate which part of the question you are responding to
(e.g. 1b). Your typed answers should be uploaded as a word document to Canvas by
Thursday, May 2, 2024 at 11:59 PM EST. This take home final exam is designed to be
completed independently. You may consult your notes and course readings as you formulate your
responses. This take home final exam is worth 50 points.
1. During our discussion on candidate ideals, we discussed the idea of prototypes and how these
influence voter decision making in elections.
a. Explain what a political prototype is by defining it clearly and giving an example of a
prototype (either in politics or marketing/advertising or another context; 2 points).
b. In the Trent et al. (2017) reading, “The Consistent Attributes of the Ideal Presidential
Candidate in an Increasingly Divided Electorate,” what presidential candidate
characteristics were more important to Democratic voters in the 2016 election compared
to Republican voters? Explain how you determined your answer from the reading. (3
points)
2. Please read the article “Google to limit targeted political ads as Silicon Valley grapples with
2020” here (https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/20/google-political-ads-targeting-072352).
Based on this Politico article, the Nielsen (2012) reading on microtargeting for class, and class
discussions:
a. Explain what microtargeting is and compare the approach to mass forms of advertising. (3
points)
b. Explain how Google’s decision on political advertising influenced how campaigns
microtargeted voters with particular messages in the 2020 campaign. (2 points)
3. Please read the news clip below to answer the next question.
Donald Trump’s overwhelming victory in New York, where he is in line to win more than 85 of the
state’s 95 delegates, may be the result of Trump’s popularity in his home state. But there’s no question
that in this case, the nomination calendar worked to Trump’s advantage, delivering him an opportunity
for a reset following his roughest stretch since voting began. “It’s like getting your quarterback hurt
during your bye week,” one operative close to Trump’s campaign said. “He was in good enough shape
in New York that he could buckle down and spend some time revamping.”
Based on your reading of the clip:
a. Identify and define the type of news frame used in the news story. (2 points)
b. Explain why journalists use this type of news frame in reporting on U.S. campaigns and
elections. (3 points)
4. You represent a client and are designing a nationally representative public opinion survey for
them. You have decided to plan for a sample size of 1,000 individuals. Your client does not think
this is enough people to survey and asks for you to double the sample size to 2,000 individuals.
Do the benefits of doubling the sample size outweigh the increased cost of the survey? Explain
your answer by comparing accuracy of the survey versus cost. (5 points)
SPC 4930 Take Home Final Exam
ASSIGNED: 4/25/24
DUE: 5/2/24 by 11:59 PM EST
5. FORMAL ESSAY: During the semester, we discussed political campaign communication in
relation to democracy. This formal essay will have you address a central question of this course:
Does current American political campaign communication strengthen or weaken democracy? As
we noted in class, democracy is the ability of citizens in a country to directly (or indirectly) have a
say in the selection of their leaders and decision-making by voting and other forms of political
participation.
In answering this essay prompt, your response should:
 Clearly address the contribution of three areas of campaign communication to
democracy—campaign advertising, debates, and news coverage.
 Include direct citations to the course readings associated with campaign advertising (Sides
et al., 2022) and news coverage (Scacco et al., 2017). These citations and the content
included in the essay should clearly indicate that you have read and understand the
articles.
 Integrate material support from the class lectures related to campaign advertising, debates,
and news coverage.
The essay should be formatted as follows:
 Structured with an introduction, body, and conclusion
 Approximately 750-900 words in response [Include word count with essay]
 In-text citations cited in APA style
 Professional spelling, grammar, and punctuation
 Double-spaced, 1” margins, 12-point, Times New Roman font
Essay Grading Rubric [30 points]
5 points
Introduction
 Includes a clear preview of the argument of the essay and answers the question
Does current American political campaign communication strengthen or
weaken democracy?
 Previews the main points that will structure the essay
Body



15 points
Main points about campaign advertising, debates, and news coverage
are clearly stated, developed, and integrated into the broader
direction/argument of the essay
Includes material support from two reading sources [Sides et al. (2022) and
Scacco et al. (2017)] for argument/discussion
Includes support from class lectures and discussions
Conclusion
 Reiterates argument of the essay about the contribution of campaign
advertising, debates, and news coverage to democracy
 Reviews the main points that have structured the essay
5 points
Mechanics
 In-text citations cited in APA style
 Professional spelling, grammar, and punctuation
 Double-spaced, 1” margins, 12-point, Times NR font, 750-900 words
[Include word count with essay]
Total
5 points
30 points
1
The Storm Is ­Here
“when do we start winning?”
That was what a friend of Ashli Babbitt’s asked on Twitter the week
before Congress met to certify the 2020 presidential election. Babbitt
replied, “January 6, 2021.”
Babbitt was a thirty-­five-­year-­old Air Force veteran who lived outside
San Diego with her husband. She owned a struggling pool-­supply com­
pany. She also was an ardent supporter of Donald Trump and his crusade to overturn the results of the 2020 election. On January 5 she had
tweeted, “Nothing w
­ ill stop us. They can try and try and try but the
storm is ­here and it is descending upon DC in less than 24 hours . . . ​
dark to light!”1 The next day, with a Trump flag tied around her neck,
Babbitt joined a mob that breached the U.S. Capitol and interrupted the
certification of the election.
Babbitt had traveled to Washington to attend a “Save Amer­i­ca” rally
that Trump and his allies or­ga­nized for that morning. At the rally, multiple ­people spoke in violent terms about what needed to happen. Rep.
Mo Brooks, a Republican from Alabama, said, “­Today is the day American patriots start takin’ down names and kickin’ ass. Are you willing to
do what it takes to fight for Amer­i­ca?” One of Trump’s sons, Donald Jr.,
said that “red-­blooded, patriotic Americans” should “fight for Trump.”
Trump adviser Rudy Giuliani called for “trial by combat.” At noon,
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Trump himself spoke for an hour, declaring that he would “never concede” the election and telling supporters, “We fight like hell and if you
­don’t fight like hell, ­you’re not ­going to have a country anymore.” He
called on supporters to go to the Capitol and “demand that Congress
do the right ­thing.”2
Thousands of his supporters heeded Trump’s call. By 1:00 p.m., some
breached the temporary fences on the Capitol grounds and clashed with
Capitol Police officers. A l­ ittle a­ fter 2:00 p.m., protesters broke a win­dow
and began to enter the Capitol. At 2:30, the Senate, including Vice President Mike Pence and several members of his ­family, was evacuated.
Protesters, including a few who w
­ ere armed or carried zip-­tie restraints,
soon occupied the Senate chamber. Approximately 800 eventually entered the Capitol. The protest had become a riot—or, as some would
­later say, an insurrection.
Babbitt was among a group that targeted the House chamber, where
some members of Congress still remained, hiding ­under desks. The rioters attacked the glass doors that opened into the Speaker’s Lobby, a
room just outside the chamber. One yelled “Fuck the blue!” at the officers standing there. The group hit the doors with their hands, flagpoles, and other objects.
When one door broke, Babbitt tried to climb through. Michael Byrd,
a Capitol Police officer standing on the other side, shot her. Babbitt
received medical attention on the scene from police and was transported to a local hospital, where she died of her injuries.3
Babbitt was the only rioter to be killed that day, but she was other­
wise similar to the types of p­ eople who entered the Capitol. Most who
­were charged with a crime had no connection with far-­right groups,
militias, or white nationalist organ­izations, although such groups, including the Proud Boys and the Oathkeepers, ­were represented among
the rioters. Court rec­ords showed that most of t­ hese p­ eople said they
­were only ­doing what Trump had told them to do: defend him and keep
Biden from winning a “stolen” election. This was Babbitt’s goal, too.4
Trump welcomed their efforts. Indeed, he had long been willing to
downplay, countenance, or even encourage vio­lence on his behalf. In
his first presidential campaign he praised supporters who assaulted
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
3
protestors at his rallies, offering to pay their l­egal bills. In his second
campaign, rather than disavowing the support of extremist groups,
he encouraged them. In the presidential debate on September 29, 2020, he
told the Proud Boys to “stand back and stand by.”
And so it was no surprise that Trump was “initially pleased” when his
supporters stormed the Capitol, according to White House officials
who l­ ater spoke with reporters. The vio­lence was well underway before
Trump fi­nally tweeted, at 2:47 p.m., “Please support our Capitol Police
and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay
peaceful!” Even then, one official said that Trump had not wanted to
include “stay peaceful.”5
Members of Congress and White House aides implored Trump to
speak out more forcefully. Trump sent a second tweet at 3:25, calling for
­people to “remain peaceful” and saying, “No vio­lence!” But he refused
to condemn the vio­lence outright or tell his supporters to leave the
Capitol. At 4:22 p.m. he published a video message in which he said that
“we have to have peace” and told his supporters to “go home.” But he
also said that “we love you, ­you’re very special” and repeated his false
claim of election fraud. At 6:25 p.m., a­ fter the rioters had fi­nally been
cleared from the Capitol, Trump praised them again, tweeting, “­These
are the ­things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election
victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from g­ reat patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long.” He added,
“Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!”6
It was a jarring sentiment even at that point, and it would become
more so when the full toll of that day was clear. Ashli Babbitt was dead;
the Capitol building had been damaged extensively; and the Capitol
Police had suffered devastating harm and loss—­approximately 140 officers ­were injured by rioters, who beat them with baseball bats, flagpoles, and pipes. One officer, Brian Sicknick, died the following day of
a stroke that was possibly linked to the injuries he had received when a
rioter pepper-­sprayed him. Four officers committed suicide in the
months following the riot.7
Beyond the toll on p­ eople and property was the cost to American
democracy itself. A hallmark of democracies is the peaceful transfer of
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power ­after an election. That did not happen. Another hallmark is the
willingness of election losers to consent to the outcome, thereby upholding the legitimacy of the system even as they regroup and seek to
win next time. That did not happen, ­either. Not only did Trump continue to insist that the election was stolen, but on the night of January 6
he was joined by eight Senate Republicans and 139 House Republicans,
all of whom voted to object to the election results when Congress reconvened only hours ­after members ­were forced to flee for their lives.8
The 2020 election and the attack on the Capitol w
­ ere the culmination
of a long year of casualties and crisis in the United States. ­There was the
COVID-19 pandemic, which took the lives of over 350,000 Americans
in 2020 alone and put at least 14 million p­ eople out of work,9 and t­ here
­were yet more deaths of African Americans at the hands of police officers, most notably the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police
officer Derek Chauvin, on May 25, 2020, which led to massive protests.
The Trump White House saw its own series of crises, culminating in
Trump’s impeachment in early 2020 and then a second impeachment
in early 2021 ­because of his actions—­and then inaction—­during the
insurrection.
­These extraordinary events seemed initially as if they might transcend the power­ful partisanship that usually characterizes American
politics. Perhaps Americans would come together to beat a deadly virus;
as one Washington Post columnist noted in February 2020, “a global
crisis . . . ​could unite the planet and encourage every­one to pull together.” Or perhaps they would be united by the gruesome spectacle of
a police officer kneeling on the neck of a man for nine minutes. As one
headline ­after Floyd’s murder put it: “­Will This Be the Moment of Reckoning on Race That Lasts?” But anything like unity or a reckoning
proved fleeting at best. Po­liti­cal leaders stoked partisan divisions with
predictable, even violent, consequences. Thus, politics ­shaped how the
central events of the election year played out as much, if not more, than
­these events s­ haped politics.10
In turn, this had impor­tant consequences for the presidential election. For an incumbent like Trump, the combination of impeachment,
a pandemic, and a recession seemed like a r­ ecipe for a landslide defeat.
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
5
It was not. In the national popu­lar vote, Biden’s margin of victory was
only about 2 points greater than Hillary Clinton’s in 2016. In the key
battleground states, the margins ­were even closer than in 2016.
Of course, Trump still lost, and the attempts by his supporters and
allies in Congress to overturn the election failed. Joseph R. Biden Jr.
became the forty-­sixth president of the United States. In his inaugural
address, Biden expressed his own hopes of unifying the country, saying, “We can join forces, stop the shouting and lower the temperature. For without unity ­there is no peace, only bitterness and fury. No
pro­gress, only exhausting outrage. No nation, only a state of chaos.
This is our historic moment of crisis and challenge, and unity is the path
forward.”11
But how leaders responded to the events of 2020—­and especially
how Trump and his allies responded to the election and its aftermath—­
only exacerbated divisions that had been years in the making. Understanding ­those divisions helps explain why the election came to such a
­bitter end, and why this ­bitter end may only signal the beginning of a
new demo­cratic crisis in American politics.
A CALCIFIED POLITICS
That Americans are po­liti­cally divided is obvious, but it is impor­tant to
clarify what this means. Generalizations about a divided Amer­i­ca do
not tell us what issues are most divisive, when t­ hose divisions emerged,
and ­w hether we are deeply divided or merely closely divided. This
makes it hard to say what has happened in American politics, what is
causing it, and what it implies for the ­future. We seek to push beyond
­simple generalizations to identify the facts and trends that provide insight into the politics of the Trump presidency, the 2020 election, and
the election’s aftermath.
Our argument centers on three ele­ments. First, long-­term tectonic
shifts have pushed the parties apart while making the views within each
party more uniform. This is the familiar trend ­toward gradually increasing partisan polarization. Second, shorter-­term shocks, catalyzed especially by Trump, have sped up polarization on identity issues—­those
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related to race, ethnicity, religion, and gender. And third, it is precisely
­these identity issues that voters in both parties care more about—­
exacerbating divisions even further and giving politicians e­ very incentive to continue to play to them.
The upshot is a more calcified politics. As it does in the body, calcification produces hardening and rigidity: ­people are more firmly in place
and harder to move away from their predispositions. Growing calcification is a logical consequence of growing polarization, but the concepts
are not identical. Polarization means more distance between voters in
opposing parties in terms of their values, ideas, and views on policy.
Calcification means less willingness to defect from their party, such as
by breaking with their party’s president or even voting for the opposite
party. ­There is thus less chance for new and even dramatic events to change
­people’s choices at the ballot box. New events tend to be absorbed into an
axis of conflict in which identity plays the central role. And this means
smaller fluctuations from year to year in election outcomes.
But perhaps paradoxically, a more calcified politics does not produce
the same winner year ­after year. This is ­because increasing partisan polarization has coincided with increasing partisan parity. In sheer numbers, Demo­crats and Republicans are more narrowly divided than they
used to be, meaning that any movement in elections from one year to
the next could change who governs the country. This combination of
calcification and parity raises the stakes of politics—­and makes them
more explosive.
Tectonic Shifts in Partisan Attitudes
Over the long term, the Demo­cratic and Republican parties have become more internally homogeneous and more dif­fer­ent from each
other in po­liti­cal ideology, certain demographic characteristics, and
certain policy issues. They have increasingly unfavorable views of each
other, too.
It is worth unpacking this trend. First, the “long term” refers to a
period that is mea­sured in de­cades. This means that certain partisan
divisions w
­ ere vis­i­ble at least by the 2000s and in many cases by the
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
7
1990s or even 1980s. “Internally homogeneous” means that each party
is more consistently on “one side” of an issue—­that is, Demo­crats are
more consistently liberal and Republicans more consistently conservative. “More distant” means that, on average, Demo­crats and Republicans have become more dif­fer­ent from each other or farther apart on
some under­lying ideological dimension.
­These changes are tectonic in the sense that they are slow-­moving
and, like the shifts of tectonic plates in the earth’s crust, accumulate to
alter the landscape. ­These changes travel ­under dif­fer­ent labels, such as
“partisan sorting” or “partisan polarization,” but the upshot is the same:
a growing alignment between p­ eople’s party identification and certain
demographic attributes and po­liti­cal views.
For example, po­liti­cal science research and public opinion data shows
that Demo­crats and Republicans increasingly diverge in their self-­
described po­liti­cal ideology. Between 1994 and 2020, the percentage of
Demo­crats who called themselves liberal increased from 25 ­percent to
51 ­percent, and the percentage of Republicans who called themselves
conservative increased from 58 ­percent to 75 ­percent—­although substantial fractions of both parties still call themselves “moderates” (as of
2020, 35% of Demo­crats and 20% of Republicans).12
Moreover, Demo­crats and Republicans increasingly differ demographically, including by gender, race, and religiosity. For example, compared to ­earlier periods of time, men have become less likely, and
­women more likely, to identify with the Demo­cratic Party. African
Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans have also become more likely to identify with the Demo­cratic Party. And especially
among white Americans, religiously observant ­people and evangelical
Protestants (not mutually exclusive groups, to be sure) have become
more likely to identify as Republican. The exact magnitude and timing
of ­these trends differs; for instance, the shifts among African Americans
­were larger and occurred much e­ arlier than shifts among Hispanic
Americans.13
Demo­crats and Republicans increasingly diverge on many po­liti­cal
issues, too. Between 1972 and 2016, for example, Demo­crats and Republicans came to take more distinctive positions on the role of government
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in the economy—­vis­i­ble in issues including the overall size of government, ­whether it should spend more or less on vari­ous policy areas, and
­whether it should play a larger role in regulating economic markets,
such as by guaranteeing ­people jobs or providing health care or health
insurance. Polarization on ­these issues has been driven primarily by growing conservatism in the Republican Party. The parties have also diverged
on noneconomic issues. The most obvious one is abortion, with Demo­
crats shifting to the left and Republicans to the right.14
­These vari­ous and growing partisan differences are related, unsurprisingly. One’s self-­described ideology and views on policy issues are
not synonymous—­not ­every person who identifies as “conservative”
­favors cuts to government spending, for example—­but it makes sense
that they both exhibit partisan polarization. Polarization by demography and ideology are also linked: the gender gap in party identification
has grown ­because men and ­women have dif­fer­ent views of certain policies, the parties have polarized around ­those same policies, and thus
men and ­women now differ more in their partisan loyalties.15
But this pattern of polarization or sorting does not characterize
every­thing. Catholicism used to be more strongly correlated with party
when Catholics w
­ ere a linchpin of the Democratic-­leaning New Deal
co­ali­tion. Now, Catholics are evenly split between the parties.16
Partisan polarization in the public has been led by polarization
among politicians and activists. In the first half of the twentieth c­ entury,
both po­liti­cal parties had an ideologically diverse mix of elected officials
and interest group leaders. The Demo­cratic Party had its northern liberals and its southern conservatives; the GOP had its Goldwater conservatives and its liberal Rocke­fel­ler Republicans. As time went on, conservative southern Demo­crats ­were replaced by Republicans. Ronald
Reagan’s support of tax cuts and deregulation and opposition to abortion helped to position the GOP more firmly as a party of the right.
As leaders became more ideologically similar within each party,
many rank-­and-­file partisans did too, especially ­people attentive enough
to politics to know where leaders stood. However, ­because many ­people
are not po­liti­cal junkies, party polarization among citizens has always
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
9
100%
90
76
75%
62
50%
50
25%
0%
1952
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
Figure 1.1.
A Growing Number of Americans Perceive Impor­tant Differences between the Parties.
Source: American National Election Studies conducted in presidential election years.
been more modest than among po­liti­cal leaders. Many ordinary voters
continue to have at least some views that are out of step with the reigning ideas in their party.17
Nevertheless, partisan polarization is meaningful and, crucially, it is
vis­i­ble to Americans. When asked, “Do you think ­there are any impor­
tant differences in what the Republicans and Demo­crats stand for?,”
Americans increasingly say yes (figure 1.1). In 1952, only 50 ­percent did;
by 1984 it was 62 ­percent, by 2004 it was 76 ­percent, and in 2020 it was
90 ­percent. ­These trends ­were apparent among men and ­women, dif­fer­
ent racial and ethnic groups, both Demo­crats and Republicans, and so
on. In other words, the trend in perceptions of the parties is not due to
changes in the demographic composition of the American public, such
as its growing racial and ethnic diversity; it is more the result of changes
in the parties themselves. As a result, the vast majority of Americans—
as well as all kinds of Americans—­now reject the old George Wallace
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quote that ­there is not a “dime’s worth of difference” between the two
major parties.18
An increasing percentage of voters can place the two parties on the
liberal-­conservative spectrum with basic accuracy—­meaning, they
place the Demo­crats to the left of the Republicans. Moreover, voters
tend to see an increasing distance between the parties on vari­ous issues,
and especially to see the opposing party as more distant from their preferred party.19
As the parties have polarized and as ­people have perceived ­those differences, they have also come to feel differently about the two parties.
Thus, partisan divides are not only about substantive po­liti­cal issues—­
more taxes or fewer taxes, say—­but about ­whether the other party and
­those who support it are fundamentally good or bad.20 In a 2019 Pew Research Center survey, substantial fractions of Demo­crats and Republicans
said that members of the other party are more closed-­minded, unintelligent, immoral, or unpatriotic than other Americans. For example,
55 ­percent of Republicans said that Demo­crats w
­ ere more immoral than
other Americans, and 47 ­percent of Demo­crats said this of Republicans.
This dislike of the opposing party has become more prevalent over
the past decades—­a phenomenon known as “affective polarization” or
“negative partisanship.”21 The trend only continued into 2020. In par­tic­
u­lar, when asked to evaluate the two parties on a 0–100 scale, where 100
indicates the most positive feelings, Americans increasingly rate the opposing party unfavorably—­that is, below 50 (figure 1.2). Data from
American National Election Study (ANES) surveys shows this trend
since the question was introduced in 1978. Between 1978 and 2016, the average rating of the opposing party declined from 48 to 31, while the
average rating of a person’s own party was largely stable. In online surveys conducted by the ANES since 2012—­including in 2020, when the
pandemic prevented face-­to-­face interviewing—­unfavorable feelings
­were even more prevalent, in part ­because ­people appear to feel more
comfortable expressing negative opinions when they are not being interviewed by another person.22 In 2012 the average rating of the opposing party among online respondents was 25; in 2020 it was 19. And
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
11
100
75
Rating of own party
Online
surveys
71
50
In-person or phone interviews
71
64
Rating of opposite party
48
31
25
25
19
0
1978
1990
2000
2010
2020
Figure 1.2.
Views of the Opposing Party Are Increasingly Unfavorable. The lines represent average
ratings on a 0–100 scale among Demo­cratic and Republicans (including ­those who lean
­toward a party). Source: American National Election Studies.
b­ ecause views of respondents’ own party rebounded, 2020 saw a rec­ord
level of affective polarization.
­These trends in polarization are significant enough on their own. But
they take on even greater significance in the minds of ordinary Americans, whose perceptions of the parties are often exaggerated and ste­reo­
typed. For example, Americans see the parties as farther apart on issues
than they ­really are, as well as more demographically distinct from each
other. Republicans think that almost half of Demo­crats are Black, about
twice the real number. Demo­crats think that about 45 ­percent of Republicans are very wealthy, making $250,000 or more a year; the true
number is more like 2 ­percent. Partisans also exaggerate the extent of
affective polarization itself: they think the other party feels more prejudice against their own party than is ­really true. One reason for ­these
rampant misperceptions seems to be that Americans’ m
­ ental picture of
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the po­liti­cal parties includes mainly party leaders, activists, and
ideologues—­that is, the type of partisans who are most likely to illustrate the pattern of polarization.23
­These trends in polarization have impor­tant implications for elections. One is higher levels of partisanship in presidential approval
and voting be­hav­ior. Most partisans approve of their own party’s president but disapprove of the opposing party’s president. Similarly, most
partisans vote for their party’s candidates up and down the ballot. Presidential candidates typically win 90 ­percent or more of their party’s
voters. And split-­ticket voting—­such as voting for the Republican
presidential candidate and the Demo­cratic congressional candidate—
is in decline.24
A second, and related, implication is the weakening power of other
­factors that have traditionally affected evaluations of presidents and
voting in presidential elections. Most impor­tant is the state of the national economy. In the past, incumbent presidents benefited from economic growth and suffered from economic downturns. But strong
partisanship has weakened the relationship between the economy and
presidential approval, in part b­ ecause ­people are loath to give the opposing party’s president credit for a growing economy or to punish
their own party’s president when the economy goes south. Similarly, a
more polarized po­liti­cal environment may make presidential election
outcomes less sensitive to changes in the economy ­because so many
partisans are unwilling to support the opposing party’s candidate
­under any circumstances.25 In short, recent election outcomes seem to
depend less on achieving shared goals, like peace and prosperity, and
more on the clashing views increasingly vis­i­ble in party politics.
A third implication is that t­ here are smaller shifts in presidential election outcomes from year to year. If ­factors like the economy do not affect presidential approval or elections as much, and if partisan loyalty is
strong, then one year’s election outcome is not likely to differ much
from the previous outcome.26
But smaller shifts do not mean no shifts—­and even small shifts can
be consequential given partisan parity. In the 1952 ANES survey,
59 ­p ercent of Americans identified with or leaned t­oward the
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Demo­cratic Party but only 36 ­percent identified with or leaned t­ oward
the Republican Party—­a Demo­cratic advantage of 23 points. But this
advantage declined over the years, and by 2016 it was only 7 points
(46% vs. 39%). This parity is vis­i­ble not just at the national level but also
in crucial battleground states; in 2016, the outcomes in Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Wisconsin w
­ ere all de­cided by less than 1 percentage
point. This increasing party parity ­matters all the more b­ ecause American elections tend to use winner-­take-­all rules. A narrow win gets you
four years in the White House or a House or Senate seat, but a narrow
loss gets you nothing.27
It makes sense, then, that t­ hese long-­term changes are crucial to explaining the dramatic events of 2020 and the violent aftermath of a narrowly de­cided election.
Sudden Shocks in Identity Politics
Over the short term—­years, not decades—­the Demo­cratic and Republican parties have rapidly divided on issues related to identity, especially
race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and gender. Of course, some party
divisions on ­these issues ­were apparent years ago. But recently t­ here has
been a sharp increase in the magnitude of t­ hese divisions. If the pro­cess
of partisan sorting or polarization was tectonic, like the slow creep of
the earth’s crust, the pace of partisan polarization on identity-­inflected
issues more resembles the shocks of an earthquake. Th
­ ese shocks stem
directly from the identity, rhe­toric, and decisions of po­liti­cal leaders
and how the public has reacted to them. A central part of this story is
Trump himself.
One example of an “identity shock” concerned immigration. Since
1965, Gallup has asked Americans, “In your view, should immigration
be kept at its pre­sent level, increased, or decreased?” From 1965 to 1993,
restrictive views became increasingly common, as more and more
Americans wanted to decrease immigration (figure 1.3). Since the mid1990s, restrictive views have receded overall, although t­ here have been
occasional spikes in the ­percent who favored decreasing immigration,
such as ­after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
Increase immigration
75%
Trump
inauguration
50%
50
Democrats
21
25%
30
Republicans
0%
1965
1977
1986
1993
2000
13
11
2010
2020
Keep at present level
75%
50%
40
48
Democrats
35
Republicans
25%
0%
1965
1977
1986
1993
2000
2010
2020
Decrease immigration
71
75%
50%
65
Republicans
61
44
Democrats
25%
58
48
Trump
inauguration
20
13
0%
1965
1977
1986
1993
2000
2010
2020
Figure 1.3.
Trends in Demo­cratic and Republican Views of Immigration Levels. Source: Gallup polls.
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
15
More notable, though, is the pattern of partisan polarization. Early
on, ­there was almost none. In the 1965 poll, which was conducted right
before Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,
the views held by Demo­crats and Republicans ­were almost identical.
That matched the signals that party leaders ­were sending, as large
­bipartisan majorities in both the House and Senate voted for this bill.
The 1977 poll and the 1986 poll likewise showed ­little division between
parties. But in the mid-1990s, a partisan gap opened up—­vis­i­ble mostly
in the larger percentage of Republicans who wanted to decrease
immigration—­though it dis­appeared within a few years. In a February 1999 poll, for example, roughly equal numbers of Demo­crats (7%)
and Republicans (9%) wanted to increase immigration. Only beginning in the early 2000s was t­ here any consistent partisan gap, with
Demo­crats generally being more open to immigration than Republicans. For example, in a poll conducted in June 2016, 30 ­percent of
Demo­crats wanted to increase immigration, compared to 11 ­percent of
Republicans.
In the four years since that 2016 poll, however, t­ here has been a sea
change in Demo­cratic attitudes. While Republican support for increasing immigration moved up only slightly, to 13 ­percent in 2020, the percentage of Demo­crats who wanted to increase immigration shot up
from 30 ­percent in 2016 to 50 ­percent in 2020. This produced much more
polarization in a very short time. The gap in Demo­cratic and Republican support for increasing immigration was 2 points in 1999 and 19
points in 2016—­a 17-­point increase in polarization. Between 2016 and
2020, ­there was a 20-­point increase (from 17 to 37). In other words, more
polarization occurred in ­those four years then in the previous seventeen.
That is what a sudden shock looks like.
The same pattern characterized attitudes on other immigration topics
and identity-­inflected issues: any longer-­term partisan gap quickly became much larger. One set of survey questions that captured this gap
focused on how Americans explain the disadvantages facing Black
Americans and specifically w
­ hether they attribute t­ hose disadvantages
more to Black Americans’ lack of effort or to structural forces like slavery or discrimination. For example, one question asks ­whether p­ eople
16
CHAPTER 1
agree or disagree that “Generations of slavery and discrimination have
created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out
of the lower class.”28 Since the 1990s, white Demo­crats have been more
likely than white Republicans to attribute racial in­equality to structural
forces. Thus, party differences on t­ hese questions are not brand new.
Nevertheless, in surveys conducted in 2016 and a­ fter, ­there was a sharp
increase among Demo­crats in their endorsement of structural explanations for racial in­equality, but virtually no change among Republicans.
Demo­crats also became more liberal on other questions related to civil
rights for African Americans. And they became more favorable to Islam
and Muslims.29
On other identity issues, recent partisan polarization has been more
symmetrical, with both parties moving away from each other. For instance, Demo­crats have become more sympathetic to claims of sexual
harassment while Republicans have become less so. For example, in
2008, 73 ­percent of Demo­crats disagreed with the statement “­Women
who complain about harassment cause more prob­lems than they solve.”
By 2018, that had increased to 82 ­percent. By contrast, the percentage of
Republicans who disagreed dropped from 52 ­percent to 39 ­percent.
­There was also an increase in the percentage of Demo­crats who disagreed with the statement “When ­women demand equality ­these days
they are actually seeking special ­favors” (from 71% to 78%). Republicans
went in the opposite direction (from 49% to 39%).30
Meanwhile, on many other issues not as closely tied to racial, ethnic,
and gender identities, partisan polarization over this period was more
muted. In 2016, the two parties ­were 63 points apart on the question of
­whether the government should provide universal health care and in
2020 they ­were 71 points apart. Polarization increased even less on the
question of w
­ hether abortion should be l­egal. In 2016, 51 ­percent of
Demo­crats said abortion should be l­egal in all cases, compared to
9 ­percent of Republicans; in 2020 ­those fractions ­were nearly the same,
53 ­percent and 9 ­percent.31
What has brought about this partisan polarization specifically on
identity-­inflected issues? The chief explanation, as it was for the more
general pattern of partisan polarization, has to do with the po­liti­cal
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
17
leaders who provide cues for ordinary voters. Dating back to the 1930s,
activists and leaders within the Demo­cratic and Republican parties diverged on civil rights for African Americans. In the 1980s, activists and
leaders within the parties diverged on immigration as well. In 1986,
when Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act—­
which, among other ­things, legalized undocumented immigrants who
had arrived in the country before 1982—­there was much more Republican opposition than t­ here was when Congress passed the 1965 immigration bill. Even though Ronald Reagan supported and ultimately
signed the bill, the majority of House Republicans opposed it. Although
it took time, t­ hose differences among po­liti­cal elites w
­ ere gradually reflected in public opinion, such as opinion on immigration in the 1990s
and early 2000s.32
The more recent and rapid transformation began with the campaigns
and presidency of Barack Obama. Obama’s status as the first African
American president helped clarify the partisan politics of race in a new
way, despite years of partisan debates about racialized issues ranging
from affirmative action to welfare programs. Even though scholars
found that Obama actually talked about race less than other recent
Demo­cratic presidents, his mere presence in the Oval Office changed
how Americans perceived the parties’ positions on racial issues. They
came to see larger differences between the Demo­cratic and Republican
parties and, in par­tic­u­lar, to believe that the Demo­cratic Party was more
supportive of government action to help African Americans. Moreover,
­people’s racial attitudes became significant predictors of Americans’
attitudes ­toward almost anything connected to Obama. For example,
racial attitudes w
­ ere much more strongly associated with support for
Obama’s health care reform proposal than the one Bill Clinton had proposed in 1993. Racial attitudes also predicted attitudes t­ oward figures in
his administration, such as Hillary Clinton, as well as Americans’ party
identification and their votes in both the presidential and midterm elections during Obama’s tenure. During his tenure, police killings of African Americans and the resulting Movement for Black Lives also helped
push the Demo­cratic Party (and perhaps Obama himself) ­toward more
liberal positions on racial issues.33
18
CHAPTER 1
The rise of Donald Trump was even more consequential for polarization on identity-­inflected issues. Trump put t­ hese issues at the center of
his presidential campaign and talked about them in a more inflammatory way than most politicians. During his campaign he was condemned, including by fellow Republicans, when he called for a ban on
Muslims traveling to the United States and a database of Muslims living
in the country, when he declined to disavow the support of Ku Klux
Klan ­grand wizard David Duke and other white nationalists, and when
he said he would not get fair treatment in a lawsuit ­because the judge
was of Mexican descent—­a remark that House Speaker Paul Ryan said
was “the textbook definition of a racist comment.”34 Trump’s casually
sexist treatment of w
­ omen emerged multiple times during the campaign, most infamously in the Access Hollywood tape in which Trump
was recorded describing kissing w
­ omen and grabbing their genitalia
without their consent.
Hillary Clinton’s campaign made the contrast with Trump very clear.
Her positions on racial issues ­were more explicit and liberal than
Obama’s—­one of her first speeches as a candidate discussed systemic
racism—­and she frequently criticized Trump for his treatment of
­women. As a result, voters came to see even larger differences between
the parties on racial issues than they had ­under Obama. And Americans’
attitudes on issues like immigration, the treatment of Muslims, racial
in­equality, and sexual harassment ­were more strongly associated with
voting for Trump in the primary and general elections than in other
recent elections. In short, po­liti­cal cues, especially from Trump, helped
make identity-­inflected issues a more polarizing force.35
That only continued into Trump’s presidency. Indeed, the rapid shifts
among Demo­crats, such as their increasingly positive views of immigration, ­were likely due to President Trump’s push for restrictions on immigration. As po­liti­cal science research has shown, p­ eople form po­liti­cal
opinions not only by taking cues from their po­liti­cal allies but also by
reacting against their po­liti­cal enemies.36 Demo­crats’ extraordinary animosity t­ oward Trump meant that any Demo­crats with conservative
positions on issues like immigration confronted the incongruity of opposing Trump but sharing, at least to some degree, his positions on
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
19
identity-­inflected issues. The easiest way for ­these Demo­crats to resolve
this incongruity was to shift their positions away from Trump’s. Indeed,
even before he became president, Trump’s push for a U.S.-­Mexico border wall appeared to make it less popu­lar among Demo­crats.37
This increasing alignment of partisan politics and identity politics has
transformed the Demo­cratic Party. For many years, Demo­cratic politicians had to manage tensions within its co­ali­tion between African
Americans and white Demo­crats with liberal views on racial issues on
the one hand and a significant number of white Demo­crats with conservative views on the other. Politicians did this by maintaining support
for civil rights but also sending racially conservative signals—­for
instance, presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s 1992 criticism of the
rap artist and po­liti­cal activist ­Sister Souljah for her comments about
white ­people, including a song in which she said, “If ­there are any
good white ­people, I ­haven’t met them.” Even in 2012, a large number of
white Obama voters expressed conservative views on identity-­inflected
issues, attributing racial in­equality to African Americans’ lack of effort
or opposing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. But
the defection of ­those voters to Trump in 2016, as well as the subsequent
shifts in Demo­cratic attitudes during Trump’s presidency, lessened the
intraparty co­ali­tional tension for Demo­crats. Demo­cratic candidates
could support immigration or express concern about the Black Americans killed by police officers with less fear of alienating many Demo­
cratic voters. This is not to say that Demo­crats speak with one voice or
are uniformly progressive on identity-­inflected issues. Nevertheless, the
con­temporary Demo­cratic Party is much dif­fer­ent than the one that Bill
Clinton or even Barack Obama led.
Po­liti­cal Priorities
The third ele­ment of our argument centers on Americans’ po­liti­cal priorities. As early as 2019, Americans prioritized the same identity-­
inflected issues that have come to define our politics. H
­ ere, po­liti­cal
priorities refer to the issues that ­people think are impor­tant. P
­ eople have
opinions on many issues, of course, but do not care equally about all of
20
CHAPTER 1
them. When an issue is impor­tant to ­people, they are more likely to take
action on that issue, vote based on candidates’ positions on the issue, and
so on. The importance attached to issues is relevant not just to individual
voters but also to the shape of po­liti­cal conflict overall. If the most impor­
tant issues are the ones Americans disagree on, then more conflict is likely
to result. Politics gets angrier when p­ eople deeply care about their
disagreements.38
To gauge Americans’ po­liti­cal attitudes and priorities throughout the
2020 campaign, we conducted one of the largest survey proj­ects fielded
during an election campaign. This proj­ect, called Nationscape, interviewed about 500,000 Americans between July 2019 and January 2021.
We ­w ill draw on this proj­ect throughout the book—to map trends,
compare opinions among groups of Americans, shed light on what
­factors affected choices at the ballot box, and ascertain po­liti­cal
priorities.
It can be challenging to mea­sure po­liti­cal priorities, however. Surveys
routinely ask ­people to rate the importance of vari­ous issues, but it is
not clear that this approach generates meaningful responses. P
­ eople
who rate an issue as more impor­tant, for example, do not appear to rely
more on that issue when they choose between candidates.39
A better way to mea­sure po­liti­cal priorities is what we might call a
“show, d­ on’t tell” strategy. Within Nationscape, we designed an experiment that allowed ­people to reveal, or show, which issues they care
about rather than simply asking them to tell us.40 In this survey, we
asked ­people ­whether they supported or opposed forty-­four policies,
such as instituting universal background checks for gun purchases, raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, and providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. We also asked about some nonpolicy considerations, such as impeaching Trump and electing a ­woman
or gay man to the White House. Then we randomly selected items from
that list and presented respondents with two competing “packages” of
between two and four policies. One package could have been instituting
universal background checks, raising the minimum wage, and not providing a path to citizenship. The other package would have the opposite
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
21
positions on t­ hose three issues. The packages sometimes had exclusively
liberal or conservative positions and sometimes a mix (as in this example). The point is that respondents had to choose which package they
preferred. Respondents saw ten sets of packages and had to make ten
choices. (More information on the survey and the experiment appears
in the appendix to this chapter.)
By examining t­ hese choices across respondents, we generate the “revealed importance” of each issue. Revealed importance captures how
much more likely ­people are to choose a set of policies when the set
includes that par­tic­u­lar issue. The higher the importance, the higher the
priority Americans attach to that issue.
So what issues do Americans care about? It is instructive to focus
initially on the salient issues during the Trump presidency: ­whether to
impeach Trump, immigration policy, taxes for both the m
­ iddle and
upper classes, the role of the government in health care, ­whether transgender p­ eople should be able to serve in the military, trade policy, and
paid maternity leave. All of t­ hese reflect priorities for Trump and w
­ ere
the subject of debate between Trump and Demo­crats. Altogether, t­ here
­were sixteen specific policies included in the Nationscape survey experiments that w
­ ere relevant to ­these issues.
Figure 1.4 pre­sents the revealed importance of t­ hese sixteen issues.
Specifically, this figure shows the increase in the share of p­ eople who
choose a package of issues when their position on a par­tic­u­lar issue is
included in the package. For example, the revealed importance of “impeaching Trump,” 0.35, means that when a set contained the respondents’ position on this issue (­w hether for or against impeaching
Trump), 67.5 ­percent of ­people chose that set and 32.5 ­percent did not,
for a difference of 35 ­percent.
The results from the 2019 surveys show that in the run-up to the election year, far and away the most impor­tant issue to Americans—­
Democrats and Republicans alike—­was the impeachment of Trump
(figure 1.4). Below impeachment ­were a number of policies related to
immigration: ­whether to deport all undocumented immigrants, build
the border wall with Mexico, separate c­ hildren from undocumented
22
CHAPTER 1
Impeach Donald Trump
Deport all undocumented immigrants
Build wall on southern US border
Create path to citizenship for Dreamers
Separate children from undocumented parents
Create path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants
Provide government health insurance to all
Subsidize health insurance for poor
Ban people from Muslim countries from US entry
Allow transgender people to serve in military
Enact Medicare for All
Raise taxes for incomes over $600k
Require 12 weeks of paid maternity leave
Cut taxes for incomes under $100k
Raise taxes for incomes over $250k
Limit trade with other countries
.1
.15
.2
.25
.3
Revealed importance
Figure 1.4.
Revealed Importance of Selected Salient Issues during the Trump Presidency. The
graph displays estimates of revealed importance and 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape surveys (July–­December 2019).
parents at the border, and create a path to citizenship. Dif­fer­ent policies
for the government’s role in health insurance, all of which ­were debated
in the Demo­cratic primary, follow next. Every­thing ­else was less impor­
tant, including tax policy and trade, despite the debates over the 2017
tax cuts passed by Republicans and the tariffs and other restrictions on
trade enacted by the Trump administration.
Thus, Americans’ po­liti­cal priorities as of 2019 w
­ ere focused on some
of the most partisan and divisive issues of that time, and especially t­ hose
with the additional emotional charge of identity politics. Indeed, the
full results from the experiment—­presented in the appendix to this
chapter—­show that ­these issues w
­ ere as impor­tant as, if not more
impor­tant than, radical policies that we included for comparison, including complete bans on abortion and guns. Of course, we do not
know how long t­ hese issues have been impor­tant, since our experiments
began only in 2019. But in the year and a half that the Nationscape survey was in the field, t­ hese priorities w
­ ere remarkably stable. This
.35
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
23
suggests that ­these priorities are long standing and some may even have
predated the Trump presidency.
One implication is that existing partisan divisions ­were magnified by
how ­people defined their priorities. The types of policies where Demo­
crats and Republicans might find some common ground w
­ ere not as
impor­tant as ­those where they strongly disagreed. When we compared
the revealed importance of all forty-­four issues to the partisan polarization in opinion on t­ hose issues, the relationship was positive: the farther
apart Demo­crats and Republicans w
­ ere, the more impor­tant the issue
was to Americans overall.
A second implication, which we explore in ­later chapters, is that
­people whose issue positions aligned with their party’s ideology—­
Democrats who took a liberal position, Republicans who took a conservative position—­tended to care more about ­those issues than did
­people whose positions ­were out of step with their party. This also
helped lock in partisan divisions. If partisans who ­were out of step, such
as the substantial number of Republicans who favored tax increases on
the wealthy or raising the minimum wage, cared deeply about t­ hose
issues, then t­ here would have been more potential for cross-­party co­ali­
tions or for an enterprising Demo­cratic candidate to steal away t­ hose
voters and weaken partisan loyalty. But instead, the issues that Demo­
crats and Republicans cared about tended to keep them in the party’s
fold—­and intensify conflict between the parties.
A CALCIFIED 2020
It was far from obvious that the idea of “calcified politics” would ultimately apply to the 2020 presidential campaign. The events leading up
to the election seemed like they could create big po­liti­cal changes.
­After Trump’s unexpected victory in 2016, his presidency brought continuous chaos and controversy, culminating in impeachment in early
2020. As Demo­crats stepped up to challenge him, the party faced a
crowded primary field but no dominant front-­r unner. Then came
a global pandemic and economic recession. In the midst of all that, a
brutal murder led to historic protests for racial justice. To many, the
24
CHAPTER 1
election year was one of superlatives—­“the worst,” “the craziest,” and
so on.41
And yet ­these events did not create the expected po­liti­cal changes.
­People’s attitudes ­toward Trump shifted only slightly, the Demo­cratic
primary resolved quickly, and much of the impact of the racial justice
protests on public opinion proved ephemeral. In key battleground
states, the election was closer than in 2016. In short, the drama coincided with a ­great deal of po­liti­cal stasis. But at the same time, one big
­thing did change: the person who is the nation’s president.
Thus, a story about the 2020 election has to address two questions:
why Trump lost, but also why the election was so close. The tectonic
shifts in the two po­liti­cal parties, the identity shocks of the past de­
cade, and Americans’ po­liti­cal priorities all help to answer ­those
questions.
The story begins with the Trump presidency (chapter 2). When
Trump took office ­there was speculation that he would not be a conventional Republican but instead an economic populist willing to embrace
heterodox ideas like raising taxes on the wealthy or enacting new spending for the country’s infrastructure. But in fact, he governed mostly like
a traditional conservative. He cut taxes, especially on the wealthy; he
weakened and hollowed out the federal bureaucracy; and he proposed
increases in defense spending but large cuts in other discretionary
spending. In other words, Trump did not disrupt the ongoing tectonics
of partisan polarization—­instead, he reinforced them.
If President Trump seemed to cast aside the economic pop­u­lism implicit in his campaign, he certainly embraced his campaign’s other focus:
a hard-­line agenda around identity. Trump moved quickly to limit travel
from certain Muslim-­majority countries, ramp up deportation of undocumented immigrants, and build a wall at the Mexican border. He
pursued controversial mea­sures like the separation of immigrant
­children from their families. When opportunities arose to pursue less
restrictive policies—­even popu­lar ones like providing a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants who w
­ ere brought to the country as ­children—­Trump sided with the hard-­liners in his party and rejected t­ hose opportunities. Ultimately, Trump’s actions as president
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
25
furthered what his campaign had already started to accomplish: coupling partisanship with views on identity-­inflected issues.
Trump’s actions helped ensure that he remained a chronically unpop­
u­lar president, which was an impor­tant impediment to his reelection
(chapter 3). Even before his election, he was an unpop­u­lar person and
candidate. His tenure in the White House did l­ittle to change that.
­Because he governed as a representative only of the GOP and especially
its hard-­line faction, he did l­ ittle to increase his appeal beyond his party,
which he was prob­ably ­going to need, given his narrow victory in 2016.
Of course, partisan polarization limits how popu­lar any con­temporary
president can hope to be. But small and potentially consequential shifts
in popularity are pos­si­ble, and Trump was never able to lift his popularity even above the 50 ­percent mark.
But at the same time, Trump’s approval rating showed no major decline, despite his many scandals, incendiary remarks, and governing
missteps. In fact, Trump’s approval was more stable than any other
president’s in the age of opinion polling. Two reasons ­were partisan
polarization and Republicans’ po­liti­cal priorities. Partisan polarization
helped ensure that Republicans stuck by Trump’s side through the
scandals and through impeachment—­especially b­ ecause Trump’s conventional conservatism satisfied most Republicans and ­because few
Republicans wanted to do anything to help the Demo­cratic Party. As
Paul Ryan said when he called Trump’s remark about the Hispanic
judge “racist” but then backed Trump over Hillary Clinton anyway,
“I believe that we have more common ground on the policy issues of
the day and we have more likelihood of getting our policies enacted
with him than with her.”42
Republicans’ po­liti­cal priorities mattered, too. Not only did most
Republicans oppose Trump’s impeachment and ­favor the linchpins of
his identity agenda, but they also considered t­ hese issues to be top priorities. The smaller number of Republicans who opposed Trump’s
agenda did not appear to care as deeply about the issues on which they
disagreed with Trump. Trump did not necessarily make the party more
conservative on immigration in the sense of shifting overall GOP opinion. But he was clearly more responsive to the party’s hard-­liners, who
26
CHAPTER 1
cared most about the issue. The party’s more moderate voices w
­ ere increasingly marginalized.
By the beginning of the election year, then, Trump was not in an ideal
position for reelection. Despite a robust economy, his approval rating
was lower than that of all the incumbent presidents who went on to
reelection. But steadfast support within the GOP kept him from being
a massive underdog.
A lot, then, turned on whom the Demo­crats would nominate to challenge him (chapter 4). With the largest field of candidates in any modern primary, no clear front-­runner, and tensions between the party’s
moderate and progressive wings, the scene was set for a protracted and
ideologically polarizing ­battle. But this did not happen. Like Hillary
Clinton before him, Biden showed that a multiracial co­ali­tion of supporters could help him withstand stumbles in the early caucus and primary states. The ideological ­battle mostly fizzled as many Demo­crats,
including eventually Biden’s opponents, ­were willing to back Biden if it
meant getting rid of Trump.
Again, partisan polarization and Demo­cratic priorities helped the
party achieve a quicker resolution to the primary than many anticipated.
The growing ideological homogeneity within the party meant that t­ here
was actually a g­ reat deal of consensus on policies. Most Demo­cratic
primary voters took liberal positions on most issues, regardless of which
candidate they supported. Moreover, Demo­crats’ po­liti­cal priorities
reflected their deep dislike of Trump and their overwhelming opposition to his agenda and especially to his identity agenda. This made the
party even more committed to defeating Trump.
As Biden sewed up the nomination, two t­ hings happened that
seemed destined to reshape the election: the COVID-19 pandemic
(chapter 5) as well as the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police
officer Derek Chauvin and the national protests that resulted (chapter 6). Po­liti­cally speaking, the pandemic was a potential risk to Trump’s
reelection bid, but it also offered him an opportunity: to rally the country and work together to defeat a deadly virus. It was an opportunity he
did not take. A
­ fter a brief period in March 2020 during which he warned
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
27
Americans of the pandemic’s seriousness and helped create truly bipartisan concern about the virus, he pivoted and began downplaying the
virus, opposing countermea­sures, and pushing to reopen businesses
even as cases mounted. This ensured that the partisan polarization that
characterized so many other issues came to characterize COVID-19 as
well. It also meant that Trump, unlike many state governors and world
leaders, did not see his approval rating increase. Moreover, his intended
case for reelection—­the country’s economy ­under his tenure—­became
much harder to make.
The consequences of Floyd’s murder for politics and public opinion
followed a similar trajectory. Immediately ­after Floyd’s killing on May 25,
2020, t­ here was a bipartisan consensus condemning Chauvin. This led to
sharp shifts in public opinion: more favorable views of African Americans and the Black Lives ­Matter movement and less favorable views of
the police. But two ­things changed. First, Floyd’s murder stayed in the
news only as long as the national protests continued. By the end of July,
the protests had dwindled and the news coverage with it. Second, Trump
and his allies seized on the few instances of vio­lence at the protests to
change the subject and portray the protestors themselves as the threat.
And so, as with COVID-19, the consensus dis­appeared and Demo­crats
and Republicans moved farther apart once again. This only increased the
ongoing alignment between partisan politics and identity politics.
That polarization continued into the fall campaign (chapter 7). While
Biden’s message centered on the pandemic and country’s economic strug­
gles, Trump sought to portray the country as on an upswing, one threatened by Biden and the “Radical Left.” L
­ ittle altered the basic state of the
­horse race. Partisans solidly backed their party’s candidate throughout
the fall. The usual campaign events, such as the candidate debates, did
not shift Biden’s lead. Neither did the more dramatic events, such as the
death of Supreme Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, her replacement
by Amy Coney Barrett, and Trump’s serious ­battle with COVID-19. But
­there was a widening gap between the candidates in another re­spect:
money. Trump strug­gled to match Biden’s spending, which meant that
Biden’s ads dominated the airwaves.
28
CHAPTER 1
When the votes ­were fi­nally counted, one ­thing was clear: calcified
politics had produced a surprisingly close outcome, despite a surge in
voter turnout (chapter 8). Party loyalty kept the election much closer
than the Biden landslide that preelection polls suggested. Across counties and states, the 2020 results w
­ ere strongly correlated with the 2016
results. To be sure, the small differences between the 2016 and 2020
results w
­ ere enough to make Biden the winner, and Trump’s low approval rating was undoubtedly impor­tant ­here. But several t­ hings kept
the election close. One was the unusual state of the economy. By Election Day, the worst of the recession had passed. Although the country’s
employment numbers and economic output had not fully recovered,
­people’s incomes ­were up thanks to large stimulus checks from the federal government. The implications of the economy for the election ­were
therefore ambiguous. Additionally, the outcome of the election did not
appear much affected by local conditions that could have increased
Biden’s lead, such as the size of his advertising advantage on tele­vi­sion
or the number of COVID-19 deaths in a county. Another f­ actor was
Trump’s support among conservatives of all stripes, including, to many
observers’ surprise, conservative Latinos and African Americans.
To many, the closeness of Biden’s win stemmed from the racial justice
protests. ­People blamed the fact that a small number of protests ­were
accompanied by vio­lence, or the fact that some progressives seized on
George Floyd’s murder to push for “defunding” the police. But t­ here is
­little clear evidence for this. If anything, it appears Biden did better in
counties with protests, even ones at which ­there ­were injuries, arrests,
or property damage. And views of the police and of the protests seemed
more a consequence of partisanship than a cause of how ­people voted.
The election’s aftermath turned a contentious race into a full-­blown
crisis (chapter 9). Trump had long promised to challenge the outcome
if he lost and he followed through, filing dozens of long-­shot lawsuits
that gained ­little traction in court. He unsuccessfully pressured state
election officials to “find votes” for him and unsuccessfully pressured
the Department of Justice to investigate what he claimed was massive
election fraud. But if Trump was wrong in thinking ­these officials would
back him, he was right in betting that rank-­and-­file Republicans would.
T he S tor m I s ­H ere
29
It appeared that GOP fealty to Trump might change ­after the riot.
Trump’s approval rating among Republicans fi­nally dropped and a
larger number of congressional Republicans supported the second impeachment effort than had the first. But with time, sentiment in the
party shifted. Ashli Babbitt became a martyr as Trump and his allies
sought to rewrite the history of January 6. Republican support for prosecuting the rioters declined. Once again, a singular and tragic event—an
attack on the U.S. Capitol—­could not transcend partisan politics.
Meanwhile, Republican leaders in the states enacted new obstacles to
voting and rewrote laws to take power away from the kinds of local election officials who did not cave to Trump’s pressure ­after the election.
The GOP’s actions illustrate the incentive created by an era of calcified politics and partisan parity: find any way pos­si­ble to bend the rules
in your f­ avor and target your opponents. When elections and even control of the government hinge on a few states or a few thousand votes,
and you think the other party is not just wrong on policy but also immoral and unpatriotic, it becomes easier to justify d­ oing what­ever it
takes to win, regardless of its demo­cratic merit. Many partisans ­will countenance any mea­sure targeted at the opposition, perhaps even vio­lence.
When the 2020 election came to its b­ itter end, Republicans chose this
route rather than reckon with the party’s loss and rethink its direction.
But it did not have to be that way. Far more Republicans accepted
Mitt Romney’s loss in 2012, and far more Demo­crats accepted Clinton’s
in 2016. No one was told to “fight like hell” and then invaded the Capitol.
Vio­lence and demo­cratic decay are not an inevitable consequence of
calcified politics. The ­future depends on what po­liti­cal leaders do when
the losses are especially ­bitter—­and ­whether they ­will uphold democracy when the bitterness has no end in sight.