Read and ask questions

Question for Consideration Assignment InstructionsThe QFC assignment is a way to generate discussion between prepared students while also
providing an objective means of tracking participation.
NOTE: Rather than doing one per class, each student will submit one each week. If your last
name begins with a letter A-M, you will submit on the first day of class that week, and if your
last name begins with N-Z, you will submit on the second day. Then, around week 5 or 6, we
will switch. There will be two weeks where the second lecture day is either cancelled or filled
with non-readings, so there will be no reading questions those weeks.
Directions: These need to be typed documents (word doc or pdf, not pages, please) that you
submit on Canvas by noon of the day the reading is due. You also need to have these accessible
to you during the class (either by printing or on your phone/laptop/ipad, etc) since we will use
them in class. They that should include 4 components:
1) Include a quote from the text AND Provide context for the quote:
Pick a quote/passage from one text you have read for class and type it into the document.
Do not pick short-ish quotes (like, part of a sentence). You need to capture the full
thought or a significant portion of it. So, no full paragraphs and no partial sentences. Try
to pick quotes that:
– Seem significant to a part of the argument
– Help illuminate something about the author’s position, assumptions, etc.
– Have key terms and philosophical concepts that are important for the
argument
– Etc.
1. For the context: you basically need to describe what is happening around the quote and
how the quote fits into the general claims/argument. Careful attention to the surrounding
statements is likely to provide you with important information about the meaning and
significance of the passage and will help you perform better on this assignment.
See the example for more detail.
2) Your philosophical question:
Type out a question about the chosen passage and its context.
What makes a good question? Well, if you can provide a quick yes or no response, or if
you can answer the question by appealing solely to examination of empirical evidence
(e.g., observing the color of litmus paper after you dip it in a liquid), you have not asked a
philosophical question. Among other things, philosophical questions “are questions
whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement”
(Floridi 2013). Here are some examples of different types of philosophical questions.
3) Reason for asking this question:
Provide a reason why this question was raised for you/why you are raising this question
of the text. Good reasons do not include “Because it was interesting” or “because I don’t
understand.” They should instead include reasons that have to do with why the question
itself is important, how the answer to the question might impact argument reception or
clarity, why the answer to the question is significant for and might alter the author’s
point, etc. Among other things, you should clarify why it is important to at least try to
find a plausible answer to the question (e.g., What issues must be considered as we
attempt to answer the question? What might be the implications of answering the
question one way or the other? Who might be benefited or harmed, and in what ways, if
the answer is taken seriously and, say, used to guide the development of public policies
and practices?)
Grading Rubric for QFCs
Quote and Context of
Quote
.5 Point
You have a quote, but
no clear context is
given.
Question about the
selected passage
You have a question.
Reason for asking the
question
Present, but either (a)
not clearly connected
to the question or (b)
not directly relevant
to the reading
3/4 Points
You chose a quote
that is clear,
understandable, and
relevant to the
philosophical
argument, and decent
but insufficient
context about how
the quote fits with the
rest of the material
Question is clear,
understandable, and
relevant to the
philosophical
argument/text
Clear,
understandable, and
relevant to the
philosophical
argument
1 Points
Very good choice of
clearly identifiable
quotation with some
good philosophical
significance for the
argument and the
context clearly
articulates the role of
this quote in the
overall argument
Question is
thoughtful and helps
advance
understanding of
some complexity,
author’s argument, or
points directly to
philosophical
significance
Clear and reflective;
demonstrates an
appreciation of why
the question is
philosophical and
what type of
philosophical
question it is;
addresses complexity
and points to
philosophical
significance
Sample Question for Consideration
Part 1: Selected Passage
“One of the main contributions of poststructuralist philosophy has been to expose as illusory this
metaphysic of a unified self-making subjectivity, which posts the subject as an autonomous
origin or an underlying substance to which attributes of gender, nationality, family role,
intellectual disposition, and so on might attach. Conceiving the subject in this fashion implies
conceiving consciousness as outside of and prior to language and the context of social
interaction, which the subject enters…The self is a product of social processes, not their origin”
(Iris Marion Young, “The Five Faces of Oppression,” 45).
This passage comes from a section in the text where Young is defining what groups are. At this
point in her argument, she is talking about how individuals relate to groups. Just before this
passage she discusses how groups constitute individuals rather than the other way around. In the
section following this passage, she goes on to argue that the identity of individuals comes about
as a result of the relations between that person and others.
Part 2: My Question
In this article Young says several times that oppression in the condition of groups. How does her
concept of identity—identity as something that isn’t unified or autonomous or in existence prior
to the existence of groups—support her claim that oppression isn’t a condition of individuals? If
people don’t have fixed individual identities and the notion of such an identity is an illusion, is
the harm of oppression the fact that people are treated as though they members of certain groups
when they actually aren’t? Does this mean that we should get rid of the notion of groups
entirely? Is grouping people at all always a risk for causing oppression?
Part 3: My Reason for Asking
So much of philosophy and the way we talk about identity colloquially, especially in
contemporary American society, makes it seem like individuals are completely autonomous
beings who have free will. In this conception of the individual, we choose what groups we’re
part of and if other group us in a way that we don’t like, it’s either our fault (we didn’t properly
represent ourselves to others) or we have no choice because we are “obviously” a member of
certain groups—like women, men, Asians, etc. Young seems to be claiming the opposite about
individuals, but strikes me as unintuitive given the way we usually talk about identity. If she’s
right about how identity is formed, then we’d need to change how we understand the ways that
oppression affects individuals. In addition to this, it would cause us to call into question the very
idea that individuals can exist prior to their relations to others or to groups. It also calls into
question the value of groups and instead points to some of the potential dangers of using groups
to talk about identity.
INDIGENOUS COSMQPOLITICS IN THE ANDES: Conceptual Reflections beyond “Politics”
Author(s): MARISOL de la CADENA
Source: Cultural Anthropology , MAY 2010, Vol. 25, No. 2 (MAY 2010), pp. 334-370
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40784464
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preserve and extend access to Cultural Anthropology
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITICS IN THE ANDES:
Conceptual Reflections beyond “Politics”
MARISOL de la CADENA
University of California, Davis
It* s inconceivable that in the 2 1 st century, God still has to be defined accor
to the European standards. . . . We think the life of Jesus is the Great
coming from Inti Yaya (Paternal and Maternal Light that supports it all),
aim is to deter anything that doesn’t let us live in justice and brothe
among human beings and in harmony with Mother Nature. . . . The P
should note that our religions NEVER DIED, we learned how to merge
beliefs and symbols with the ones of the invaders and oppressors.
– Humberto Cholango, May 2007 l
How can we present a proposal intended, not to say what is, or what o
to be, but to provoke thought, a proposal that requires no other verific
than the way in which it is able to “slow down” reasoning and create
opportunity to arouse a slightly different awareness of the problems
situations mobilizing us?
– Isabelle Stengers, 2005
The political reconfiguration that is currently taking place in Latin Am
may mark epochal changes in the continent. Electoral results in Bolivia and
have led international and national analysts to interpret these changes as
continental re-turn to the left, but what is unprecedented is the presence of r
indigenous social movements as a constituent element of these transforma
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 334-370. ISSN 0886-7356, online ISSN 1548-1360. ©
the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. DO1: 10.1 1 1 1 /j. 1548-1360. 2010.01061.x
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
Their demands tend to disturb political agendas and conceptual settlements
gressive and conservative alike.
Take the first quote above, excerpted from a letter that Humberto Chol
the President of Ecuarunari – an indigenous political organization from Ecu
wrote to Pope Benedict XVI in May 2007. At a meeting in Brazil, the
had said that at the time of the Conquest Indians had already been longin
their conversion, which had been nonviolent; Cholango’ s letter protested
declarations. A complex political document, the letter denounced, made alli
and also proposed a distinct agenda. Cholango denounced the more than 500
of colonization by the dominant Catholic Church, as well as the neoim
stance of George W. Bush, then President of the United States. They coinc
their genocidal consequences vis-à-vis indigenous ways of living in Latin Am
the document said. Against these consequences, Ecuarunari made alliances
ecumenical liberation theologians and so-called leftist presidents in the r
Significantly, the document alerted everybody that, against the will of colo
indigenous practices have always been there; they remain strong and cur
guide the political project in Abya Ayala, the name with which indigenous
movements refer to Latin America.
The practices Cholango mentioned may be identified as religious (in fact, he
so does); yet the letter changes the problem by lifting religious practices from an
exclusive concern with the sacred or spiritual, and placing them within historical,
earthly, and political concerns of cohabitation between Catholic and non-Catholic,
indigenous and nonindigenous institutions. Changing the problem, the letter moves
the conversation from transcendental religious beliefs to a plane of immanence and
historical ontology entangled with organized indigenous politics. Significantly, the
analytical problem that the letter reveals is that indigenous politics may exceed
politics as we know them. Established politicians find it difficult to accept, for
example , that “Jesus the Great Light coming from Inti Yaya” has tangible connections
both with “Mother Nature” and with human beings. Moreover, Inti Yaya and
Mother Nature, until recently foreign to politics, can be summoned into it and
even make their way into the most official of all state documents. Surprising many,
Chapter 7 of the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, reads: “Nature
or Pachamama, where life becomes real and reproduces itself, has the right to be
integrally respected in its existence, and to the maintenance and regeneration of
its life cycles, structures, functions, and evolutionary processes” (my emphasis).2
That nature has rights may be (sort of) understood in environmentalist grammar.
335
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
But what is Pachamama and what happened that allowed such an entity a presenc
in the constitution?
Clearly annoyed, Rafael Correa, president of Ecuador and at times antineolib
eral, blamed an “infantile” coalition of environmentalists, leftists, and indigenis
for the intrusion of Pachamama- Nature in the Constitution. Wrapping up his accu
sation, he added that the coalition was the worst danger for the Ecuadoran politi
process (Ospina 2008). 3 The reaction is not unusual among politicians like Corre
modern, urban, and self-identified as nonindigenous, they dismiss the excess
residual (or infantile in this case) and hope that it will gradually disappear. But,
Cholango insists, what he calls their “beliefs and symbols” have not disappeared
500 years. Summoning those strange actors may indeed be a political strategy t
interpellate indigenous subjectivities. But can the strategy itself have an ontologi
explanation of its own? Can we think about these presences as political actors – o
as an issue in politics, at the very least – instead of brushing them away as exce
sive, residual or infantile? How do we do that? These questions seem unusual; the
disrupt conceptual comfort zones. They arise from the conceptual challenge pos
by the equally unusual presences, not of indigenous politicians, but of the entiti
(which I call “earth-beings”) they conjure to the political sphere.
The appearance of earth-beings in social protests may evince a moment of
rupture of modern politics and an emergent indigeneity.4 I do not mean a ne
mode of being indigenous. I mean an insurgence of indigenous forces and practic
with the capacity to significantly disrupt prevalent political formations, and reshu
fle hegemonic antagonisms, first and foremost by rendering illegitimate (and, thu
denaturalizing) the exclusion of indigenous practices from nation- state institutions
Although it can be reabsorbed into a new political hegemony, the current mome
represents a unique historical conjuncture. Emerging through a deep, expansive
and simultaneous crisis of colonialism and neoliberalism (Blaser 2007) – convergin
in its ecological, economic, and political fronts – the public presence of unusu
actors in politics is at least thought provoking. It may represent an epistemic o
casion to “slow down reasoning” – as in Stengers’ s quote above – and, rather th
asserting, adopt an intellectual attitude that proposes and thus creates possibiliti
for new interpretations. Taking my cue from Stengers, I intend this ethnograph
cally inspired essay as an invitation to take seriously (perhaps literally) the presenc
in politics of those actors, which, being other than human, the dominant disci-
plines assigned either to the sphere of nature (where they were to be known
by science) or to the metaphysical and symbolic fields of knowledge (William
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
Pampamisavoq. My insights into tin* relations between humans a
from two Quechua individuals, Mariano Turpo and his son Na/ario.
village in Peru called Pacchanta, located more than 1 5,000 feet ab
southeast ol the t it v ol” CV/co. Mariano was close- to 90 when 1 m
of old aae two wars alter. Na/ario and I continued working toget
tragically ended his life in July 2007. 1 hev were1 both pampamisa
“ritual specialists”) ^nd politicians. (A literal translation ol pampanu
with the mi su or table” and, therefore, enabled to interact with
call landscape.) They were not isolated traditionalists; rather, both w
and local innovators. When younger, Mariano’s activism took him t
state functionaries, even the Peruvian president. Na/ario traveled
Museum of the American Indian in Washington, 1).C’, where he was
exhibit. He also participated in meetings in Ecuador and Bolivia org
social movement regional network. Through them, Peru remains
although I also draw from events in Bolivia and I cuador. Rather th
event, the current political emergence ot indigeneitv takes place th
ol activism and everyday practice.
“EXCESSIVE PRACTICES” PROLIFERATE AND DISRUPT
“POLITICS AS USUAL”
As the 2 1 st century unfolds, earth-beings and human interactions with them
what Penelope Harvey (2007) calls “earth-practices” – have been increasi
frequent presences on political stages in the Andes. In Bolivia, “offering
Pachamama” (known as pagos, despachos, or misas)s became public during the
litical mobilizations known as Guerra del Agua and Guerra del Gas that occurr
in 2000 and 2003, respectively, that precipitated the fall of two consecutive
oliberal regimes in Bolivia. On January 21, 2006, a day before Evo Mora
inauguration as the new President of Bolivia, a group of Aymara elders rec
nized him as their leader in a public ceremony that summoned the surroun
landscape.6 Thereafter, similar practices – libations to the earth before a poli
conversation, for example – have made their way into the main quarters of
Bolivian State, even attracting international attention. A July 2006 story in the
Street Journal (Córdoba and Luhnow 2006) titled “A Dash of Mysticism: Gover
Bolivia the Aymara Way” reported that David Choquehuanca, Bolivia’s foreig
minister, had introduced Andean “beliefs” into his function. We may be tem
to interpret the frequency of these practices as an expression of momentous (
would wish ephemeral) “organized ethnic politics” in Bolivia. However, the s
reasoning does not apply in Ecuador, for both Cholango’s letter to the Pope, as
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
well as the inscription of “Nature or Pachamama” in the Constitution occurre
despite the electoral defeat of Luis Macas, the 2006 indigenous candidate to th
Ecuadoran Presidency. Moreover, that similar practices have appeared on politic
stages in Peru – exceptional among Andean countries because ethnic politics hav
little political traction – suggests a composition more complex than organized po
itics (leftist or ethnic) articulating their emergence. I came to this realization aft
attending the political demonstration I describe below.
In early December 2006, more than 1 ,000 peasants gathered in Cuzco’ s mai
square, the Plaza de Armas. They had traveled from their villages located at t
foot of a mountain named Ausangate, well known in Cuzco as a powerful eart
being, the source of life and death, of wealth and misery; obtaining a favorab
outcome requires maintaining proper relationships with it and its surroundin
(other mountains, lesser sentient entities). In the Plaza de Armas, the peasant
joined other demonstrators: hundreds of devotees of the Sanctuary of Coyllur R
and the members of the Catholic brotherhoods that guard the place. They were
there to protest the prospective concession of a mine located in the Sinakara, o
of the peaks in the mountain chain to which Ausangate belongs and that also house
Coyllur Rit’i. Visited annually by thousands of pilgrims from all over Cuzco, th
sanctuary commemorates the apparition of a divine shepherd and a miraculou
cross. Not unusual in grassroots demonstrations in Cuzco, the Plaza was replet
with people wearing the distinctively indigenous chullos (multicolored woolen
hats) and ponchos. Also as usual, there were banners; some displayed cultural-
environmental slogans appropriate for the occasion: “We will defend our cultur
patrimony with our lives: No to the mine!!” But there were also unusual banner
of the kind carried by standard bearers in the pilgrimage to Coyllur Rit’i itsel
Also intriguing, this time, among the demonstrators were ukukos, ritual dance
and central characters in the pilgrimage. Ritual dancers, rural and urban religio
brotherhoods, participating as such in a political demonstration. … I had not se
anything similar in this Plaza where I have attended countless and assorted politi
demonstrations over many years.
Yet the degree to which this demonstration was different was brought home t
me by my friend Nazario, whose village, Pacchanta, is at the foot of the Ausangate
He was there to protest the mining project – in fact he had called to let me kno
about the event. Initially, while we were demonstrating, I thought we shared
single view against the mine; however, once we debriefed about the meeting,
and how it could influence future events, I realized that our shared view was a
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
pastures that families depend on to earn their living grazing alpacas and sh
and selling their wool and meat. Nazario agreed with me, but said it would
worse: Ausangate would not allow the mine in Sinakara, a mountain over whi
presided. Ausangate would get mad, could even kill people. To prevent that kil
the mine should not happen. I could not agree more, and although I could not b
myself to think that Ausangate would kill, I found it impossible to consider
metaphor. Preventing Ausangate’ s ire was Nazario’ s motivation to participat
the demonstration and therefore it had political import.
Days later and back in the countryside, I realized that in one way or anoth
many shared his view. Among them some were peasants, others merchants; s
self-identified as indigenous, others did not. The local notables (the mayor, ju
of peace, teachers, merchants) were divided – not on the sentiency of Ausang
but, rather, on the potential dangers of Ausangate’ s reaction, including landsl
epidemics, and droughts, and how to negotiate and deal with it. When in 20
visited Pacchanta, Nazario Turpo’s village, rumor had it that the project for
mine had been cancelled. Perhaps it would not have been a successful venture
buzz went, and Ausangate had receded from the regional political stage. During
visit, I also talked to Graciano Mandura, the newly elected mayor of Ocong
the district that houses the complex Coyllur Rit ‘I- Sinakara- Ausangate. Born
Nazario in Pacchanta, Graciano is a native Quechua speaker who learned Spanis
elementary school, holds a degree in animal husbandry from the University of C
and was working for a local NGO when he decided to run for Mayor. As a candid
Graciano joined the effort against the mine that threatened the sanctuary an
mountain chain; in our conversation, I asked why he had joined the antimin
effort, and he explained that the mine would deter tourism, an activity that
generating income in the region. This was a response I was expecting. But the
added that he knew from experience that the mountains, which he called by t
name, demand respect. Otherwise inexplicable accidents happen – it has alw
been so. Wouldn’t it be his responsibility as Mayor to prevent those acciden
whatever their reason? Now, this response – and more specifically its formula
through the logic of a responsible state official – confirmed that there was m
than politics as usual in this locality. Slowing down reasoning was ethnographi
called for.
Ausangate and the sanctuary of Coyllur Rit’ i are not the only earth-bein
to have become public politically. In northern Peru, a coalition of peasants
environmentalists made Cerro Quilish public as a “sacred mountain” and enlis
it in the fight against Yanacocha, the largest gold mine in Latin America.7 I resume
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
a brief discussion of this event later. For now, suffice it to say, that although not
each of the mining conflicts proliferating in Peru articulates the presence of earth-
beings, the few that did become public were influential enough to disturb Peruvian
President Alan Garcia. Sacred mountains, he said, were an invention of “old anticapitalist communists of the nineteenth century who changed into protectionists in
the twentieth century and have again changed into environmentalists in the twenty
first century.”8 Those places, he continued, were nothing but tierras ociosas idle lands, whose “owners do not have any formation, or economic resources,
therefore their property is not real.” Although leftist pundits have responded to
many of Garcia’ s neoliberalizing points, they have not said anything about sacred
mountains. Perhaps they think the president is right in that respect; sacred sites
are nonsense, a curiosity hoped to disappear soon. If I want to contest Garcia’ s
position (and convince at least some of my leftist friends in the process), where do
I look for a way into a discussion that has some possibility to bear fruit?
Political economy and cultural politics certainly offer entry points. There is
no denying that neoliberalism is an important player in the game; free market
policies, global mineral prices, and mining activities in Peru have all increased
dramatically. Between 1990 and 2000, mining investment grew fivefold; between
1 990 and 2003, mineral exports increased from $ 1 ,447 million to $4,554 million.
In 2002, Peru was the leading producer of gold in Latin America and the world’s
sixth largest producer. Mining concessions mushroomed, growing 77.4 percent
between 2002 and 2007, from 7,045,000 has to 13,224,000 has. Many new
concessions have been granted in territories where mining has historically not
occurred and that are often occupied by indigenous communities.9 These numbers
are spectacular enough to explain the escalation of antimining protests. One feels
tempted to interpret these events within the parameters of political economy
and the analytical vocabulary it makes available. I could, for example, see the
antimining demonstrations as indigenous responses to the neoliberal expropriation
of their land, or the result of something like “environmental consciousness.” This
perspective would be compatible with an ethnographic analysis of cultural politics
that takes distance with an earlier Andeanist ethnographic record that, as Orin Starn
commented many years ago, has been habitually rich in ritual and symbolic analysis
and oblivious to politics (199 1).10 Analyzing the copresence of both – Andean
rituals confronting dominant property politics, for example – would amount to a
scholarly contribution.
Another analytical temptation: I could see these events as indigenous challenges
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
the religion of the subjects” (Asad 2005), and that they instead forge an indige
counter public sphere (Fraser 1997; for Bolivia see Albro 2006; Stephenson 20
Such interpretations would not be inaccurate – they could be a response of so
to positions like Garcia’s, the Peruvian President. Yet, what is accurate is n
necessarily sufficient (cf. Chakrabarty 2000) and questions remain. What kin
publics are being mobilized into the political sphere – and why do they disrup
Answers to these questions using ideology as analytics seem short: the differ
between Rafael Correa, the president from Ecuador, and Humberto Cholang
the spokesperson for Ecuarunari seems to be more than ideological; import
differences persist between the two even when the President, at least sometim
seems to make left-leaning gestures. Measuring these differences in “degre
leftism” would be, I think, if not spurious, at least a waste of time. Simila
ideology does not explain the difference between Peruvian President Alan Ga
a neoliberal modernizer, and Nazario Turpo, who does not ascribe to a polit
ideology in a definitive way. Moreover, how do we explain the coincidence bet
the adamant neoliberal President Garcia and the (so far) antineoliberal Pres
Correa, both irate at the presence of, let’s say “excessive” actors on their nat
political stages? What follows is an attempt to denaturalize that excess by propos
a historical understanding of the epistemic-political processes that made it suc
THE POLITICAL THEORY THAT BANNED EARTH-BEINGS
FROM POLITICS
The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe
– Schmitt, 1996
Politics is not made up of power relations; it is made up of relatio
worlds
– Rancière, 1999
A reading of the Andean ethnographic record along epistemic lines shows
that earth-practices are relations for which the dominant ontological distinction
between humans and nature does not work.11 Earth-practices enact the respect
and affect necessary to maintain the relational condition between humans and
other-than-human beings that makes life in (many parts of) the Andes. Other-than-
humans include animals, plants, and the landscape. The latter, the most frequently
summoned to politics these days, is composed of a constellation of sentient entities
known as tirakuna, or earth-beings with individual physiognomies more or less
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
known by individuals involved in interactions with them.12 The “things” that in
digenous movements are currently “making public” (cf. Latour 2005) in politics a
not simply nonhumans, they are also sentient entities whose material existence
and that of the worlds to which they belong – is currently threatened by th
neoliberal wedding of capital and the state. Thus, when mountains – say Quilish
Ausangate – break into political stages, they do so also as earth-beings, “contenti
objects whose mode of presentation is not homogenous with the ordinary mode
existence of the objects thereby identified” (Rancière 1999:99). Borrowing fro
the history of science to trace the history of politics (for the latter as much as th
former was invented) I propose that these objects are contentious because the
presence in politics disavows the separation between “Nature” and “Humanity,”
which the political theory our world abides by was historically funded.13
According to the modern order of things science and politics are to each other
like water and oil: They do not mix. The first stands for objective representation o
nature, while the second is the negotiation of power to represent people vis-à-v
the state. This distinction, historians of science Steven Shapin and Simon Schaf
fer explain, resulted from the quarrel between Hobbes, author of Leviathan, an
Robert Boyle, champion of the “experiment” as scientific method and architect
the new field of experimental science and its social institutions (Shapin and Schaff
1 985). They propose that this quarrel (in which Hobbes denied the truth of Boy
experiment because of its private nature, and Boyle insisted that experiments co
not have the public aspect that should characterize politics) was one important h
torical moment in the invention of the language that lifted “politics” from “scienc
and in the consequent formulation of the boundaries between epistemology a
the forces of society. Bruno Latour (1993) builds on this analysis to develop h
argument about the creation of what he calls the modern constitution: the regi
of life that created a single natural order and separated it from the social by creati
an ontological distinction between things and humans that it purported univers
He suggests that, rather than creating two separate spheres – Boyle science a
Hobbes politics – what they did together (through their quarrel) was to creat
“our modern world, a world in which the representation of things through t
intermediary of the laboratory is forever dissociated from the representation
citizens through the intermediary of the social contract” (Latour 1993:27). Hob
and Boyle were, thus, “like a pair of Founding Fathers, acting in concert to promo
one and the same innovation in political theory: the representation of nonhuma
belongs to science, but science is not allowed to appeal to politics; the represent
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOUTiCS
to the nonhumans produced and mobilized by science and technology” (Latou
1993:28).
The presence of earth-beings in social protests invites us to slow down reasoning because it may evince an intriguing moment of epistemic rupture with this
theory of politics. Their public emergence contends – to use Rancière’ s word with both science and politics; it may house the capacity to upset the locus of
enunciation of what “politics” is about – who can be a politician or what can be
considered a political issue, and thus reshuffle the hegemonic antagonisms that for
more than 500 years organized the political field in the Andes, and that gradually articulated through modern scientific paradigms, banned earth-beings from
politics. Here I borrowed Chantai Mouffe’s distinction between politics and the
political – for which she, in turn, builds on Carl Schmitt (Mouffe 2000). Antagonism separates “friends” from “enemies” in such a way that “the adversary intends
to negate the other’s way of life … in order to preserve one’s forms of existence”
(Schmitt 1996:27). The political enemy is “the other, a stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in an especially intense way, existentially something
different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible”
(Schmitt 1996:27). Antagonism is not good or evil, ugly or beautiful, profitable
or unprofitable, for all these distinctions belong to other specific fields – ethics,
aesthetics, and economics respectively – to which the political cannot be reduced.
The problem with liberalism and particularly with liberal democracy, says Schmitt,
is that having tied the political to the ethical, it negates conflict and, thus, the
political itself.
Mouffe takes up this point and builds on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to
define politics as the field that makes antagonism livable, curbs or even cancels
its warlike potential, without ever canceling the conflict it entails. Politics are,
she explains, those practices through which the antagonistic differences between
friends and enemies are tamed, dealt with (ideologically and institutionally) and
transformed into the agonisms – the relationships among adversaries – that characterize hegemonic orders, with their inclusions and exclusions (Mouffe 2000). 14
Yet, I must add to Mouffe, hegemony does not act only on the sphere of
politics. Hegemonic biopower – wielded by both socialism and liberalism alike transformed the political into an accepted battlefield for life. In such battlefield
decisions are taken about who the enemies are, but as important, about who, not
withstanding the antagonism, are not even worthy of enemy status. On occasions
they are not even worth killing; they can be left to die because, although included
in the concept of “Humanity,” they do not count – at all, for they are too close to
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
“Nature.” If liberalism, as Schmitt and Mouffe suggest, tied the political to ethi
and, thus, negated conflict, the birth of the modern political field, we learn fro
science scholars, was tied to the denial of the state of “Nature.” Sustaining the noti
of the political that eventually became hegemonic was the ontological distinctio
between “Humanity” and “Nature,” the creation of the “natural Man,” his senten
to inevitable extinction along with his other-than-human beings, and the occlusi
of this antagonism through the notion of an adamantly inclusive and hierarchica
organized “Humanity.” Only the fully humans engaged in antagonisms, and onl
they could transform their enmities into adversarial relations – that is, engage i
politics.
Initially, the antagonism between European and local other-than-human en-
tities was visible. In Spanish America, the Catholic Church considered them as
diabolic enemies, and practices with earth-beings were idolatries condemned to
extirpation. In British America, Locke authorized war against natives – their closeness to nature made them unproductive, land had to be incorporated to civilization
via the agricultural work of the white man. The antagonism must have been silenced
gradually as reason gained ground and eventually prevailed over faith as a knowledge/power regime, and monopolized politics for those who knew through science.
Interaction with things through nonrepresentational practices – the absence of the
distinction between signifier and signified that allowed modern scientific practice
and politics alike – was deemed equivalent to the absence of reason, and more
specifically of political reason.
Hegel’s musings about Africa may serve to illustrate the point. In Africa, he
wrote, “natural forces as well as the sun, moon, trees, animals are recognized as
powers in their own right, they are not seen as having an eternal law or providence
behind them, or as forming part of a universal and permanent natural order” (Hegel
1997:130). There “the kings have ministers and priests – and sometimes a fully
organized hierarchy of officials – whose task is to practice sorcery, to command
the powers of nature, and to determine the weather” (Hegel 1997:130). Pages
later we learn that the African’s lack of understanding of “Nature’s Laws” was only
compatible with a political organization based on the “arbitrariness of the autocrat”
subjecting “men of equally savage temper” (Hegel 1 997: 1 37, 1 38). This reasoning
should not be simplified as racism – it was enabled by the antagonistic relationship
articulating the ontological distinction between humans and nature. Race (as a
modern tool to rank “Humanity” along a “Civilization”- “Nature” continuum) was
also enabled by this distinction and therefore already included the overarching
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
The discrimination that enabled race (and racism)
political built on the silenced antagonism between nature à
occluded the war between the world ol modern colonizers and those of the colonized and
in neither case allowed for politics between them. I heir view as enemies displaced, the
potential of an adyersarial relationship, a rightful strudle foi’ a hegemonic project, between
them was stilled. It ^ave way to a center-periphery biopolitics of bene’ olent ãm’ inevitable
inclusion in process and civilization. This produced a regime of visibility (Rancière 1999)
that presented the uncounted to appear as such; the denial of their difference (amounting to
their exclusion from the’ possibility of equality) translated into ranked inclusion in Western
humanity: an offer that “the inferior” could not refuse. The object of policies of improvement,
only through a process of transformation (e.g., through which they should deny the* social
relations they held with plants, rivers, or mountains) could “the naturals” aain active and
legitimate access to politics. Until then, they were a threat (but not cjuite an enemy) from
which society, il it wanted to live a healthy life, had to be defended (cf. loucault). The
political field was in discursive proximity with the science of race and the state could scarcely
function without becoming involved in racism (loucault 2O(H:2 5 5). Althoutrh race has
i^one through constant theoretical and historical denaturali/ation since World War II, the
discrimination between who can be considered enemies and who are not worthy of such
status, and between those who can govern and those who cannot, continues to be legitimate.
Undoing this discrimination requires undoing the political and politics as we know it a
task that requires more than the most radical multiculturalism welcoming to politics those
previously evicted bv racist politics. 1 would like to suggest that denouncing racism even
undoing it may address the inferiority in question, but it does not address the epistemic
roots of the antagonism between those entitled to rule and those destined to be ruled.
What needs to be addressed is the epistemic maneuver that organized the’ political deciding
what could be brought into politics and what belonged to a different managerial sphere. If
embedded in the political was the silence about the antagonistic exclusion of “naturals,” the
elimination of “Nature” from the same sphere completed the hegemony.
by science. Hegel shared with his modern peers this belief – then and now;
underpinning runs deeper than racism alone.
The political field we currently recognize as such was shaped not only by dist
guishing friends from enemies among humans but also by the antithetical separa
of “Humanity” and “Nature.” Together these two antitheses – between human
and nature, and between allegedly superior and inferior humans – declared
gradual extinction of other-than-human beings and the worlds in which they
isted. The pluriverse, the multiple worlds that Schmitt deemed crucial to t
possibility of the political, disappeared.15 Instead a single world made its app
ance, inhabited by many peoples (now we call them cultures) more or less dista
from a single “Nature” (Descola 1996; Haraway 1991; Latour 1993; Viveir
Castro 2004). Nonscientific relations with other-than-humans were reduced to
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
belief, a far cry from a method to ascertain truth, yet perhaps worthy of prese
vation as long as they did not claim their right to define reality. The relation
among worlds was one of silent antagonism, with the Western world definin
for history (and with “History”) its superbly hegemonic role as civilizational, a
as a consequence accruing power to organize the homogenous life that it striv
to expand. Politics as a relation of disagreement among worlds – as the “meetin
of the heterogeneous,” in Rancière ‘s words (1999:32) – disappeared, or rarely
happened.
Nonrepresentational, affective interactions with other- than-humans contin-
ued all over the world, also in the Andes.16 The current appearance of Andean
indigeneity – the presence of earth-beings demanding a place in politics – may
imply the insurgence of those proscribed practices disputing the monopoly of sci-
ence to define “Nature” and, thus, provincializing its alleged universal ontology
as specific to the West: one world (even if perhaps the most powerful one) in
a pluri verse. This appearance of indigeneities may inaugurate a different politics,
plural not because they are enacted by bodies marked by gender, race, ethnicity,
or sexuality demanding rights, or by environmentalists representing nature, but
because they bring earth-beings to the political, and force into visibility the antag-
onism that proscribed their worlds. Most important, this may transform the war
that has ruled so far silently through a singular biopoli tics of improvement, into
what Isabelle Stengers calls a cosmopolitics: a politics where “cosmos refers to the
unknown constituted by these multiple, divergent worlds and to the articulation of
which they would eventually be capable” (Stengers 2005:995). In creating this articulation, indigenous movements may meet those – scientists, environmentalists,
feminists, egalitarians of different stripes – also committed to a different politics
of nature, one that includes disagreement on the definition of nature itself.
Antagonism, niulticulturalism, multinaturalism. In Latin America, the antagonism with indigeneity and earth-beings is located in the image, rhetoric, institutions, and
practices oi “the lettered city,” a well-known concept in Latin American studies initially
discussed bv Uruguayan literary critic Anojei Rama in la Ciudad letrada (I960). (An Ln^lish
version was published in 1996; see Rama 1996.) The term described the power oí literacy
in Latin Ameritan societies, and the central role of cities in deploying and reproducing it.
More specifically, from the urban headquarters literacy emerges as a beneyolent technology
of ‘improvement, the historical thrust of which has been to programmatically let Indians die:
Indio leído. Indio perdido (a literate Indian is a lost Indian) says a very old and widespread adage
in Spanish-speaking Latin America, reflecting the belief that for better or worse, literacy
instills reason and, thus, in line with Captain Pratt’s belief, it “kills the Indian and saves
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
the Man.” letting Indians die was necessary to achieve progress; moreo
through cultural technologies, via alfabetización and urbani/ ación. Pres
urbanization, the death of Indians was, in lad, their birth as mestiz
citizens of the nation. The same belief holds for Portuguese speakin
cording to Azclene Kanjnan^ an indigenous sociologist from Brazil,
state tells the Indian: if you are incapable and live in the forest then I
oct your education and live in the city, then vou become Brazilian, and
to Your culture or territorv anvmore” (Oliart 2002). What from an
expresses a denial of ontological difference, the state phrases as prog
cultural improvement. “Letting Indians clic1” was not recognized as an
recentlv, when ind^enous movements utilizing the possibilities of reco
the terms of the state namely, rights to cultural difference transform
into a political conflict to be negotiated, and raised claims to a plurinat
to the proposal this essav develops, this plurality does not stop at mul
project for multinaturalism. (On the antagonistic relation between indi
see also Aparicio and Blaser 2008.)
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS: POLITICS THROUGH PARTIAL
CONNECTIONS
Latin American Indians (and indigeneity as a field of life) are not a usual “e
or “adversary” – for although, indeed, radically different they are not the co
others, the total strangers that Schmitt holds enemies to be. Having em
through collaborative friction (Tsing 2005) with practices and institutions
to itself, and, thus, including those practices, indigeneity as a historical fo
is “partially connected” with and participates in Andean nation -state insti
These institutions deny the ontological difference of indigeneity albeit th
practices of inclusion that usually enact a partial connection with the ont
difference that they are set to deny. “Partial connection,” a concept I borro
Marilyn Strathern, refers to a relationship composing an aggregate that is
singular nor plural, neither one nor many, a circuit of connections rather th
parts” (2004:54). Partial connections create no single entity; the entity that
is more than one, yet less than two.
Through the lens of partial connections, indigeneity in the Andes –
would venture in Latin America – can be conceptualized as a complex form
a historic-political articulation of more than one, but less than two, soc
ral worlds. As a historical formation, Andean indigeneity did not disappea
Christianity first, or citizenship (through mestizaje) later; but (as Cholang
in his letter to the Pope) it was not impervious to them either, for doing so would
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
have meant to be impervious to history. Neither indigenous nor mestizo, it is an
indigenous-mestizo aggregate that we are talking about: less than two, not the
sum of its parts (therefore not the “third” result of a mixture) and indeed not
one – let alone a pure one (de la Cadena 2000). Without closure, you can also
call it “mestizo-indigenous” for the order has no teleology. Moreover, its naming
may change, for its shape is fractal: as fragments with no clear edge, “indigenous-
mestizos” are always a part of the other, their separation is impossible. Thus seen,
albeit hard to our logic, indigeneity has always been part of modernity and also
different, therefore never modernist.17 Partially connected indigenous-mestizos
are, like fractals, self- similar even though, depending on how you look at them,
they also appear to be different (Green 2005; Wagner 1991).
Graciano Mandura (Major of Ocongate, bilingual in Quechua and Spanish,
holding a university degree) and Nazario Turpo (pampamisayoq in Ocongate,
monolingual Quechua speaker, and not knowing how to read or write) participate
in indigeneity from two different positions – one more capable through literacy, the
other better able to interact with other-than-human beings – but both connected
to the worlds that their lives make less than two. And it is precisely this partial
connection that has allowed Andean indigeneity a presence on regional and national
political public stages : connected to the historically shaped discourses through which
they appear (class, ethnicity, and the current confrontation with neoliberalism) and
exceeding them at the same time. What is going on, I purport, is not a paradigmatic
shift in the history of indigenous resistance; the excess has always been present.
The extraordinary event is its public visibility; the shift it may provoke would be
epistemic, and thus encompass our analyses.
During the Cold War, Andean indigenous politicians articulated a peasantworker voice to manifest the conflict with the nation-state through the analytics
of class and the demands that it allowed. The few ethnographies of the period
produced by U.S. scholars that worked within the same analytics identified the
excess, but contained it within interpretations of solidarity, rebellion, and strug-
gle.18 Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall – a symbol of the downfall of
socialist states and the decline of Marxist political organizations – indigenous lead-
ers continued their quest as political adversaries through demands for cultural
rights. Voiced through “ethnicity,” political claims of this period marked what
some have identified as “return of the Indian” (Albo 1991) publicly led by activists
of indigenous descent, who rejected the lettered city’s offer to assimilate. Instead
they self-identified publicly as indigenous intellectuals, an oxymoronic label of the
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITICS
bilingual – Quechua and Spanish, for example – and many with an academic de
gree, the broad national public consider these politicians as spokespersons
indigeneity. Notwithstanding their activism, the foundational modernity of politic
has rendered this indigenous presence at least partial, with modern politicians –
Presidents of Ecuador and Peru, for example – engaging in what they understa
and ignoring what they cannot. Phrases like “The rivers, fish, and forest call out f
help, but the government does not know how to listen” speak both of the impos
bility that underpins the relation between Indians and modern political institutio
as well as of the partial connection that makes the same relation possible.19 Fr
quently, to be recognized as legitimate adversaries (cf. Mouffe), indigenous leade
speak in modern terms, translating their practices into a politically acceptab
speech, and leaving “the unacceptable” behind without necessarily abandoning
(Cruikshank 2005; Graham 2002) – a point to which I will return. The politica
presence of indigeneity has had as a precondition its subordination to the letter
city. “Be other so that we do not ossify, but be in such a way that we are not undo
that is make yourself doable to us”: such is according to Povinelli (2001 : 329) wh
liberalism demands from indigeneity.
Yet what “cannot be undone” is modern politics; therefore the political left
extends analogous requirements to indigenous politicians. The indio permitido,
use Silvia Rivera’s words (cf. Hale 2004), is not the only one who thinks t
ideology that the new liberal state permits; leftist politicians also impose condition
to accept Indians (e.g., to articulate their demands with the vocabulary of gende
ethnic, economic, territorial, or environmental struggle). Wielding these concep
“Indians” can get recognition and access to resources; through leftist agendas in
digenous struggles have been fought and won indeed. However, class, ethnicit
race, or culture (the categories that both indigenous politicians and scholars use
respectively, participate and examine indigenous politics) work within the natur
culture divide that the presence of Ausangate, Quilish – or any other earth-bei
for that matter – in a political demonstration epistemically disturbs. Hence t
categories may be insufficient if we want to inspect the disturbance. Containing th
presence of earth-beings in politics as manifestations of “ethnic difference,” we m
step into the contemporary stronghold where the hegemony of the modern den
of indigenous difference is renewed. “Ethnic politics” demanding “cultural right
may open a discussion, and even articulate the need to include the indigenous
politics – but this inclusion has clear limits: earth-beings as actors in the contr
versies are “beliefs” honored only when they do not express an epistemic altern
tive to scientific paradigms (ecological and economic) and their cognate policies,
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
working toward the production of the common good (productive efficiency, eco-
nomic growth, even sustainable development) designed to satisfy a homogenous
humanity benefiting from an also homogenous nature. These are the nonnegotiable limits of the Modern Constitution (cf. Latour) and indeed of the modern
state. Not surprisingly then, these were the limits from where neoliberal Peruvian
President Alan Garcia dismissed “sacred mountains” as an invention – and that pre-
vented leftist pundits in the same country from arguing anything but ideological
discrepancies.
And yet, are these really the limits of the processes that individuals like
Humberto Cholango or Nazario Turpo assert? Would indigenous politicians be
so naive as to make demands only to the limits of “rights” assigned to them by
a Constitution that does not allow their lived difference a chance? I would argue
that this is where the political (as the field where antagonisms transpire) starts:
before culture, and before politics emerge as exclusively human fields. Nature what it is, what it does – is not an “apolitical” entity as we have learned to think.
Rather, its constitution as ontologically distinct is at the heart of the antagonism
that continues to exclude “indigenous beliefs” from conventional politics – with the
idea of “beliefs” working to occlude the exclusion, or setting the internal limits (cf.
Povinelli 1 995) to the ontological construction of politics. What I call “indigenous-
mestizo” is not only an ethnic identity. Partially connected with Andean nationstates, it is a vital socionatural formation that encompasses other- than-humans as
well as their definition as nature and their distinction from humans.20 And, thus,
when indigenous movements summon “culture” this notion has the capacity to
include (what we call) nature also as other-than-human beings that are not allowed
a voice in the established political language. The new Ecuadoran constitution,
composed with robust participation of indigenous politicians, is intriguing in this
respect: it declares that “Nature” or Pachamama (Source of Life) has rights. This
phrase composes a culture- nature entity that, more complex than it seems at first
sight, may belong to more than one and less than two worlds.
As used by indigenous movements “culture” or “nature” do not necessarily
correspond to our meanings of the terms. Instead, emerging in modern politics, they
may be sites of relations of equivocation occurring in the interval between two (or
more) different language situations. Equivocation, according to Eduardo Viveiros
de Castro, is not a simple failure to understand, but “a failure to understand that
understandings are necessarily not the same , and that they are not related to imaginary
ways of ‘seeing the world’ but to the real worlds that are being seen9 (Viveiros de Castro
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
when different perspectivai positions – views from different worlds, rather than
perspectives about the same world – use homonymical terms to refer to things that
are not the same. Equivocations cannot be “corrected,” let alone avoided; they can
however be controlled. This requires paying attention to the process of translatio
itself – the terms and the respective differences – “so that the referential alterit
between the [different] positions is acknowledged and inserted into the conversation
in such a way that rather than different views of a single world (which would be th
equivalent to cultural relativism) a view of different worlds becomes apparent” (Viveiros
de Castro 2004:5, emphases added). An example may be necessary.
At the demonstration against the mining concession in the mountain chain over
which Ausangate presides, banners that read “We will defend our cultural patrimony
with our lives. No to the Mine!!” called my attention. “Cultural patrimony” is
frequently used to refer to Machu Picchu – an icon of international tourism.
Thinking that perhaps such usage had influenced the demonstrators’ decision to us
it, and referring to both sites as tourist attractions and icons of regional cultura
heritage, I asked Nazario: “Is Ausangate the same as Machu Picchu?” His response:
“No, they are different. I know Ausangate much better; I know what he likes, h
knows me too. I sort of know Machu Picchu because I am going there with tourist
now. I am beginning to know him. But I am not sure what he likes, so I do my be
to please him.” Nazario had not failed to understand my question; I had to take int
account the equivocation. We were clearly talking about the same “things” – Mach
Picchu and Ausangate. In my world they were mountains; in Nazario’ s they wer
beings. Participating in our partially connected worlds, each was more than one bu
less than two entities. The “ethnic” and “environmental” issues that were included
in the protest did not complete their significance. The defense of the Sanctuary o
Coyllur Rit’ i (and of Ausangate) convened an event that belonged to more tha
one world: one concerned with pollution and culture, and the other concerned
with Ausangate’ s reaction and, for some, both were inseparable, yet distinct.
Thinking about Andean “mountains” (labeled or not “sacred”) as sites of equiv-
ocation that enable circuits between partially connected worlds without creating
unified system of activism, can build awareness of the also partially connected al
liances between environmentalists and indigenous politicians in Andean countrie
allowing for more than their definition as movements for cultural or environmenta
rights. Equivocations, if controlled, may be analogous to the form of disagreemen
that Jacques Rancière identifies as central to his notion of politics: the under-
standing that the interlocutors both understand and do not understand the sam
thing by the same words (Rancière 1999: xi); yet exceeding political economy
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
this disagreement could potentially bring issues of political ontology to the for
(see Blaser 2009). When awareness of “mountains” (or any other entity whose
meaning we do not doubt) as equivocations does not exist, the partial connection
that underpinned the political event (and even made it possible) disappears, an
the dispute – for example the defense of Ausangate – is interpreted as a “proble
between two cultures,” instead of a controversy nested within more than one an
less than many socionatural worlds. Then the fate of mountains is easily defined by
the one culture, which, claiming universal principles, can extend its reason beyon
the surrounding families, even beyond the region where the mountain lives, an
into the country. This culture, living up to social responsibility, would also prov
solutions to avoid potential local deaths, their definition as “contamination,” o
“accidents,” and their cause as “neglect.” The problem would then be settled fro
one perspective alone, that of universal nature. Every potential danger accounte
for if not controlled, razing mountains to mine them for metals while ignorin
the other socionatural world to which the mountains also belong would not b
political conflict – and one of political ontology at that – but the cultural proble
modernity has “always” shrugged shoulders at with hegemonic complaisance and
a resigned sigh. For a different result, the problem has to be taken to a differe
plane: to the political moment that created the ontological divide between human
and nature, extended the divide to rank other socionatural worlds accordingly
and created politics as a human affair different from nature, which was assign
to scientific representation. Seen from this different historical plane – revealin
the epistemic politics of modern politics – the conflict would potentially chang
rather than a cultural problem between universal progress and local beliefs, the fat
of other-than-human beings – Ausangate for example – would emerge as a polit
cal conflict among worlds, one of them demanding symmetrical disagreement. A
this point, politics would not be only composed of power relations and silence
antagonisms – it would be “made up of relationships between worlds” (Rancièr
1999:42).
“LAND” AND THE “ENVIRONMENT” AS EQUIVOCATIONS
It is a matter of imbuing political voices with the feeling that they do not master
the situation they discuss, that the political arena is peopled with shadows of
that which does not have a political voice, cannot have or does not want to
have one.
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITICS
Participating in more than one and less than two socionatural worlds, in-
digenous politicians are inevitably hybrid, usually shamelessly so. Relations wit
other-than-human beings take place along with activities such as participating
judiciary trials, organizing a workers union, participating in environmental NGO
even working for a capitalist organization. As I have already said, this is not new
the novelty is the visibility of this hybridity leading to potential awareness of o
analytical categories as equivocations. The activities of Mariano Turpo (Nazario
father, and like him monolingual in Quechua) in the 1950s and 1960s against th
local hacienda owner provide a good example; social science scholarship would
describe them as a “local peasant movement to recover communal lands.”21 Ye
there was that – but there was also more.
Physically distant from national centers, Pacchanta – the village where Mar-
iano and Nazario lived – is currently a place barely imagined by most Peruvian
intellectuals. Things were different in the 1960s, when Marxist leftist organizations confronted the then-prevalent hacienda system by successfully organizing
peasant unions. Mariano Turpo was among the most well-known “peasant leaders”
in Cuzco. Through him, Pacchanta became a political epicenter where modern,
urban activists converged to discuss peasant support for their regional and national
political agendas. As a union organizer, Turpo was an ubiquitous activist, indefatigably moving between city and countryside – he organized the celebration of
May 1 , Labor Day in Peru, collected quotas from other peasants whom he called
compañeros (partners in struggle), physically confronted the hacienda men, hiding
from them in caves inside Ausangate and other mountains, attended and even spoke
in demonstrations in the Plaza de Armas del Cuzco – the same place where, 40 years
later, Nazario and I participated in the demonstration to defend Ausangate.
Along with his political activism Mariano continued his practices as a pampamisayoq, interacting with the earth-beings that surrounded Pacchanta. Moreover,
both pursuits were not separable. They unfolded through relations that ignored
the distinction between natural and social worlds for he conceived of power as
forces connected to the surrounding socionatural landscape, transpiring both from
earth-beings – willful mountains, lakes, winds – and from social institutions and in-
dividuals: state representatives, peasants, local merchants, and politicians. Mariano
wanted “to recover land” for his ajllu. But this phrase exceeded the terms of his
alliance with leftist activists. Ayllu is a Quechua word that elicits the relations of
humans and other-than-human beings that interact in a given territory marking it
as a specific place.22 Justo Oxa, an elementary school teacher whose birth language
is
Quechua
and
self-
identifies
as
indigenous
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writes:
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
The community, the ayllu, is not only a territory where a group of people
live; it is more than that. It is a dynamic space where the whole community
of beings that exist in the world lives; this includes humans, plants, animals,
the mountains, the rivers, the rain, etc. All are related like a family. It is
important to remember that this place [the community] is not where we are
from, it is who we are. For example, I am not from Huantura, I am Huantura.
[Oxa 2004:239, emphasis added]
The land that the hacienda had taken over was the ayllu (not of the ayllu) “since
the time of the Incas” (as Mariano and others would explain) and this impinged
on all the beings that composed the place. “The sheep were dying, we did not
have pastures, we could not raise them – potatoes would not grow in the soil we
had been left with. Both, the soil and the seeds were sad. Our children were sad.
Nobody could eat – we were living a dying life. Ausangate ignored us because
we did not care about him or our life – to be able care again, to be able to raise
the animals, our children, and each other and also respect Ausangate, we had to
be brave and confront the hacendado,” Mariano remembered. In the shadow of
the “peasant movement to recover lands” and sustaining it, was the entanglement of
relationships among humans and heterogeneous other-than-humans that made life
possible in the territory that the hacienda also occupied, in ways that negated those
practices. In Quechua, those practices are known as uyway, a word that dictionaries,
translate into Spanish as “criar hijos, hacer crecer las plantas y los animals” [to raise
children, to make plants and animals grow] (Itier n.d.). Embedded in everyday
practices, uyway refers to mutual relations of care among humans and also with
other- than-human beings. Once again Justo Oxa writes,
respect and care are a fundamental part of life in the Andes; they are not a
concept or an explanation. To care and be respectful means to want to be
nurtured and nurture other, and this implies not only humans but all world
beings . . . nurturing or uyway colors all of Andean life. Pachamama nurtures
us, the Apus nurture us, they care for us. We nurture our kids and they will
nurture us when we get old. We nurture the seeds, the animals and plants,
and they also nurture us. [Oxa 2004:239]
The possibility of recovering caring practices among humans and other-than-
human beings also motivated Mariano* s fight against the hacienda. “By feeding
the mountain spirit, peasant producers also ensure that the mountain spirit will
feed them,” wrote Michael Taussig after reading many ethnographic works about
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
politicians, to consider these ideas seriously was unthinkable. Ethnographic w
were precisely where these practices belonged – not in politics. Mariano
aware of the feelings of his leftist partners, but he colabored political practices
them and this made the combined classist- indigenous endeavor “to recover la
success. But “land” was an equivocation. It was the homonymical term that allo
two partially connected worlds to fight jointly for the same territory. The
became publicly known as the end of the hacienda system and the beginning o
Agrarian Reform. That Mariano’s world had recovered the ayllu – in its relat
significance – remained unknown, in the shadows from where such world
made the historical event possible.
Under his father’s guidance, Nazario also became a pampamisayoq. In th
role he was (among other things) a supporter of the grassroots efforts to pr
the surrounding earth-beings against the prospective mine. I am not saying
Nazario acted as a guardian of untouched traditions. Although we never tal
about it, I do not think he was against the market economy either: he wor
for a successful tourist agency with whose aid he was translating his practices
“Andean Shamanism” a bourgeoning new field for tourists’ consumption and a
source of income for peasants and herders like him. If anything, Nazario was
his father, an innovator: a local cosmopolitan articulating other worlds, and
practices, into their own, and finding terms of alliance that could enhance t
lives. It was not mining itself that he and the rest of people I talked to oppo
Mining, as an economic activity, has been part of Andean peasants’ lives ever
the Conquest and those from the area that surrounds Ausangate are familiar
gold panning in Madre de Dios, a lowland region of infamous working condit
However, there is an important difference between earlier mining technol
and the ones used by corporations currently prospecting the region that Ausa
presides. The first followed the mineral veins by blowing solid rock with dyn
and perforating tunnels inside the mountains. At present, corporations are kn
for their open-sky mining technologies, which literally destroy mountains
very short time – sometimes less than a year. These differences are consequen
while digging tunnels allows for the continuation of relations with earth-beings
open-sky mining destroys earth-beings themselves.23 Nazario was concerned
the type of relations that could unfold between Ausangate (the earth-being) and
mine. As lived from his world corporate mining ventures do not just encroac
peasant land and pollute the environment; they also destroy a socionatural w
In Mariano and Nazario Turpo’s world political skills include the relation
between human beings and other-than-human beings that together make place:
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
mountains, rivers, crops, seeds, sheep, alpacas, llamas, pastures, plots, rocks –
even dogs and hens.24 And as the new liberal state (unable to see these relations
dismisses this place, abstracts it, and legally reterritorializes it (e.g., by declari
it “empty” or “unproductive” space) to make room for mining and the economi
benefits it would potentially generate, people like Nazario and Graciano concern
about the destruction of their place, bring their concern to politics. Obviousl
uyway – mutual relations of care among human and other-than-human being
are not the only type of relations mobilized into politics. Along with his worri
about Ausangate’s ire, Graciano Mandura mentioned pollution as a problem, an
the potential harm to tourism that mining could therefore cause in the area.
Nazario shared this concern, for tourism was a key source of his monetary incom
Caring about earth-beings and place is, of course, not at odds with a desire fo
economic well-being. Moreover, among peasants there are those who side with
the mine – perhaps even pampamisayoq do (although I have not run into o
yet). There is no simple glue for any movement, and not even mighty moun-
tains provide it. But analogous to how “land” as equivocation enabled the allian
between leftist politicians and indigenous peasants while at the same time occlu
ing relations of care between mountains- animals- crops- humans, when it com
to the antimining struggle in the region of Ausangate (and elsewhere) there i
more than the defense of nature in the environmental movement. Also an equi
ocation, the “environment” encompasses earth-beings; however, different than
the confrontation with the hacienda when earth-beings where only a local mat
ter of concern, they currently appear in national and even international politic
stages.
The incursion of capitalist mining ventures into geographical areas that cor-
porations or the state deemed remote, unproductive, or even empty has made
earth-beings more public than ever in the last half century – a consequence that
neoliberalism did not foresee. In her doctoral dissertation, Fabiana Li (2009) analyzed the process through which a mountain in the northern Peruvian Andes,
the Cerro Quilish, became the protagonist in a controversy that pitted peasants
and the environmentalist NGO that backed them against the transnational mining
company that owned Yanacocha, the largest gold mine in Latin America and among
the biggest in the world. A main issue in the controversy was the ontology of
Cerro Quilish. For the mining company the mountain was mainly a repository of
gold – four million ounces of it; for the environmentalists and many farmers that
opposed the mine, Quilish represented a source of water for local agriculture. A
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
relationship with the mountain as an earth-being, translated it as a “sacred moun
tain.” Many among the mine’s opponents took distance from such a definition, an
emphasized the importance of the mountain as an aquifer; however the “sacred
aspect of Quilish, joined its already appealing natural qualities. Transformed into
robust nature- cultural entity, the Quilish called the attention of environmentalists
in the United States and Europe and fortified the already strong national opposition
to the Yanacocha mining company.
A completely coeval phenomenon – and by no means a revivalist or millenar-
ian resurgence – the appearance of earth-beings in politics directly confronts tech
nologies that threaten to destroy places that until the current technological surg
and after the 1 9th-century mining expansion had remained relatively marginal t
capital. Confronting corporate capital, the neoliberal state, and their entwined
world-making consequences, the public presence of earth-beings in politics are
part-and-parcel of the global processes that have provoked scholarly discussion
about “emergent forms of life” (Fischer 2003) and “global assemblages” (Ong and
Collier 2005). Digging a mountain to open a mine, drilling into the subsoil to
find oil, and razing trees for timber may produce more than sheer environment
damage or economic growth. These activities may translate into the violation o
networks of emplacement that make life locally possible – and even into the de-
struction of place. In such cases they have met a capacious and at times surprisingly
successful opposition that has opened a dispute (still unthinkable to modern mind
between local earth-beings and universal “Nature,” and has sometimes enrolled
environmentalists in the negotiation. Thus, current political conflicts are out of the
ordinary. In some cases, the label “war” (initially used to refer to the confrontation
around water and gas in Bolivia in 2000) is perhaps appropriate to designate som
of the recent confrontations.
May 2008. Sucre, Bolivia. A large group of indigenous citizens, who had arrived
in a long march from the countryside to meet Evo Morales, the Aymara President of the
country, and to celebrate a national anniversary, were attacked by a group of urban residents
who, impervious to the many cameras that documented the event, insulted the indigenous
marchers as animals, stripped them oí their clothing and emblems, and, once naked, forced
them to declare their allegiance to the nonindigenous nation-state imagined by these urbanités
(El Correo del Sur (Sucre], May 2 5, 2008). The violence of the episode was Frightening
physically and conceptually. It suggested a moment when, refusing to accept the end of the
racist biopolitics that had ruled the country until recently, the regional dominant classes
decided to overtly kill Indians, viewed as usurpers of the power the elites had wielded for
centuries. But as I have suggested earlier, it was not only intolerance toward humans and
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
their bodies that motivated these actions. Months earlier, the follo
in a loeal newspaper:
I he i*overnment of MAS, all of it, its ministers, representative
to the constitional assembly, talk like mummies … its wise m
burn coca, and they burn sacred fire in the central room of th
Then, when all is silence, and only the sound of the pututo (
they make their rituals to their gods, for I :vo Morales to becom
Kempff Suárez, “writer and diplomat” signed as author, La Ra/
2007)
Conceptually, the event expressed more than racism; there are many relevant political
reasons for the violence that looms obvious in Bolivia, but central among those is that
indigenous worlds are making a claim from the very heart of the state, and thus revealing
the biopolitieal antagonism that ruled Bolivia until 2006, and, what is worse, possibly
transforming it into adversarial relations. The silenced war can become politics and this
cannot be tolerated “rather explicit war than politics” is the apparent response of a not-sosmall elite group.
AN OPEN-ENDED FINALE: PLURAL POLITICS IN A POLITICAL
PLURIVERSE
The point is not that scientists have to accept whatever those empower
people tell them, the point is that learning from them is their chance to
their preconceived ideas at risk.
– Isabelle Stengers, 2002
I do not want to be misunderstood. Being an “engaged intellectual” – un
intelectual comprometida – was the way I lived in Peru and it continues to m
my scholarly work. In fact, my networks tangled with those of Mariano T
because of his role in modern politics – an unknown activist in the movement
produced one of the most important changes in contemporary Peru. Hence
discussion here is not intended to subtract from engaged activism but to add
it. Similarly, I hope not to be interpreted as an advocate of “indigenous peop
singular or pristine condition. What I have tried to do here is follow Isabe
Stengers* s proposal to “slow down reasoning,” to let the composition ofthat w
does not have a political voice (or, in some cases, does not want to have
affect my analysis and, as she suggests in the above quote, put my preconce
ideas at risk to make anthropology say something different – or open it up b
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOLITES
Nazario, I learned of the coloniali ty of politics and the many and complex fea
from which it derives its hegemony. An obvious one is the lettered quality
politics, shaped by the role of the city and its intellectual legacy. All too natu
the better educated rank higher in the scale of politics; the exceptions – th
who do not have a university degree, like Bolivian President Evo Morales –
regarded as anomalies and the object of scandals. In the best of cases, we tend
think that the scandal (and the “deficiency” it connotes) may be easy to overc
perhaps through alliances with the better educated. Again Bolivia comes to m
and we think of Alvaro García Linera, the current Vice President of that coun
and a sociologist, as the gray matter behind the President, the organic intelle
working in horizontal collaboration with intellectuals of all paths of life, disregar
“rank.” An illustration of contemporary Gramscian practice, we may even
proud of it.
The problem, however, emerges when such collaboration forgets that politics
(as a category and a practice) was historically disabled to work in symmetry with
the radical difference that modernity itself produced among the many worlds that
inhabit the planet. Politics emerged (with science) to make a livable universe, to
control conflict among a single if culturally diversified humanity living in a single
scientifically knowable nature. The consequence is not just that politics is lettered;
the problem is that it can only allow humans in its quarters – period. Analogous
to dominant science, which does not allow its objects to speak, hegemonic politics
tells its subjects what they can bring into politics and what be should be left to
scientists, magicians, priests, or healers – or, as I have been arguing, left to dwell
in the shadows of politics.25 Because mountains cannot be brought to politics
(other than through science), Nazario’ s partnership with Ausangate is all but
folklore, beliefs that belong to another “culture,” that can be happily commodified
as tourist attraction, but in no case can it be considered in politics. This exclusion
is not just racism; it expresses the consensual agreement foundational to politics.
The exclusions that result from it are disabled from their translation as political
disagreement because they do not count – at all. Implemented with the aid of
History, interrupting this agreement to make the exclusions count as such seems an
impossible anachronistic task (Chakrabarty 2000). After all modern politics offers
inclusion … in its own terms.
Refusing this inclusion, not wanting to have the voice that politics offers them
while at the same time intervening in politics, is what local leaders like Mariano
have frequently and invisibly done for some time. Currently, however, earth-beings
are becoming more visible in politics, and many times in their own terms. If we
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
slow down, suspend our assumptions and the ideas that they would lead to, we
may perceive how this emergence alters the terms of the political; it disrupts the
consensus that barred indigenous practices from politics, assigned them to religion
or ritual, and occluded this exclusion. We may use this historical opportunity to
put our preconceived ideas at risk and renew our analytical toolkit, vocabulary,
and framework alike.
Yet this opportunity exists only if we are willing to give up two old answers (and
fears), which mirror each other: (1) indigenous politics are traditional and archaic
and therefore dangerous as they can evolve into antidemocratic fundamentalism (the
specter of “Balkanization” – and as of recent “Bolivianization” – haunting gentlemen
and ladies steeped in liberalism), or from the other end of the spectrum, (2)
indigenous politics are essentially good, and we have to side with it (the ghost of
the good savage troubling the naively principled).
I have proposed that the current emergence of Andean indigeneity could force
the ontological pluralization of politics and the reconfiguration of the political.
There are several things, however, that this phrase does not mean.26 First, it
does not refer to ideological, gender, ethnic, racial, or even religious plurality;
nor does it refer to the incorporation or inclusion of marked differences into a
multiculturally “better” sociality. Second, it is not a strategy to win hegemony or
to be a dominant majority – let alone an indigenous majority. My proposal to think
through the pluralization of politics is not intended to mend flaws within already
existing politics – or “politics as usual.” Rather, it aims at transforming the concept
from one that conceives politics as power disputes within a singular world, to
another one that includes the possibility of adversarial relations among worlds: a
pluriversal politics.
Toward that end, I build both on Carl Schmitt’ s notion of the political as
a pluriverse and Jacques Rancière ‘s concept of politics as disagreements among
worlds. Borrowing from Viveiros de Castro (2004) and Strathern (2004), I think of
the pluriverse as partially connected heterogeneous socionatural worlds negotiating
their ontological disagreements politically – that would entail major conflict, the
political importance of the discussion would be superlative, but it would replace
the current unacknowledged war, and its occasional public eruptions. The idea
of a pluriverse is Utopian indeed: not because other socionatural formations and
their earth-practices do not take place, but because we have learned to ignore their
occurrence, considering it a thing of the past or, what is the same, a matter of
ignorance and superstition. Thus, rather than Utopian, my proposal is, in Stengers’ s
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOUTICS
to slow down reasoning and provoke the kind of thinking that would enable us
undo, or more accurately, unlearn, the single ontology of politics.
This would require two steps in the reconceptualization of (what Mouffe ca
the political before pluriversal politics could start. The first step is to recognize t
the world is more than one socionatural formation; the second is to interconn
such plurality without making the diverse worlds commensurable. The Utop
process is, thus, the redefinition of the baseline of the political, from one wh
politics started with a hegemonic definition that housed the superiority of
socionatural formation of the West and its practices, to one that starts with
symmetric understanding of plural worlds, their socionatural formations and t
practices. From the prior baseline (or, rather, the one we are used to) politic
appeared as an affair among humans after denying the ontological copresence
other socionatural formations and its practices and translating the denial, w
the use of universal history, from an antagonistic maneuver – a declaration
war against worlds deemed inferior – into a necessary condition for one goo
livable world order. The new baseline is precisely the breaking of the silenc
making the antagonism public to enable its transformation into agonism. At t
point, rather than the biopolitical war that both liberalism and socialism wa
against its alleged “others,” a new pluriversal political configuration – perha
a cosmopoli tics, in Stengers’ s terms – would connect different worlds with i
socionatural formations – all with the possibility of becoming legitimate adversar
not only within nation-states but also across the world.
At a more concrete level a pluriversal politics (or a cosmopolitics) would
accept what we call nature as multiplicity and allow for the conflicting views a
that multiplicity into argumentative forums. This is, I think, what Ecuadorian lea
Humberto Cholango proposed in his letter to the Pope: He first denounced t
antagonism between modernist institutions and indigenous relations with oth
than-human beings, and then translated this antagonism into a political confl
with the capacity to interpellate indigenous and nonindigenous actors. In the m
specific case of the mine that threatened Ausangate, a pluriversal political ord
competently fluent in multiplicity, would take seriously (by which I mean literal
rather than metaphorically) both Nazario Turpo’s relationship with Ausangate
willful entity as well as its definition as nature and a potential repository of g
The different worlds in which Ausangate exists would be publicly allowed with
being put into equivalence of any sort, and then, politics – bitter discrepanc
among different, perhaps irreconcilable ideological, economic, cultural, or inter
of any other sort – would start. Some would side with Nazario, others would
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
oppose him. Rather than dismissed as superstition, or “respected” as culture, with
pluri versal politics the question of Ausangate as a being would count. Included
in the disagreement, it could then contend (or perhaps agree) with, for example,
proposals for economic growth and development, or with issues of social justice
and equality. Set free from its exclusive representation as “Nature,” the mountain’s
multiple and heterogeneous ontologies (incl. its possibility as a repository of mineral
wealth) would weigh in also heterogeneous political projects without necessarily
tilting them to the left or right.
Pluriversal politics add a dimension of conflict and they do not have
guarantees – ideological or ethnic (cf. Hall 1996). People – indigenous or not,
and perhaps ethnically unlabeled – could side with the mine, choosing jobs and
money over Ausangate, either because they doubt or even publicly deny its being
a willful mountain or because they are willing to risk its ire for a different living.
Ausangate ‘s willfulness could be defeated in the political process – some would
embrace it, others would not – but its being other than a mountain would not
be silently denied anymore for a pluriversal politics would be able to recognize
the conflict as emerging among partially connected worlds. And although I would
not be able to translate myself into Nazario’s ontology, nor know with him that
Ausangate’ s ire is dangerous, I would side with him because I want what he wants,
to be considered on a par with the rest, to denounce the abandonment the state has
relegated people like him – while at the same time threatening with assimilation to denounce the mining ventures that do not care about local life; in a nutshell to
defend in his way, in my way and in the way that may emerge as ours the place
where Nazario lives.
A last-minute postscript. On June 5, 2009, at dawn, a violent confrontation took
place between police forces and a lar^e group of Peruvian citizens, self-identified as belonging
to the Awajun-1 luambisa indigenous group. The police’s objective was to break up a blockade
at a major highway, near the town of Bajnia in the Amazonian lowlands, northern Peru.
The Awajun-Huambisa had taken control of the highway as part of a general strike, which
started on April 9, organized by several Amazonian indigenous groups. The dash yielded
manv deaths the official count yielded 2 } policemen and 10 Awajun-I luambisa individuals.
Accordino; to the local count the number of deaths amounts to hundreds, most of them
indigenous.
The conflict be^an a year earlier. Between May and June 2008, Alan Garcia issued
101 law decrees intended to ease the concession of Amazonian territories to oil, timber,
and hydroelectric corporations. A successful indigenous strike in August 2008 forced the
National Congress to ask the Peruvian President to cancel the decrees. He ignored the
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INDIGENOUS COSMOPOUTICS
(Irrisión the* indigenous protest began anew the following year. 1 h
reached international audiences as indigenous politicians accused the* Pr
HO Convention 169, which requires states to consult indigenous peo
occurring on the lands they inhabit. The consultation had not taken
government had breached an agreement boasting constitutional status,
be annulled. If consulted, this political group, which the president had
would refuse* the decrec’s. Ye*t the* ivasons are not ideological only:
We speak of Our brothers who quench our thirst, who bathe us,
our needs this [brother] is what we* call the rivc*r. We do not use
sewage; a brother cannot stab another brother. We do not stab ou
transnational corporations would care about our soil like we have
millennia, we would gladiv give them room so that thev could work
care is their economic benefit, to fill their coffers with wealth. We*
whv the* government wants to ra/e our lives with those* decrees. [Los
http: / /w ww.stM-vindi.org/producc -iones/videos/ 1 ÌOHÌ, accessed
Leni, a young Awajun leader his face painted in red and black, a
his head spoke the* above words in the midst of the* strike. His wo
and humans are* brothers is indeed completely coeval with that of corp
latte’i* kill rivers; to prevent this killing, indigenous politicians mobili
islative decrees (those that wanted to raze indigenous life according t
the antagonism into an open political conflict; “if the government c
today, we leave the area,” said another interviewee* about the durat
(http: / /www .serv indi. org/producciones/v ideos/ 1308 3, accessed Ju
government rejected the political conllict, and instead, sent the pol
the movement. The result was the June 5 bloody confrontation betwee
forces, the news of which quickly traveled the1 world. On June 19, the
the decrees, but indigenous leaders had to go into hiding it seems t
antagonism is not silent anymore. Whether the indigenous leadership w
ing the defense* of their world and its beings into a political issue, an
relationship with the hegemonic world, is uncertain. A fundamentally tr
it would defy universal politics indeed.
ABSTRACT
In Latin America indigenous politics has been branded as “ethnic politics.” Its ac
is interpreted as a quest to make cultural rights prevail. Yet, what if “cult
insufficient, even an inadequate notion, to think the challenge that indigenous
represents? Drawing inspiration from recent political events in Peru – and to a
extent in Ecuador and Bolivia – where the indigenous- popular movement has co
sentient entities (mountains, water, and soil – what we call “nature”) into the
political arena, the argument in this essay is threefold. First, indigeneity, as a historical
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 25:2
formation, exceeds the notion of politics as usual, that is, an arena populated by
rational human beings disputing the power to represent others vis-à-vis the state. Second
indigeneity ‘s current political emergence – in oppositional antimining movements in
Peru and Ecuador, but also in celebratory events in Bolivia – challenges the separation
of nature and culture that underpins the prevalent notion of politics and its accordin
social contract. Third, beyond “ethnic politics” current indigenous movements, propo
a different political practice, plural not because of its enactment by bodies marked b
gender, race, ethnicity or sexuality (as multiculturalism would have it), but because
they conjure nonhumans as actors in the political arena.
Keywords: nature- culture, indigenous politics, antimining movements, cos
mopolitics, pluriverse, Andes, Latin America.
NOTES
Acknowledgments. Although I am signing as this essay’s author, the ideas that I use have b
colabored with several friends. Mario Blaser, Arturo Escobar, Penny Harvey, Nazario Turpo
Margaret Wiener are my silent coauthors. Fabiana Li shared with me her dissertation when it wa
in progress; I draw from it from most of what I know about Cerro Quilish. Conversations with
Puig della Bellacasa confirmed the value of Isabelle Stengers ‘s work beyond science studies.
Starn has been a constant critical presence even if he does not know it. Finally, many have rea
essay. I owe special thanks to Claudia Briones, Paulo Drinot, Joe Dumit, Cristiana Giordano,
Goslinga, Kregg Hetherington, Suad Joseph, Caren Kaplan, Alan Klima, Kristina Lyons, Ro
Motta, Hortensia Muñoz, Bettina Ng’weno, Deborah Poole, Dana Powell, Magali Rabasa,
Revesz, Justin Richland, Steve Rubenstein, Guillermo Salas, Mike Savage, Suzana Sawyer, Isa
Stengers, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. Earlier versions were presented at the Universit
Manchester; Duke University; University of California, Davis, Cultural Studies Program; Univer
of California, Irvine; and the University of Oregon at Eugene. And to Kim Fortun and Mike Fo
your integral care has been essential to this essay.
1. Posición de la confederación de pueblos de la nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador fren
las declaraciones emitidas por Benedicto XVI en la V conferencia de obispos de Am
latina y el Caribe (Ceiam), en mayo del 2007 en Brasil. Electronic document, http: //w
altercom.org/articlel48222.html, accessed March 1, 2010 (English translation taken fr
http: //www. tlaxcala.es/pp. asp ?reference=28O5&lg=en).
2. bee http://www.eluniverso.com/2UU8/U//24/1212/121//h8(JU64BUS2fch42UCJAh
655555BF60C.html, accessed March 1, 2010.
3. I thank Eduardo Gudynas for referring me to this document.
4. I have borrowed the idea from Michael Fischer’s notion of “emergent forms of life,” w
he uses to discuss new work in the biological sciences and empirical, theoretical, ethical, a
political realistic resulting from them. My borrowing of the notion makes explicit emphas
the historical copresence, and even global intertwinement between current scientific prac
and indigenous habitations of the world.
5 . These are small bundles of f…