Complete three sections (20 questions) for 1 reading exercise focused on identification and explanation of fallacies

Topic 2 Reading exercises from:Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Logic, 14th Edition. Routledge.
4.3 INSTRUCTIONS
Identify and explain the fallacies of relevance in the following passages:
PROBLEMS
1. If you can’t blame the English language and your own is unforgivingly precise, blame the
microphone. That was the route Jacques Chirac took after his nuclear remark about a nuclear
Iran. “Having one or perhaps a second bomb a little later, well, that’s not very dangerous,” Mr.
Chirac said with a shrug. The press was summoned back for a retake. “I should rather have paid
attention to what I was saying and understood that perhaps I was on the record,” Mr. Chirac
offered, as if the record rather than the remark were the issue.
—Stacy Schiff, “Slip Sliding Away,” The New York Times, 2 February 2007
2. Nietzsche was personally more philosophical than his philosophy. His talk about power,
harshness, and superb immorality was the hobby of a harmless young scholar and constitutional
invalid.
—George Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy, 1915
3. Like an armed warrior, like a plumed knight, James G. Blaine marched down the halls of the
American Congress and threw his shining lances full and fair against the brazen foreheads of
every defamer of his country and maligner of its honor.
For the Republican party to desert this gallant man now is worse than if an army should
desert their general upon the field of battle.
—Robert G. Ingersoll, nominating speech at the
Republican National Convention, 1876
4. However, it matters very little now what the king of England either says or does; he hath
wickedly broken through every moral and human obligation, trampled nature and conscience
beneath his feet, and by a steady and constitutional spirit of insolence and cruelty procured for
himself an universal hatred.
—Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 1776
5. This embarrassing volume is an out-and-out partisan screed made up of illogical arguments,
distorted and cherry-picked information, ridiculous generalizations and nutty asides. It’s a nasty
stewpot of intellectually untenable premises and irresponsible speculation that frequently reads
like a “Saturday Night Live” parody of the crackpot right.
—Michiko Kakutani, “Dispatch from Gomorrah, Savaging the Cultural Left,”
The New York Times, 6 February 2007.
6. I was seven years old when the first election campaign which I can remember took place in
my district. At that time we still had no political parties, so the announcement of this campaign
was received with very little interest. But popular feeling ran high when it was disclosed that one
of the candidates was “the Prince.” There was no need to add Christian and surname to realize
which Prince was meant. He was the owner of the great estate formed by the arbitrary occupation
of the vast tracts of land reclaimed in the previous century from the Lake of Fucino. About eight
thousand families (that is, the majority of the local population) are still employed today in
cultivating the estate’s fourteen thousand hectares. The Prince was deigning to solicit “his”
families for their vote so that he could become their deputy in parliament. The agents of the
estate, who were working for the Prince, talked in impeccably liberal phrases: “Naturally,” said
they, “naturally, no one will be forced to vote for the Prince, that’s understood; in the same way
that no one, naturally, can force the Prince to allow people who don’t vote for him to work on his
land. This is the period of real liberty for everybody; you’re free, and so is the Prince.” The
announcement of these “liberal” principles produced general and understandable consternation
among the peasants. For, as may easily be guessed, the Prince was the most hated person in our
part of the country.
—Ignazio Silone, The God That Failed, 1949
7. According to R. Grunberger, author of A Social History of the Third Reich, Nazi publishers
used to send the following notice to German readers who let their subscriptions lapse: “Our
paper certainly deserves the support of every German. We shall continue to forward copies of it
to you, and hope that you will not want to expose yourself to unfortunate consequences in the
case of cancellation.”
8. In While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West from Within (2006), Bruce
Bawer argues that “by appeasing a totalitarian [Muslim] ideology Europe is “imperiling its
liberty.” Political correctness, he writes, is keeping Europeans from defending themselves,
resulting in “its self-destructive passivity, softness toward tyranny, its reflexive inclination to
appease.” A review of the book in The Economist observes that Mr. Bawer “weakens his
argument by casting too wide a net,” and another reviewer, Imam Fatih Alev, says of Bawer’s
view that “it is a constructed idea that there is this very severe difference between Western
values and Muslim values.”
—“Clash Between European and Islamic Views,” in Books,
The New York Times, 8 February 2007.
9. To know absolutely that there is no God one must have infinite knowledge. But to have
infinite knowledge one would have to be God. It is impossible to be God and an atheist at the
same time. Atheists cannot prove that God doesn’t exist.
—“Argument Against Atheism,”
http://aaron_mp.tripod.com/id2.html (2007)
10. When we had got to this point in the argument, and everyone saw that the definition of
justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said: “Tell me,
Socrates, have you got a nurse?”
“Why do you ask such a question,” I said, “when you ought rather to be answering?”
“Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose; she has not even taught you
to know the shepherd from the sheep.”
—Plato, The Republic
4.5 INSTRUCTIONS
Identify and explain any fallacies of defective induction or of presumption in the following
passages:
PROBLEMS
1. My generation was taught about the dangers of social diseases, how they were contracted, and
the value of abstinence. Our schools did not teach us about contraception. They did not pass out
condoms, as many of today’s schools do. And not one of the girls in any of my classes, not even
in college, became pregnant out of wedlock. It wasn’t until people began teaching the children
about contraceptives that our problems with pregnancy began.
—Frank Webster, “No Sex Education, No Sex,” Insight, 17 November 1997
2. A national mailing soliciting funds, by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA),
included a survey in which questions were to be answered “yes” or “no.” Two of the questions
asked were these:
“Do you realize that the vast majority of painful animal experimentation has no relation at
all to human survival or the elimination of disease?”
“Are you aware that product testing on animals does not keep unsafe products off the
market?”
3. If you want a life full of sexual pleasures, don’t graduate from college. A study to be
published next month in American Demographics magazine shows that people with the most
education have the least amount of sex.
—The Chronicle of Higher Education, 23 January 1998
4. There is no surprise in discovering that acupuncture can relieve pain and nausea. It will
probably also be found to work on anxiety, insomnia, and itching, because these are all
conditions in which placebos work. Acupuncture works by suggestion, a mechanism whose
effects on humans are well known.
The danger in using such placebo methods is that they will be applied by people
inadequately trained in medicine in cases where essential preliminary work has not been done
and where a correct diagnosis has not been established.
—Fred Levit, M.D., “Acupuncture Is Alchemy, Not Medicine,”
The New York Times, 12 November 1997
5. In a motion picture featuring the famous French comedian Sacha Guitry, three thieves are
arguing over division of seven pearls worth a king’s ransom. One of them hands two to the man
on his right, then two to the man on his left. “I,” he says, “will keep three.” The man on his right
says, “How come you keep three?” “Because I am the leader.” “Oh. But how come you are the
leader?” “Because I have more pearls.”
4.6 INSTRUCTIONS
Identify and explain the fallacies of ambiguity that appear in the following passages:
PROBLEMS
1. …. the universe is spherical in form … because all the constituent parts of the universe, that is
the sun, moon, and the planets, appear in this form.
—Nicolaus Copernicus, The New Idea of the Universe, 1514
2. Robert Toombs is reputed to have said, just before the Civil War, “We could lick those
Yankees with cornstalks.” When he was asked after the war what had gone wrong, he is reputed
to have said, “It’s very simple. Those damn Yankees refused to fight with cornstalks.”
—E. J. Kahn, Jr., “Profiles (Georgia),” The New Yorker, 13 February 1978
3. To press forward with a properly ordered wage structure in each industry is the first condition
for curbing competitive bargaining; but there is no reason why the process should stop there.
What is good for each industry can hardly be bad for the economy as a whole.
—Edmond Kelly, Twentieth Century Socialism, 1910
4. No man will take counsel, but every man will take money: therefore money is better than
counsel.
—Jonathan Swift
5. I’ve looked everywhere in this area for an instruction book on how to play the concertina
without success. (Mrs. F. M., Myrtle Beach, S.C., Charlotte Observer)
You need no instructions. Just plunge ahead boldly.
—The New Yorker, 21 February 1977
FALLACIES
from The Essentials of Philosophy and Ethics
In LOGIC, a fallacy is an invalid ARGUMENT, that is, one in which it is possible for all the
premises to be true and yet the conclusion is false. As such, it is clearly to be avoided. People
often use the term colloquially, to include arguments they consider ‘false’ because they disagree
with one or other of the premises. ‘It is a fallacy that paying people the dole encourages laziness’
is probably a critique of the following informal argument: ‘If people can get money without
working then they will become lazy. The dole is a form of getting money without having to work
for it; so, the dole encourages laziness.’ Here, the argument hinges on ‘if people can get money
without working then they will become lazy’, which looks plausible when understood as,
‘sometimes, if people can get money without working then they will become lazy’, but less so
when understood as, ‘in all cases’. . . (John Stuart MILL considered that this sort of argument
was indeed correct, warning against the state attempting to aid sections of the citizenry.)
More fallacious fallacies: fallacies and tactics in informal argumentation
Argumentation is the process of providing reasons to support a position. Reasons are, in practice,
often limited to producing ‘authorities’ who are claimed to hold the same view, perhaps
important people, important books or, of course, God.
Some legitimate tactics follow.
1. Reductio ad absurdum
From the Latin for ‘reduce to absurdity’, the process of taking the other person’s
argument and showing that it leads logically to absurd consequences.
2. Affirming the antecedent
An argument of the form, if P then Q. P, therefore Q. If it is autumn, then the leaves will
fall off the trees. It is autumn, therefore the leaves will fall off the trees. Although ‘valid’,
the argument is little different from the illegitimate tactic described below as ‘begging the
question’. ARISTOTLE called it the ‘modus ponens’.
On the other hand, DENYING THE ANTECEDENT, that is, for example, saying: ‘If it
is autumn, then the leaves will fall off the trees. It is NOT autumn, therefore the leaves
will NOT be falling off the trees’, is a fallacy, as trees may lose their leaves for any
number of reasons (such as a drought, for example).
3. Denying the consequent
An argument of the form, if P then Q. P, therefore Q. If it is autumn… no, let’s have
another example! If you eat too many cream cakes you will get fat. You are not fat,
therefore you have not eaten too many cream cakes. Although arguments of this from are
technically ‘valid’, it is clearly more a logical truth than a practical one! Aristotle called it
the ‘modus tollens’.
4. Analogies
Some would say THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS are a form of analogy, and certainly, the
term can be used that way. An analogy is simply a comparison in which one case is
claimed to be ‘like’ another in some important respect.
5. Counter-example
A special kind of analogy that challenges or even demonstrates the falsity of what has
been claimed.
6. Enthymeme, or suppressed premisses
Arguments that have to have extra premisses added to make them valid, such as
‘Smoking in bars affects people whether they are smoking or not, therefore it should be
banned.’ Here the extra premisses are that: ‘The effect of smoking on people is bad’ and
‘bad things should be banned’.
The following are illegitimate tactics.
1. Affirming the consequent
A surprisingly common error, of the form if P then Q. Q therefore P. If it is autumn, the
leaves will fall off the trees. The leaves are falling off the tress, therefore it is autumn. It
is a fallacy because the leaves could be falling off the trees for some other reason such as
(mentioned in the legitimate tactic ‘Affirming the antecedent’, above) during a drought.
A related common fallacy in argument, sometimes called ‘correlation confusion’, consists
of assuming that because two things often go together there must be a link.
2. Begging the question
The fallacy of assuming the very point at issue. In effect, the conclusion as one of the
premisses in an argument supposedly intended to prove it. It is a form of circularity in
argumentation.
3. The false DICHOTOMY
Two choices are given when, actually, other alternatives are possible.
4. Equivocation and ambiguity
Using a word or phrase that has two or more meanings as though it has just one. There
are various types of ambiguity: lexical ambiguity refers to individual words; referential
ambiguity occurs when the context is unclear; and syntactical ambiguity results from
grammatical confusions.
5. Non sequiturs and genetic fallacies
From the Latin, meaning ‘that which does not follow’. Statements are offered in a way
that suggests they follow logically one from the other, when in fact there is no such link.
The important ‘genetic fallacy’ is both a kind of non sequitur and a product of ambiguity:
this is where assumptions are drawn about something by tracing its origins back, although
in fact no necessary link can be made between the present situation and the claimed
original one.
6. Special pleading
Employing values or standards against an opponent’s position, while not applying them
to your own.
7. Wishful thinking
Assuming conclusions because we wish them to be so. An appeal to ‘majority opinion’ to
back up a factual claim is a particular kind of wishful thinking.
8. Red herrings
Irrelevant topics or arguments brought into a discussion with the effect of allowing the
real issue to go unexamined. Apparently, herrings were sometimes used to confuse dogs
chasing after foxes.
9. STRAW MAN arguments
Introducing and attributing a weak or absurd position to an opponent and proceeding to
demolish it.
10. Ad hominem attacks
From the Latin, meaning ‘towards the man’, these are comments directed not at the issue
at hand but at the individual opponent. (The term is occasionally used to refer to the
legitimate tactic of exposing an inconsistency in a person’s argument too.)
Another variety of ad hominem attack, that takes place before the main argument has
been introduced, is known as ‘poisoning the well’. There is also the so-called ‘bad
company’ tactic, where the opponent’s position is criticised by its supposed association
with some other view. The Nazis often appear in arguments, brought in for this purpose.
11. Humpty-dumptying
After Lewis CARROLL’s egg-shaped character who sits on a wall (but not, it seems, a
fence) and insists that a word can mean ‘just what I want it to mean – neither more or
less!’
12. Self-contradiction
And finally, the unfortunate tendency of a poor argument to inadvertently ‘shoot itself in
the foot’.
LYING – OR UNJUSTIFIED FALSE BELIEF?
Politicians rely on all the illegitimate tactics in argument, including equivocation, and ambiguity.
But then there is, of course, that ‘nuclear bomb’ tactic in argumentation: the downright lie. There
are many examples in history of wars built upon falsehoods, but more recently, Britain’s Prime
Minister, Tony Blair, was accused of lying in making a case for the war in Iraq.
For example, Blair had told an American news station (NBC, 3 April 2002) that: “we know that
[Saddam Hussein] has stockpiles of major amounts of chemical and biological weapons, [and]
we know that he is trying to acquire a nuclear capability”. But, after the war, it turned out that
there were no stockpiles, and the Prime Minister was accused of lying.
Can philosophy shed any light in this sort of debate? Well, there is a notion in philosophy that
we cannot say we know something unless we believe it to be so, we have a good, relevant reason
for believing it, and (finally) it really is so.
As to the second of these, subsequent events showed that the ‘reason’ Blair offered for believing
there to be Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, that is ‘secret assessments’ by the British
intelligence services, rather than supporting his view, stated that intelligence on the subject was
‘sporadic and patchy’. Rather than ‘knowing’ about Saddam’s weapons, the most that British
Intelligence claimed was that: ‘Iraq retains some production equipment and small stocks of CW
precursors, and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons’ (JIC assessment, 15
March 2002, quoted in The Rise of Political Lying by Peter Oborne, 2005).
So was Blair lying? Not technically. He could simply have misread the evidence. Nonetheless, in
the British Parliament an ‘Inquiry’ was called for, to find out. However, using a kind of Socratic
or ‘dialectical’ reasoning, Parliament could already have deduced quite a lot:
1. Either the Prime Minister believed that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
or he did not. If he did not, then he was lying when he said they were there.
2. If he believed there were such weapons then either he had secret evidence for it, or he did
not. If he did not, then he was lying when he said he ‘knew’ they existed.
3. Since now there were no weapons to be found, either they were destroyed at the outset of
war, or the secret evidence was wrong. If the weapons had been destroyed it would have
been possible to demonstrate this. But as this had not been demonstrated, the evidence
must have been wrong.
On this complex matter, which is less to do with lies than that old philosophical problem of
‘knowledge’, the Prime Minister eventually offered the justification that his claim was ‘true’ in
that he ‘believed it at the time’. This standard clears up many problems. He could have
‘believed’ there were weapons, as long as he ‘believed’ he had evidence for it. But it is also a
dangerous tactic, which if considered legitimate, tends to destroy the distinction between truth
and falsity itself.
In fact, it might be better if politicians lied more.
fallacy
from Dictionary of World Philosophy
From the Latin fallacia (“deceit,” “trick,” or “fraud”), this term means bad or faulty reasoning,
and is often also called non sequitur, a Latin phrase meaning “it does not follow,” and, less
often, paralogism, from the Greek para (“beside”) and logos (“reason”). With a narrower focus
on the use of argument for the purpose of refutation, i.e. to prove opposed views wrong, a fallacy
is sometimes also called a sophistic refutation or an apparent refutation.
There is an indefinitely large number of ways in which reasoning can be faulty; but, among those
most notable, are as follows.
Formal fallacies
These are faulty or erroneous inferences relatively to a system of formal logic (see logic). Some
are erroneous simply given their form and without any regard to the content of their sentences.
Others are erroneous in a system because they use rules of inference not included in the system.
Notable among these are the fallacies of propositional logic (or sentential logic, or the logic of
statements). They are the fallacy of affirming the consequent,
If p then q
and q
Hence p
For example,
If this is apple pie then it has apple in it
and it has apple in it
Hence, it is apple pie
and the fallacy of denying the antecedent,
If p then q
and not p
Hence not q
For example,
If this is apple pie then it has apple in it
and it is not apple pie
Hence, it does not have apple in it
Informal fallacies
These are fallacies resulting from errors concerning the meanings, relevance, or pragmatic use of
terms or sentences involved. Notable among them are as follows.
Ad baculum is a type of argument that appeals to a threat or fear in support of a conclusion. For
example, a jury member could say to the other jury members: you should find the defendant
guilty because, otherwise, you will be stuck in this jury for a long time. Though, as exemplified,
this type of argument is fallacious when it unduly appeals to threats, it arguably is not fallacious
when it permissibly appeals to threats, as in cases invoking punishment to justify obedience to
the law, e.g. you should not break the law because, otherwise, you will be likely to be punished.
Ad hominem (literally, “argument against the man”) is a type of argument that attacks a person’s
views or reasons by appeal to characteristics of the person. One subtype relies on attacks on the
person’s character, e.g. “what he says cannot be believed because he’s a liar.” In evaluating legal
testimony, such an attack may be valid in establishing the lack of credibility of a witness. So can
it be in political debate, for example in establishing the trustworthiness of a candidate to public
office. However, such attacks on character are often fallacious, for example when the attack is
clearly undeserved, or when it is used to distract from other, more significant matters.
A second subtype of ad hominem arguments relies on attacks on the relation between the
person’s views and his or her actions,e.g. “You don’t practice what you preach.” It is fallacious
to infer, from the fact that one fails to act in accordance with the views one advocates, that these
views are false. However, this version of the argument may not be fallacious when it is used to
point out that the circumstances make the advocated views unjustified, e.g. because what they
advocate cannot be generally, if ever, done.
Other subtypes are the tu quoque (you-too) version, and the bias (what you advocate is to your
advantage) version, which can be fallacious or not depending on conditions such as those just
discussed concerning the previous versions. A morally significant version of the ad
hominem argument is what can be called the ad naturam argument, whereby one’s views are
discounted merely because of the kind of person one is, as in the reply “because you are a
woman” (argument ad feminam).
Ad ignorantiam is an argument inferring that a proposition is true from the premise that the
proposition is not known to be false. These arguments could be easily abused, for example when
a person must be guilty of a crime because we do not have much or any evidence disproving that
the person is guilty. However, when evidence is inconclusive, they may be acceptably used to
establish certain presumptions. For example, in police investigations, a person’s unexpected and
out of character disappearance from the person’s usual whereabouts for a number of years, plus
the absence of any evidence that the person is alive – i.e. plus ignorance concerning whether or
not the person is alive – can serve as an acceptable basis to presume the person may very well
have died.
Ad misericordiam is any argument appealing to pity, sympathy, or compassion in support of a
conclusion in a manner that tends to hide strong evidence against the conclusion, or puts undue
emotional pressure on those to whom it is addressed.
Ad populum, also called fallacy of slanting, is any argument appealing to popular sentiment or
belief in support of a conclusion in a manner that exaggerates the evidential support provided by
such sentiment, or tends to hide strong evidence against the conclusion. A related fallacy is
the argumentum consensus gentium, where the popular sentiment or belief being appealed to is
that of all, most, or a great many human beings.
Ad verecundiam is any argument pointing out that, if one did not accept a certain opinion, one
would fail to respect the expert that formulated it, e.g. you should believe the experts’ opinion
that the city water is safe because it would be arrogant and disrespectful for you not to believe
their opinion. This may be an acceptable ground to establish a presumption or shift the burden of
proof so long as it does not tend to hide or distract people from paying attention to relevant
evidence; however, it is fallacious when it is used to bring closure to an argument or to treat
respect for experts as always overriding the examination of evidence.
Argument from authority is any argument that uses expert opinion to support a conclusion. It is a
practical, though fallible, way of presumptively establishing a conclusion and shifting the burden
of evidence; however, it is fallacious if used to bring closure to an argument on the basis of the
respect due to experts, or if treating expert opinion as always taking precedence over the
examination of evidence (as in the previously described ad verecundiam fallacy and, arguably,
into argumentum consensus gentium too).
Begging the question (petitio principii) or, in general, circular reasoning are fallacies in that the
conclusion, though involving different words, is not, as in good deductive arguments, contained
in the premises. Instead, it has exactly the same content, i.e. merely repeats or says exactly the
same thing, as the premises. Arguably a related version – because it also assumes or presupposes
what is or should be at issue – is the black-or-white fallacy, i.e. any argument that insists on
selecting one of two alternatives when at least a third one, i.e. a tertium quid – a Latin phrase
used by medieval logicians to mean “a third something” – is available.
Contradictio in adjecto is a Latin expression meaning “a contradiction in what is added,” which
denotes a fallacy involving a contradiction between, for example, a noun and an adjective
modifying it, e.g. a dimensionless cube.
Cum hoc ergo propter hoc is sometimes called the fallacy of false cause; this fallacy involves the
error of arguing that, simply because two events are correlated (eleven Argentine players and
eleven blue and white shirts are present on the field at the beginning of a World Cup game
involving Argentina’s team), one of them – say, the blue shirts’ being present – is the cause of
the other – the players’ being present.
Gambler’s fallacy, also called Monte Carlo fallacy, consists in supposing, of a sequence of
independent events, that the probabilities of later outcomes must decrease or increase to
compensate for earlier outcomes.
Genetic fallacy argues from the goodness or badness of an item’s origin to the goodness or
badness of the item. A particular case of this fallacy is the ad hominem fallacy discussed above.
Ignoratio elenchi, also called the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion or missing the point, is a type of
argument involving a failure of relevance, say, by arguing that theft is wrong during a trial aimed
at determining whether a defendant is guilty of theft.
Infinite regress (in Latin, regressus ad infinitum) is a ground used to consider a view defective
because thought to generate an infinite series of such things as explanatory reasons, and
justifying reasons, and either no such series is thought to exist or the series, though existing, is
thought not to have its explanatory or justificatory role. When the views thus criticized are
indeed unwarranted, it is not simply, if at all, because they generate an infinite series. For not
every infinite series is vicious. The views are often unwarranted because of other features, e.g.
that they try to provide justification or explanation when all such things are precluded.
Lazy reason – argos logos in Greek and ignava ratio in Latin – fallacy is to suspend all inquiry
on the grounds that it is useless or that nothing not already known can be discovered. Also
called lazy sophism, this was often characterized as a fallacy in Ancient Greece and Rome. A
variety of versions were formulated. One was: either what is sought is known or it is unknown. If
known, then it is useless to seek it, because one already knows it. If unknown, then it makes no
sense to seek it, because one knows not what to seek. Either way – either because one already
knows it or because one knows not what to seek – it is worthless to seek anything.
In a different sense, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (CE 1724–1804) used the
expression lazy reason (faule Vernunft) to denote the view that all inquiry has ended, which leads
reason to rest rather than continuing to inquire.
Non causa pro causa is also called the fallacy of false cause; this type of fallacy consists in
taking for the cause of something what is not its cause.
The fallacy of accent is any argument involving a shift in emphasis as a means of establishing a
proposition.
The fallacy of amphibology is any argument relying on its components being capable of more
than one interpretation, e.g. come to the meeting, because Mary will tell everyone how she lost
80 pounds at City Hall on Tuesday, May 3.
The fallacy of composition is any argument inferring that a whole has a certain feature simply
because its parts have it, e.g. the book is thin because the book pages are thin.
The fallacy of division is any argument inferring that a part has a certain feature simply because
the whole it belongs to does, e.g. the book pages are thick because the book is thick.
The fallacy of equivocation is the use of an expression in two different senses operant in the
same argument. Arguably a form of equivocation is subreption (from the Low
Latin subreption, noun for subreptio, “to steal”; hence, “a stealing”), the fallacy consisting in the
subreptitious introduction of a proposition or a change in meaning.
The fallacy of four terms is any syllogism appearing to involve three but, in fact, involving four,
e.g. what is right is useful, only one of your arms is right, hence only one of your arms is useful.
The fallacy of hypostatization is also called of reification; this fallacy consists in an argument
postulating a thing on the basis of features that do not require it, e.g. plants have souls, because
they grow well when they are watered, hence they like being watered, and liking is a feature of
souls.
The fallacy of hasty generalization is any argument drawing an inductive conclusion from
limited evidence, e.g. he will never learn how to swim, because he tried twice and failed.
The fallacy of many questions is the tactic of asking questions by packing presuppositions in
them that will be implied by any yes or no answer to the questions, e.g. “Have you quit beating
your little brother?”
The fallacy of secundum quid is the failure to take a statement in its proper restricted sense,
where secundum quid – Latin for “according to something” – was used in medieval philosophy
to mean in a qualified, restricted, or secondary sense.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc a Latin phrase meaning “after this, therefore because of this”; it is the
name of one of the fallacies of relevance, also known as the fallacy of false cause.
An additional shortcoming that can be attributed to an argument is that of being a slipperyslope argument, or wedge argument, i.e. that a reason the argument uses to justify something
would, if good, entail the justification of another thing, and then another and another, all
considered unjustified. Hence, it is concluded the argument is not good. These and many other
informal fallacies had already been studied in Antiquity and used by the sophists who thoroughly
developed eristic (from the Greek eris, i.e. “strife”), the art of controversy, often involving
fallacious but persuasive arguments.